

**HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESEARCH**
at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg


CONFLICT BAROMETER 2010

**Crises - Wars - Coups d'État
Negotiations - Mediations - Peace Settlements**

19th ANNUAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS



High-Intensity Violent Conflicts in 2010



4 Severe crisis

5 War

The countries affected by more than one conflict are marked according to the highest intensity.

Name - conflict item(s)

Europe - severe crises

- 1 Russia (Islamist militants/Dagestan) - secession, system/ideo.
- 2 Russia (Islamist militants/Ingushetia) - secession, system/ideology

Sub-Saharan Africa - severe crises

- 3 DR Congo (Eryele) - regional predominance
- 4 Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden) - secession, resources
- 5 Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists) - regional predominance, resources
- 6 Uganda (LRA) - regional predominance

Sub-Saharan Africa - wars

- 7 Somalia (Islamist groups) - system/ideology, national power
- 8 Sudan (Darfur) - regional predominance, resources

The Americas - severe crises

- 9 Colombia (FARC) - system/ideology, regional predominance, resources

The Americas - wars

- 10 Mexico (drug cartels) - regional predominance, resources

Asia and Oceania - severe crises

- 11 India (Jem et al./Kashmir) - secession
- 12 India (Naxalites) - system/ideology
- 13 Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz - Uzbeks) - regional predominance, resources
- 14 Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State) - secession
- 15 Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch) - regional predominance
- 16 Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes) - system/ideology, regional predominance

- 17 Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups) - system/ideology, regional predominance

- 18 Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces) - secession, system/ideology

Asia and Oceania - wars

- 19 Pakistan (various Islamist militants) - system/ideology, national power

The Middle East and Maghreb - severe crises

- 20 Algeria (AQIM) - system/ideology, national power
- 21 Iraq (AQI, ISI) - system/ideology, national power
- 22 Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine) - secession, system/ideology
- 23 Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels) - regional predominance
- 24 Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas) - autonomy
- 25 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels) - system/ideology, regional predominance
- 26 Yemen (AQAP) - system/ideology, national power

The Middle East and Maghreb - wars


- 27 Afghanistan (Taliban et al.) - system/ideology, national power
- 28 Iraq (militant groups) - system/ideology, national power

Global Conflict Panorama

Global Development

In 2010, a total of 363 conflicts were observed. Among these were six wars and 22 severe crises, amounting to 28 highly-violent conflicts, i.e. conflicts fought out with the use of massive violence. Sporadic violence occurred in 126 conflicts, which were therefore classified as crises. The remaining 209 conflicts were conducted without the use of violent force, with 109 conflicts being classified as latent and 100 as manifest conflicts. Compared to the previous year, the total number of conflicts decreased slightly from 368 to 363. While the number of crises rose from 110 to 126, the number of highly-violent conflicts sunk considerably from 25 severe crises and eight wars, i.e. 33 highly violent conflicts, in 2009, to 22 severe crises and six wars, i.e. 28 highly-violent conflicts, in 2010.

Global Conflict Intensities in 2010 compared to 2009



Four of the six wars had already been fought out on this level of intensity in the previous years: Afghanistan (Taliban) and Somalia (Islamist groups), Iraq (militant groups), and Pakistan (various Islamist militants). The remaining two wars, Mexico (drug cartels) and Sudan (Darfur), had been classified as severe crises in 2009. Sudan (Darfur) had already been fought out as a war from 2004 to 2008. Therefore, all six wars indicated a hardening and self-perpetuation of massive violence. Four of last year's eight wars were not conducted on this level of intensity again: Violence ceased in the conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government in Sri Lanka, whereas the conflicts between Hamas and the Israeli government, between al-Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government, and between Taliban and tribal militias in Pakistan, respectively, deescalated slightly to severe crises. The number of severe crises dropped from 25 to 22, as two of last year's severe crises escalated to wars (see above) in 2010, while ten deescalated to crises, i.e. violence abated, but did not cease. The remaining 13 severe crises of 2009 remained on the same level of intensity. Of the remaining nine of this year's severe crises, three - already mentioned above - had been wars in 2009, while five had escalated from crises to severe crises, and one had turned from a manifest conflict to a severe crises [→

Kyrgyzstan (Uzbeks - Kyrgyz)]. The total number of conflicts decreased by five, as four new conflicts emerged in 2010, while nine conflicts had ended in 2009. In addition, two conflicts were considered to have ended in 2010 so far. Two of the new conflicts arose in Asia and Oceania, one of which turned violent in the very year of its beginning [→ Indonesia (Lintas Tanzim)]. One new conflict emerged in the Americas, where also the two conflicts considered to have ended in 2010 were located. Both of them were inter-state disputes, between Uruguay and Argentina as well as Paraguay and Bolivia, respectively. The territorial dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia concerning the northern part of the Gran Chaco region had officially been settled in 2009. However, Bolivia's purchase of military equipment led to renewed tensions. After Bolivia had emphasized its intention to strengthen border control and fight drug trafficking, in March 2010, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, agreed to revitalize a strategic alliance. On August 15, the three presidents signed an agreement on regional integration. In Asia and Oceania, six conflicts had already ended in 2009, as the LTTE's military defeat had put an end to its disputes with various Sri Lankan militant groups. Another dispute had ended in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009, as the northern Somali region of Maakhir ceased to consider itself an own state independent from the autonomous region of Puntland. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the 2009 elections in Mauretania finally legalized the government that had taken power in a coup in 2008. In Europe, the territorial dispute between Romania and the Ukraine was settled by an ICJ ruling in 2009.


In order to reveal a long-term trend, the five intensity levels were categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels are summarized as low intensity conflicts and severe crises together with wars as conflicts of

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high intensity, while crises for this purpose are labelled medium intensity conflicts. The below graph also displays the total number of conflicts observed. As the graph shows, the number of conflicts observed per year rose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 363 in 2010. However, this increase must partly be considered as a statistical artifact, as the scope and quality of available information on current conflicts augmented considerably in recent years. Most of the observed conflicts were conflicts of low-intensity. With regard to high-intensity conflicts, their number increased continuously and - for the most part - regularly until 1992, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high-intensity conflicts, shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, their number dropped sharply, but then rose again until it reached 45 in 2003. The last seven years were marked by an oscillation of highly-violent conflicts between 31 and 41, i.e. on a medium level, as well as by a sharp increase in the number of crises. While highly-violent conflicts dropped to 28 in 2010, the number of crises reached an all-time high with 126.


Global Conflicts of low, medium and high Intensity
1945 to 2010



Analysis intrastate - interstate

As in the past years, intrastate conflicts accounted for a clear majority of the conflicts monitored, with 269 in contrast to 94 interstate cases. Only six of the 126 crises, i.e. sporadically violent conflicts, occurred between two states. Most remarkably, all except for one were located in Asia and Oceania, the remaining one in Europe. Four of those interstate conflicts had already been classified as crises in 2009: Armenia vs. Azerbaijan, North Korea vs. South Korea, Pakistan vs. India, and Thailand vs. Cambodia. The conflict between the USA and Pakistan had already been classified as a crisis in 2008, but had deescalated to a manifest conflict in 2009. In 2010, the conflict turned violent again when a US-led NATO helicopter strike in Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) killed Pakistani Frontier Corps soldiers and wounded another three on September 29. The following day, Pakistan stopped all NATO supply trucks passing through Khyber Agency on their way to Afghanistan.


Number of Intra- and Interstate Conflicts in 2010 by Intensity Level



The sixth interstate crisis erupted between Thailand and Myanmar. None of the 28 highly-violent conflicts were fought out between states.

The long-term analysis, for which both high-intensity categories, i.e. severe crisis and war, were summarized in one group, clearly showed that the intrastate predominance among the highly violent conflicts was observable from the very beginning of the examination period.

Intra- and Interstate Conflicts of high Intensity 1945 to 2010




Regional Development

With 114, roughly one third of all conflicts were located in Asia and Oceania, the highest number among the five regions. Sub-Saharan Africa ranked second with 85, followed by Europe with 64, the Middle East and Maghreb with 55, and the Americas with 45. Regarding highly violent conflicts, Asia and Oceania as well as the Middle East and Maghreb accounted for nine high-intensity conflicts each. However, while two among those nine were wars in the Middle East and Maghreb, Asia and Oceania witnessed one war in 2009. In sub-Saharan Africa, six highly violent conflicts, among them two wars, were observed in 2010. Europe and the Americas accounted for two high-intensity conflicts each. While the two of which in Europe were severe crises, the Americas saw their first war since 2003 [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. Compared to 2009, the number of highly violent con-

flicts remained the same in Europe, Asia and Oceania as well as the Middle East and Maghreb, and decreased in the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter region saw the most distinct decrease, as the number of high-intensity conflicts dropped from ten in 2009 to six in 2010. Yet, only one of these ten had been a war in 2009, while two wars were counted in the region in 2010. In the Americas, high-intensity conflicts decreased by one, leaving two highly violent conflicts in 2010. However, one of them was the above mentioned war in Mexico, thereby constituting an increase of the number of wars. In Asia and Oceania, there were nine highly violent conflicts both in 2009 and 2010; the number of wars among them decreased from three to one. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the overall number of highly violent conflicts remained the same, with nine cases both in 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, the number of wars among these cases sunk from four to two. In Europe, highly violent conflicts amounted to two both in 2009 and 2010, all of them being severe crises.

Distribution of all Conflicts in 2010 by Region and Intensity Type



If the number of high-intensity conflicts was related to the number of states in the respective region, the Middle East and Maghreb with 0.43 highly violent conflicts per state ranked clearly before Asia and Oceania with 0.21 and Sub-Saharan Africa with 0.13. From this relative point of view, it is obvious that the Middle East and Maghreb was the region worst affected by severe violence in 2010 - as had been the case in previous years.

Dynamics within individual conflicts

As in the past years, approx. two thirds of all conflicts, i.e. 257 out of 363, remained on the same level of intensity from 2009 to 2010. While a total of 54 conflicts deescalated by at least one level of intensity, 48 conflicts escalated. Among the escalating cases, 31 crossed the threshold to violence: Most of them, i.e. 26 cases, escalated by one level from manifest conflicts to crises, including the interstate conflict between the USA and Pakistan [→ USA - Pakistan]. The remaining five conflicts escalated by two levels. Four escalated from latent conflicts to crises, among them the confrontations between the Islamic opposition and the government in Tadjikistan [→ Tadjikistan (opposition)] and the territorial conflict be-

tween Thailand and Myanmar mentioned above. One escalated from a manifest conflict to a severe crisis: In Kyrgyzstan, tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks resulted in clashes and ethnic cleansing, leaving an estimated 400 to 2,000 people, most of them ethnic Uzbeks, dead [→ Kyrgyzstan (Uzbeks - Kyrgyz)].


Change of intensity	Number
Escalation by four levels	0
Escalation by three levels	0
Escalation by two levels	5
Escalation by one level	43
No change	257
Deescalation by one level	51
Deescalation by two levels	2
Deescalation by three levels	1
Deescalation by four levels	0

In contrast to the escalating cases, 54 conflicts deescalated. Thereby, 23 cases went from a violent to a non-violent level. Two of them deescalated by two levels, each from a crisis to a latent conflict, and one by three: Last year's war in Sri Lanka deescalated to a manifest conflict, as 2009 had seen the military defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka [→ Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)].

Conflict Items

As in previous years, the most frequent conflict item was system/ideology with 117 cases. This item signifies that the respective conflicts were conducted in order to change the political or economic system, e.g. striving for democracy in an authoritarian state, seeking theocracy as opposed to a secular state, or aiming for a socialist economic order, or concerned other ideological or religious differences. As in the years before, resources ranked second with 80 cases, closely followed by national power with 75 cases. As conflicts very often involved more than one item, many conflicts featured in this analysis two or more times. Common combinations were national power and system/ideology, national power and resources, territory and resources, regional predominance and resources, autonomy and resources, international power and territory, as well as international power and system/ideology. The three most frequent items were all quite prone to violence with more than half of the system/ideology as well as the national power conflicts being fought out with the use of sporadic or even massive violence. Resource conflicts were violent in 44 percent of the cases. Nevertheless, the item most prone to violence was secession with two thirds of the cases being conducted violently. Regional predominance ranked second with 58 percent, closely followed by system/ideology. Concerning the frequency of the items, there were remarkable differences between the various world regions, indicating varying regional patterns of conflict.

Global Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 by Intensity Groups




In Europe, the prevalent item was secession with 19 cases, followed by autonomy and system/ideology with 15 each. This high share of self-determination conflicts was unique among the regions. In addition, Europe had a relatively high number of cases featuring territory (12 cases) or international power (11 cases), indicating a comparatively large share of interstate conflicts. In contrast, resources as well as national power were contested in only six cases each, and regional predominance in just one single case. As opposed to this, resources with 32 cases, regional predominance with 27 and national power with 25 cases were the prevalent items in Sub-Saharan Africa. As these items were prone to violence, the first item might be seen as an indication of the ambiguous role of abundant resources, the latter two as indications of defective statehood. In the Americas, Asia and Oceania as well as the Middle East and Maghreb, system/ideology was the prevalent item with 21 out of 45 conflicts featuring this item in the Americas, 39 out of 114 in Asia and Oceania, and even 33 out of 55 in the Middle East and Maghreb. Nevertheless, while resources ranked equal with system/ideology in the Americas, they were of minor importance in Asia and Oceania with 14 cases and in the Middle East and Maghreb with seven. In addition, regional predominance ranked second in Asia and Oceania with 23 cases, while ranking fifth in the Middle East and Maghreb with six cases.

Coups d'état

After last year's six attempted or successful coups d'état, five failed or successful attempts to overthrow the government were observed in 2010. Except for one in Asia and Oceania, all of them were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Niger, military forces led by Colonel Salou Djibo toppled President Madaou Tandja on February 18 [→ Niger (opposition)]. Two coup attempts, on April 18 and November 17, respectively, were staged in Madagascar against President Andry Rajoelina, who himself had taken power in a military-backed coup in March 2009 [→ Madagascar (TGV - TIM)]. Guinea-Bissau witnessed the fourth coup attempt in three years, when military forces arrested the army chief as well as Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior on April 1. However, the

civilian government was reinstated the same day [→ Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)]. Asia's coup attempt was staged in Kyrgyzstan, where government forces clashed with some 2,000 supporters of Urmat Baryktobasov, a former presidential candidate and businessman near the capital, Bishkek, on August 6. Baryktobasov had returned from exile some days earlier and, according to the government, demanded to be named prime minister. Riot police and army dispersed the demonstration using tear gas and firing in the air, while the government confirmed Baryktobasov had been arrested.

Coups d'État and Attempted Coups d'État 1945 to 2010



In addition to the coups or coup attempts mentioned above, governments in various countries accused civil or military oppositional forces of plotting coups. In Burundi, eighteen soldiers were arrested in late January, on charges of planning to stage a mutiny and coup. On February 6, two other soldiers attacked an army base where the detainees had initially been held, killing one sentinel. Opposition parties dismissed the alleged plot as a government attempt to create a pretext for a crack-down on the opposition [→ Burundi (opposition)]. In Niger, on October 16, coup leader Djibo arrested two officers on charges of plotting to overthrow him. In Panama, on January 17, police forces arrested two members of the presidential guard and a Puerto Rican national accused of plotting to kidnap President Ricardo Martinelli. In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa was attacked with teargas by police officers protesting against austerity measures. He was treated in a nearby police hospital. Correa accused the police of an attempted coup d'état and declared a state of emergency on September 30, while unrest flared up throughout the country. Altogether, five people were killed, among them two police officers, and 16 injured before the situation calmed down. The national police chief resigned two days after the attack. In Turkey, on January 20, a newspaper published parts of an alleged 2003 plan for a military coup called "Balyoz". The plan comprised assaults on mosques as well as a Turkish fighter jet being shot down over the Aegean Sea in order to stir unrest. On February 22, 49 officers were arrested and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. The defendants denied the accusations, stating the plan had been part of a planning exercise at a military seminar.

Terrorism

Also in 2010, terrorist attacks played an important part in the conduct of conflicts in all regions. As terrorist measures were employed for various goals, differing patterns could be observed. Firstly, terrorist attacks were committed by domestic actors aiming for self-determination, national power, or to change the political system. For instance, the Real Irish Republican Army and the Óglaigh na hÉireann in Northern Ireland [→ United Kingdom (Nationalists/Northern Ireland)] and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain [→ Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)] continued their fights for secession, although the latter showed willingness to turn to a diplomatic path in the second half of 2010. In the Russian North Caucasus, Islamist terrorism aimed at the establishment of an independent Caucasian Emirate, shifted its field of action further and was marked by an increase of suicide bombings [→ Russia (Islamist militants/Chechnya) et al.]. The second pattern referred to actors committing terrorist assaults not only in their respective home country, but also abroad. For instance, Greek leftwing militants not only staged a series of bomb attacks in Greece, but also were responsible for a series of mail bombings against European and South American official persons and buildings [→ Greece (leftwing militants)]. But most acts of transnational terrorism in 2010 could again be assigned to militant Islamist groups. The Somali Al-Shabaab not only conducted attacks in Somalia, but also claimed responsibility for two simultaneous bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital Kampala on July 11, killing more than 80 people [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Furthermore, the transnational terrorist network al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups were still a major security threat to many countries. The conflict between Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained a severe crisis in which suicide bombings were a key means of both militant groups [→ Iraq (AQI, ISI)]. While no further violent measures by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), formed by merger in 2009, were reported for Saudi Arabia [→ Saudi Arabia (AQAP)], the conflict between AQAP and the Yemeni government turned highly violent, mainly due to AQAP's involvement in a failed terrorist attack on the US by a Nigerian citizen on 12/25/09. The young man tried to detonate a bomb on a flight with 280 passengers from Amsterdam as it came into land in Detroit. Additionally, a suicide bomber attempted to kill the British ambassador to Yemen on April 27. AQAP in Yemen also claimed responsibility for mail bombs addressed to synagogues in Detroit, USA, which had been intercepted at airports in Dubai and Great Britain [→ Yemen (AQAP)]. The Algeria-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continued to be active in several countries in 2010 [→ Algeria (AQIM); Mauritania (AQIM); Mali (AQIM)]. Additionally, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an al-Qaeda linked militant group, damaged a Japanese oil tanker by an explosion in the Strait of Hormuz on July 28. Throughout the year, links between different militant Islamist groups were constantly reported, e.g. between AQIM, Somali al-Shabaab and Nigerian Boko Haram [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)].

Furthermore, a car bomb attack on New York's Times Square was foiled by the US police on May 1. The alleged bomb planter, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, was arrested three days later when trying to leave the USA. In addition, several further suspects were detained in Pakistan, as Pakistani Taliban were supposed to be behind the attack [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants)].

Due to repeated terror threats and defeated attempts, most countries of the Global North intensified their security arrangements. On March 4, a German court sentenced four alleged members of the Islamic Jihad Union, a group linked to al-Qaeda, to prison terms ranging from five to twelve years. In mid-March, an Irish court pressed charges against two suspected Islamist militants in connection to an alleged plot to murder a Swedish cartoonist involved in the 2007 Muhammad cartoons. On May 10, eight Islamist militants were convicted to an eight-year prison term by a Belgian court for leading a group that recruited militants to fight in Afghanistan. On August 9, German police closed down the Hamburg mosque where the 9/11 plotters had met before carrying out their suicide attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. On September 16, France raised its terror alert to the second highest level. In early October, the US, the UK, Sweden and Japan issued travel warnings concerning travelling in Europe after the US State Department had warned of possible al-Qaeda attacks, especially in France, Germany and the UK. France arrested 17 people on terrorism charges in October and November. On November 17, Germany tightened its security measures at railway stations and airports in response to concrete indications of possible attacks in late November.

Measures of Conflict Resolution


Negotiations and Treaties

In at least 54 of the current 363 conflicts, some or all of the conflict parties met in order to hold talks, negotiations, or conferences. Altogether, the number of successful and unsuccessful talks amounted to at least 164. Among these, at least 19 rounds of talks were held in severe crises or wars, 73 in conflicts marked by the sporadic use of violence, and 72 in non-violent conflicts. With 130, the majority of these talks did not result in the conclusion of a formal agreement. For example, despite numerous rounds of negotiations, Flemish and Walloon parties in Belgium could neither agree on a state reform nor on the formation of a government coalition [→ Belgium (Flemish parties/Flanders)].

In Cyprus, dozens of UN-led reunification negotiations between the presidents of the de-facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the government of the Republic of Cyprus, respectively, did not lead to a breakthrough. In Israel, US-mediated proximity talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian National Authority were resumed after a stalemate in negotiations of 17 months. However, the conflict parties failed to reach an agreement. In the inter-state crisis between Pakistan and India, Indian Foreign Minister Somanahalli Malla-

iah Krishna and his Pakistani counterpart Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Quereshi met on July 15. However, the talks ended without the conclusion of any binding agreements.

Number of Negotiations in 2010 by Intensity



Concerning negotiations in highly violent conflicts, nine rounds of talks were unsuccessful, while ten resulted in the conclusion of an agreement. In wars, which belong to this group, the following negotiations were held and treaties concluded: In Afghanistan, direct negotiations were held between the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and the government on a peace plan proposed by HIG. In addition, informal talks between Taliban and Afghan government officials were held on the Maldives. However, none of the talks resulted in an agreement [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)].

In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) concluded an agreement on security cooperation in December 2009 and a power sharing deal in March 2010. However, ASWJ withdrew from the government in September. Two rounds of talks between TFG and Hizbul Islam yielded no tangible results [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)].

In Sudan's Darfur region, peace talks between the government and the two rebel groups Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) failed with respect to a peace agreement, but resulted in a ceasefire and agreement on a prisoners' exchange with JEM on February 23 as well as in a ceasefire with LJM on March 3. Further rounds of the peace talks failed, with JEM finally suspending the negotiations in early May [→ Sudan (Darfur)].

Altogether, the conflict parties signed at least 34 treaties in 26 conflicts. These included three peace deals, four ceasefire agreements, and ten deals concerning disputed items. The remaining agreements referred to the regulation of procedures, were court rulings or were of a more general nature like memoranda of understanding. Three of the four ceasefires were concluded in highly violent conflicts: In addition to the two above-mentioned ones in Darfur, al-Houthi rebels and the government in Yemen signed a ceasefire accord in Yemen's severe crisis on February 11. Amid ongoing ceasefire violations, two ceasefire implementation deals were signed in June and August, respectively [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. The remaining ceasefire was concluded in the crisis in

Nagaland, India [→ India (NSCN et al./Nagaland)].

Concerning the peace treaties, one was signed in Ethiopia's severe crisis in the Ogaden region, where the government signed a peace deal with a splinter group of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on October 12. The ONLF rejected the peace deal [→ Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden)]. Two were signed in crises [→ India (MPLF et al./Manipur); Indonesia (Bugis – Dayaks/Kalimantan)].

Other important agreements concluded were, for example, the New START treaty signed by Russia and the US on April 8, obliging both countries to further reduce the number of their strategic arms [→ USA - Russia (missile system)]. Furthermore, Russia and Norway signed a treaty defining the maritime delimitation line that had been disputed for decades [→ Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)]. In the secession conflict concerning South Sudan, the conflict parties reached two agreements and one memorandum of understanding on various issues concerning last year's contested census and the upcoming referendum on independence of the South. However, numerous rounds of negotiation on other issues yielded no results [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)].

International Organizations

By early 2010, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) administered 16 missions across the five world regions. While 15 were peacekeeping missions, the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was a DPKO-administered political mission. On May 28, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troops from the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by the end of June. MONUC, the UN's largest peacekeeping mission, was subsequently renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Despite demands of congolese President Joseph Kabila to withdraw all peacekeeping forces by next year, the UNSC declared future force reductions would be determined by conditions on the ground [→ DR Congo (FDLR)]. No new mission was deployed in 2010.

As in previous years, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most DPKO-administered UN missions, with six missions (see table below). Five peacekeeping missions were stationed in the Middle East and Maghreb, among them the political mission UNAMA in Afghanistan. Although the highest number of conflicts was observed in Asia and Oceania, only two UN mission were deployed in that region. With UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia), the UN maintained as many missions in Europe as in Asia and Oceania. MINUSTAH in Haiti was the only mission in the Americas.

The 15 DPKO peacekeeping missions amounted to a total of 99,212 uniformed personnel by October, consisting of 14,065 police, 82,897 troops, and 2,250 observers from 116 countries. Moreover, 5,733 international civilian personnel, some 14,120 local civilian staff, and about 2,600 UN volunteers were employed. UN peacekeeping missions' fatalities amounted to a total of 161 in the

period observed, compared to 121 in the previous year. Since 1948, a total of 2,843 people died in UN peace operations. The main contributors to UN operations among the 116 countries sending uniformed personnel in 2010 were once again Bangladesh (10,748), Pakistan (10,635), and India (8,704). While the Global South therefore shouldered the largest share of the peacekeeping burden in respect of personnel, the Global North did the main funding. The three main financial contributors to the annual budget of approx. USD 7.26 billion for peacekeeping missions this year were the USA with 27.17 percent, Japan with 12.53 percent, and the United Kingdom with 8.16 percent. The allocated budget represented an estimated 0.47 percent of global military spending.

In addition to the DPKO mission, the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) led eleven political field operations, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa: the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as well as the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), which had succeeded the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), respectively. In Asia and Oceania, UNDPA led two missions, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA). In the Middle East and Maghreb, it maintained three

missions, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) as well as the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). Both the DPKO-administered missions and the UNDPA-led political field operations were supported by the UN Department for Field Support (UNDFS) established in 2007.

Although the UN's peacekeeping missions depended for the most part on robust mandates, the international community also applied non-military measures to sustain or restore peace and security, such as sanctions. By early 2010, the UN maintained eleven sanction committees concerning seven states of sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan) and an arms embargo against North Korea, introduced in 2006. On 17/12/09, the UNSC reaffirmed the assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo concerning Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other associated groups and people included on the Committee's Consolidated List. The same day, the council unanimously adopted resolution 1903, thereby allowing the Liberian government to receive military material for twelve months, and terminating previous bans on diamonds and timber exports. While the committee concerning Sierra Leone was dissolved on September 29, the UNSC imposed a new arms embargo and travel bans on Eritrea, sanctioning its support for anti-government militants in Somalia, on 23/12/09, and a fourth round of sanctions on Iran, demanding the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities, on June 9.

Overview: Current UN Missions led or supported by DPKO

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
Europe			
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
Sub-Saharan Africa			
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Côte d'Ivoire
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	2007	Central African Republic, Chad
MONUSCO	UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	Congo (Kinshasa)
UNAMID	UN/AU Mission In Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan	2005	Sudan
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
The Americas			
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004	Haiti
Asia and Oceania			
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group In India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	2006	Timor-Leste
The Middle East and Maghreb			
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	1978	Lebanon
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	2002	Afghanistan
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	1974	Syria, Israel
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt

Besides the UN, several regional organizations maintained field missions. For instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) employed about 3,500 personnel in a total of 18 field operations, including seven missions on the Balkans and one in Moldova.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the counter-piracy operation around the Horn of Africa, the Military Liaison Office in Belgrade, Serbia, the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO Headquarters Skopje in Macedonia, and the NATO Headquarters Tirana in Albania. In addition, NATO continued its support for UNAMID troops in Darfur, Sudan.

By late November, the Council of the European Union maintained 14 active missions with an estimated 8,000 personnel: five in the Western Balkans, Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, four in the Middle East, and five in Africa. On January 25, the Council authorized the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, which started in Uganda in early May. On September 30, the EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) closed down after having completed its mandate. While three of the remaining missions, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUTM in Somalia, and the naval mission EUNAVFOR along the Somali coastline, were military operations, all others were civilian missions. The African Union (AU) administered the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID). On February 19, the AU suspended Niger's membership, condemning a military coup one day earlier [→ Niger (opposition)].


Authoritative Decisions by the ICJ

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled cases filed by states, so-called contentious cases, and rendered advisory opinions, so-called advisory proceedings, submitted by other authorized bodies of the UN. By late November, fifteen cases were pending, all but one being contentious cases.

The ICJ rendered judgment in two contentious cases as well as one advisory opinion. On April 20, the court rendered its judgment in the case between Argentina and Uruguay concerning two pulp mills on the River Uruguay [→ Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay River)]. The ICJ declared that Uruguay had not breached its environmental obligations but rather its procedural obligations to inform Argentina of its construction plans. On November 16, both sides signed an accord on the environmental monitoring. In the case between Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) concerning DRC's detention and expulsion of the Guinean businessman Ahmadou Sadio Diallo in 1996, the ICJ, on November 30, ordered the DRC to pay compensations to Guinea. With regard to the UN General Assembly's request for


advisory opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, the ICJ held public hearings of 29 countries in December 2009. On July 22, the world court considered that Kosovo's unilateral proclamation of independence on 17/02/08 had not violated international law [→ Serbia (Kosovo)]. However, Serbian president Boris Tadic still refused to recognize Kosovo's independence. In the period under review, four new contentious cases and one request for advisory opinion were submitted to the ICJ. On 22/12/09, Belgium instituted proceedings accusing Switzerland of violating the Lugano Convention by failing to enforce Belgian civil court rulings related to the bankruptcy of the former Belgian airline Sabena in 2001. November 23 was set as the time limit for the filing of initial pleadings. On May 30, Australia initiated legal action before the ICJ against Japan for its alleged breach of international obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). The initial pleadings were to be filed by May 2011. On July 21, Burkina Faso and Niger jointly submitted a territorial dispute concerning the boundary between the two countries. Initial pleadings were to be filed in April 2011 and January 2012, respectively. On November 18, Costa Rica instituted proceedings against Nicaragua, accusing its neighbor of violating its territorial integrity [→ Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)], despite an accepted ICJ decision in the previous year. In late April, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), one of the specialized agencies of the UN, requested an advisory opinion on a judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization upon a complaint filed against the IFAD. After Honduras had filed a case against Brazil before the ICJ in 2009, accusing Brazil of intervening in the country's domestic affairs, the court discontinued the proceedings at the request of the Honduran government on May 19 [→ Honduras (opposition)]. Furthermore, the case between the Republic of Congo and France, concerning certain criminal proceedings against former Congolese government officials in France, was removed from ICJ's general list at the request of the DRC on November 16. Two cases were being heard or were under deliberation in the period observed. After Georgia's plea for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination against Russia in 2008, the court held public hearings between September 13 and 17 [→ Russia - Georgia]. In the territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras requested permission to intervene in the proceedings in February and June, respectively. Between October 11 and 22, the ICJ held public hearings on the applications for permission to intervene [→ Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)]. With respect to the case between Germany and Italy, the court, on July 20, rejected a counter-claim by Italy to pay reparations to Italian victims of Third Reich abuses and fixed time limits for the filing of additional pleadings. In the case between Croatia and Serbia, concerning the application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in 1995, additional pleadings were to be filed in December 2010 and November 2011.

Europe




The number of conflicts monitored in Europe was 64. One conflict was already terminated in 2009 [→ Romania - Ukraine], and no new conflicts emerged. Compared with 17 violent conflicts in 2009, this year saw a slight increase to 19 violent conflicts. Among these were two highly violent conflicts, the same number as in the previous year. These two severe crises, both located in the Russian North Caucasus, were fought over secession and system/ideology [→ Russia (Islamist militants/Ingushetia); Russia (Islamist militants/Dagestan)]. The most frequent conflict item in Europe was secession, followed by an almost equal number of conflicts over system/ideology, autonomy, territory, and international power, respectively. While only one of Europe's 15 autonomy conflicts was conducted violently, this applied to 12 out of 19 conflicts over secession. This was the case in the Caucasus, as well as in Western democracies [→ France (FLNC/Corsica); Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces); United Kingdom (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)]. In contrast, international power, territory, and resources were disputed rather peacefully. Only one violent conflict over territory was counted; it was Europe's single violent interstate conflict [→ Armenia - Azerbaijan]. National power was only contested with violent means in the South Caucasus [→ Armenia (opposition); Azerbaijan (opposition); Georgia (opposition)]. The Caucasus remained Europe's most volatile sub-region, accounting for a total of 18, mostly interrelated conflicts, ten of which were crises and two highly violent. Besides the three national power conflicts, the security situation between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea suffered from three further crises in the southern Caucasus [→ Armenia - Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh); Georgia (Abkhazia)], and from regional insurgencies aiming for independent Islamic statehood in Russia's North Caucasus [→ Russia (Islamist militants/Chechnya) et al.]. Southeast Europe, including the Balkans, Europe's other conflict-ridden sub-region, with 14 registered conflicts, continued to feature a large number of conflicts. Only three of them were fought violently [→ Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants); Greece (leftwing militants); Serbia (Kosovo)], while one conflict deescalated from a crisis to a latent conflict [→ Moldova (opposition)].

Conflict Intensities in Europe in 2010 compared to 2009



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 in Europe by Intensity Groups



Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2010

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Armenia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	↗	3
Armenia - Azerbaijan	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)*	Nagorno Karabakh vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
Azerbaijan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	↗	3
Belarus (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	2
Belarus - Poland*	Belarus vs. Poland	international power	1994	•	1
Belgium (Flemish parties/Flanders)	Flemish parties vs. government, Walloon parties	autonomy	2007	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs/Republic of Srpska)	Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation	secession	1995	•	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat parties/Herzegovina)*	Croat parties vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation, Bosniak parties	autonomy	1992	↘	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance	2008	↗	3
Croatia (Croatian Serbs/Krajina, West and East Slavonia)*	Croatian Serbs vs. government	autonomy	1991	↘	1
Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)	Northern Cyprus vs. central government	secession	1963	•	2
Cyprus - Turkey*	Cyprus vs. Turkey	territory, international power, resources	2005	•	2
Denmark - Canada (Hans Island)*	Denmark vs. Canada	territory	1973	•	1
Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
France (FLNC/Corsica)	FLNC, Corsica Libera vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	3
Georgia (Armenian minority)*	Armenian minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (Azeri minority)*	Azeri minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Georgia (South Ossetia)*	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	↘	2
Greece (leftwing militants)	leftwing militants, SPF, EA, SE, Sect of Revolutionaries vs. government	system/ideology	1973	•	3
Greece - Macedonia*	Greece vs. Macedonia	other	1991	•	1
Hungary - Romania*	Hungary vs. Romania	international power	1990	•	1
Hungary - Slovakia (minority)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	international power	1993	•	1
Hungary - Slovakia (resources)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	resources	1989	•	1
Italy (Lega Nord/northern Italy)*	Lega Nord vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Italy (Red Brigades)*	Red Brigades vs. government	system/ideology	1970	•	2
Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Macedonia (Albanian minority/northwestern Macedonia)*	NLA, Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	↗	3
Moldova (opposition)	PCRM vs. AEI	system/ideology, national power	2009	↓	1
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Transdniestrian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Montenegro - Croatia (Prevlaka)*	Montenegro vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Romania (Hungarian minority/Transylvania)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Russia (Islamist militants/Chechnya)	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1989	↘	3
Russia (Islamist militants/Dagestan)	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1999	↗	4
Russia (Islamist militants/Ingushetia)	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2004	•	4
Russia (Islamist militants/Kabardino-Balkaria)*	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2004	•	3
Russia (Islamist militants/Karachay-Cherkessia)*	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2001	•	3
Russia (Islamist militants/North Ossetia-Alania)*	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2006	•	3
Russia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	2
Russia - Estonia*	Russia vs. Estonia	territory, international power	1994	•	2
Russia - Georgia	Russia vs. Georgia	international power	1992	•	2
Russia - Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)*	Azerbaijan vs. Iran vs. Kazakhstan vs. Russia vs. Turkmenistan	territory, international power, resources	1993	•	1
Russia - Latvia*	Russia vs. Latvia	international power	1994	↘	1
Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)	Russia vs. Norway	territory, resources	1947	↘	1
Russia - Norway et al. (Arctic)	Russia vs. United States vs. Canada vs. Norway vs. Denmark	territory, resources	2001	•	2
Russia - Ukraine*	Russia vs. Ukraine	territory, international power, resources	2003	•	2
Serbia (Albanian minority/Presevo Valley)*	Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	2000	•	2
Serbia (Bosniak minority/Sandzak)*	Bosniak minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	2
Serbia (Hungarian minority/northern Vojvodina)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1998	•	1
Serbia (Kosovo)	Kosovar government vs. central government	secession	1989	•	3
Serbia (Wahhabi militants/Sandzak)*	Wahhabi militants vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2007	•	1
Serbia (ZzV/Vojvodina)*	ZzV vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Slovakia (Hungarian minority/southern Slovakia)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1993	•	1
Slovenia - Croatia	Slovenia vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists/Catalonia)	ERC, CiU, Catalan regional government vs. central government	secession	1979	•	1
Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)	ETA, PNV vs. government	secession	1959	•	3
Spain - United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	•	1
Turkey - Armenia	Turkey vs. Armenia	international power, other	1991	•	2
Turkey - Greece*	Turkey vs. Greece	territory	1973	•	2
United Kingdom (Nationalists/Northern Ireland)	IRA, RIRA, ONH, CIRA, INLA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, DUP, UUP, Orange Order, UDA, UVF, RHC	secession	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (SNP/Scotland)*	SNP, Scottish regional government vs. central government	secession	2007	•	1
USA - Russia (missile system)	USA vs. Russia	international power	2007	•	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

Armenia (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict over national power between the opposition and the government of President Serge Sarkisian turned violent. Tensions between the conflict parties rose ahead of the parliamentary by-elections scheduled for January 10. Unknown perpetrators attacked members of the opposition alliance Armenian National Congress's (HAK) youth organization Hima on 12/27/09, which had been campaigning for detained HAK candidate Nikol Pashinian. The latter was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for his alleged role in the March 2008 post-election violence on January 19, with the sentence being halved in May. On January 10, Ara Simonian, candidate of the pro-government National Accord Party, won 57 percent of the votes in what international observers termed fraudulent by-elections. Hima activists clashed with police in the Armenian capital of Yerevan on February 19 during a rally marking the second anniversary of the presidential elections and the ensuing violence which had claimed ten fatalities. Throughout the year, opposition members held several protests in Yerevan. On May 28, the police forcibly dispersed protests. Three days later, security personnel and protesters clashed during a demonstration. Police arrested three opposition activists. In mid-September, opposition groups, among them the HAK, proclaimed their plans to launch long-term protest actions. In a ruling from March 30, the constitutional court formally declared innocent all pro-opposition activists who had been cleared of all charges in connection with their alleged role in the 2008 post-election unrest. A Yerevan court sentenced former defense ministry official Armen Sarkisian to two years imprisonment on May 4. Sarkisian had disclosed a secret government order sanctioning the military's suppression of the 2008 post-election protests. The government had defended the order in April, while the HAK had called it unconstitutional. On May 20, the National Assembly passed a bill regulating radio and TV emissions. The bill was criticized by the opposition as giving the government more influence over broadcast media. (map)

Armenia - Azerbaijan

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1987
Conflict parties:	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	
Conflict items:	territory	

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, continued. Despite increasingly stalled negotiations and several ceasefire violations, conflict mediators, among them the OSCE Minsk Group, deemed possible a breakthrough in the ongoing peace talks between the conflict parties. On February 18, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded in an exchange of fire with Armenian forces at the Line of Contact (LoC). In March, three shootouts claimed the lives of one Armenian and four Azerbaijani

soldiers. In the worst ceasefire violation since March 2008, four Armenian and two Azerbaijani soldiers died in skirmishes near the village of Chayli, in the NK province of Mardakert/Tartar, between June 17 and 19. In a retaliatory attack by the NK Defense Army, a force deeply integrated with the Armenian military, one Azerbaijani soldier was killed near Fizuli on June 20 to 21 [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)]. Clashes at the LoC on August 31 and September 4 claimed the lives of three Armenian and four Azerbaijani soldiers. At least 22 soldiers died at the LoC throughout the year. At the OSCE's ministerial meeting in Athens in early December 2009, the Minsk Group emphasized the necessity of a framework peace deal. During talks mediated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in the Russian town of Sochi on January 25, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev reportedly reached a verbal agreement on the wording of the 2007 Madrid Principles' preamble. According to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on March 15, the most recent draft of the Principles foresaw a gradual withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and the repatriation of Azerbaijani refugees to NK. Furthermore, the final decision over NK's status was not to violate Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. On June 17, Russia presented a new peace proposal during talks in Saint Petersburg. Aliyev rejected the proposal and threatened military intervention if peace talks failed. Further talks between the conflict parties at the OSCE ministerial meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on July 16-17 yielded no tangible results. The Minsk Group criticized the efforts as insufficient. On October 27, Aliyev and Sarkisian held Russian-facilitated talks in Astrakhan, Russia, agreeing on an exchange of prisoners. At the end of November, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the withdrawal of snipers deployed along the LoC. Both conflict parties extensively expanded their armament, Azerbaijan almost doubling its military budget for 2011 to 1.8 billion euros. (Id)

Belgium (Flemish parties/Flanders)

Intensity: 1	Change: •	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	Flemish parties vs. government, Walloon parties	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The tensions between Flemish and Walloon parties over the Flemish parties' demands for more autonomy and the partition of the partly bilingual Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) constituency slightly increased. After the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) had left the governing coalition on April 22, Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme of the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) tendered his resignation to Belgian King Albert II, who accepted the request on April 26. In the June 13 parliamentary election, the nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) won 27 of the 150 seats and emerged as strongest party. On June 17, King Albert appointed Bart De Wever (N-VA) to pave the way for government formation talks. Following unsuccessful negotiations, De Wever asked to be relieved from this post on July 8. The King appointed Elio Di Rupo of the Walloon Social-

ist Party (PS) as De Wever's successor. On August 16, negotiations on a state reform package including transfer of powers to the Belgian regions and communities failed. All attending Flemish parties insisted on a reform of the financing law while Francophone negotiators refused to transfer any further powers to the regional level. The negotiations continued but reached another deadlock on August 29 when the N-VA and CD&V rejected Di Rupo's latest proposal. After Di Rupo's resignation from leading government-forming talks on September 3, King Albert asked the speakers of the two houses of parliament to try to end the political stalemate. However, on October 5 the speakers also asked to be relieved of their duties. On October 8, the King again asked De Wever, appointed as "Royal Clarifier", to find common ground between the parties involved. The French-speaking parties rejected De Wever's compromise proposal on October 18, once more leading him to resign. Three days later King Albert appointed the Flemish socialist Johan Vande Lanotte of the Different Socialist Party (SPA) as new mediator. On November 22, De Wever emphasized that to his party, Flemish independence was merely a long-term goal. (fmb)

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs/Republic of Srpska)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict regarding the political order of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between the Republika Srpska (RS), on the one hand, and the central government as well as the Bosniak-Croat Federation (FBiH), on the other, continued. RS's autonomy rights were a particularly frequently disputed item between RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and the federal government. The latter's position was supported by the UN Office of the High Representative in BiH (OHR), headed by Valentin Inzko. Dodik alluded to a potential secession of the RS on various occasions. The RS political leadership strongly criticized Inzko's December 2009 decision to extend the mandate of international judges and prosecutors, accusing him of exceeding his legal competencies. Subsequently, the RS parliament approved a law on referenda on February 10, allowing for votes on OHR decisions and the 1995 Dayton Accord's stipulations. While Dodik stated that this law was not aimed at secession, he announced plans for a referendum concerning the Dayton Agreement. On March 22, Dodik called BiH unsustainable and suggested discussing its peaceful dissolution. In his May 24 report to the UN Security Council, Inzko warned that the RS leaders' announcements to hold a referendum would undermine state-level institutions. Following the July 22 ICJ decision on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence [→ Serbia (Kosovo)], Dodik stated that the decision would serve as a guideline for the RS regarding its future status, to be discussed after the October 3 national elections. In these elections, Dodik won the RS presidency with 51 percent of the vote. The BiH presidency was formed by Bosniak Bakir Izetbe-

govic, Croat Zeljko Komsic, and Serb member Nebojsa Radmanovic. The latter was a member of Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats. Instead of RS's immediate secession, Dodik promoted the idea of BiH as a loose confederation, with the RS regaining competencies from the central government. In his November 11 report to the UN Security Council, Inzko called on BiH's political parties to drop their nationalist agenda, explicitly criticizing the RS leadership for its refusal to discuss constitutional reforms. In his inauguration speech as president of the RS on November 15, Dodik once more opposed any centralization of competencies on the state level at the expense of RS autonomy. Also in November, Dodik, among other leading ethnic Serb and Croat politicians, received a death threat signed by the Patriotic Front of BiH claiming he was an enemy of BiH and the Bosniak people. Meanwhile, a new central government yet remained to be formed. (sim)

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	Wahhabi militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The conflict over system and regional predominance between Wahhabi militants and the government escalated. In late 2009, Wahhabi radicals damaged a police car trying to enter the remote village of Gornja Maoca in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The community rejected the regular school curriculum, put up Arabic street signs, and was reportedly ruled by the Sharia, with BiH authorities having no influence on community life. The radicals in Gornja Maoca allegedly maintained contacts with Serbia's militant Wahhabi movement [→ Serbia (Wahhabi militants/Sandzak)]. On February 2, 600 policemen raided Gornja Maoca using 240 vehicles including light wheeled tanks, and confiscated a large amount of weapons, explosives and cash. Seven radicals, including community leader Nusret Imamovic, were arrested and charged with undermining the state's territorial integrity and constitutional order as well as inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred and intolerance. On June 27, Wahhabi militants carried out a bomb attack on a police station in Bugojno, some 70 kilometers southwest of Sarajevo, killing a police officer and leaving one injured. When police tried to arrest Haris Causevic, who later confessed to the attack, he injured five policemen with a minor explosive device. Authorities arrested five more suspects the same day. On June 29, police detained Naser Palislamovic as main suspect for organizing the bombing. On July 6, Wahhabi radicals allegedly from the village of Gornja Maoca urged Bosnian Muslims to unite against what they called government oppression. In three separate operations in May and August, police arrested six Bosnian and two Serbian nationals linked to the militant Wahhabi movement. On August 31, police discovered a major cache of weapons and explosive devices in the village of Zdralovici. One month later, police arrested Wahhabi militant Elvir Mukic in Jajce and seized a substantial amount of light and heavy weaponry, including RPG rocket launchers. (gm)

Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1963
Conflict parties:	Northern Cyprus vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the de-facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the government of the Republic of Cyprus continued. Until the end of March, Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, president of breakaway Northern Cyprus, continued their UN-led negotiations concerning a possible reunification. On 12/14/09 and June 15, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UN mission UN-FICYP with each extension covering a six month period. On January 10, Greek Cypriot parties rejected a Turkish Cypriot power-sharing proposal which would have allowed for cross-voting. The proposal also demanded access to the benefits of Cyprus's EU membership for Turkish citizens in Cyprus. On March 1, Cyprus rejected Turkish-proposed negotiations in a "two plus three" format including Turkey, Great Britain, and Greece [→ Cyprus - Turkey]. Later the same month, reunification negotiations were suspended until after the Northern Cyprus presidential elections. Dervis Eroglu, who had previously advocated an independent Northern Cyprus, won the North's elections on April 18. Despite Eroglu's pledge to continue reunification negotiations, Cyprus considered his election a setback. Christofias and Eroglu resumed reunification talks on May 26. In late June, Eroglu rejected a Greek Cypriot proposal for an international conference with members of the UN Security Council, the EU, Turkey, and Greece. On July 20, Eroglu urged for a conflict solution within 2010, calling it the last chance for a settlement. On September 14, Eroglu accused the Greek Cypriot leadership of lobbying against Direct Trade Relations (DTR) between the EU and Northern Cyprus. Six days later, the European Parliament postponed its discussion of DTR. On the same day, Eroglu reiterated his goal of establishing a partnership state consisting of two bi-communal and bi-zonal states equal in status. Both Cyprus and Northern Cyprus cancelled annual military exercises in October. On October 14, Christofias and Eroglu attended the opening of a new border-crossing. Meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on November 18, the leaders of both communities agreed to intensify their reunification efforts and to meet again in January 2011. In late November, Ban stated that he would decide on the future of the UN's mediation endeavors after the January 2011 meeting. He furthermore warned that the reunification talks could be seriously hampered by the Cyprus parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2011. (gm)

France (FLNC/Corsica)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	FLNC, Corsica Libera vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the separatist Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the government continued. On January 31, the FLNC claimed respon-

sibility for 24 attacks against private houses as well as police stations and government property on Corsica in 2009. From the beginning of 2010 to the end of August, the authorities registered 48 committed attacks and seven attempts, almost the same number as in 2009, which was the lowest in 30 years. While most attacks were aimed at holiday homes and only caused material damage, separatists also took a family hostage on June 15. In early June, FLNC publicly welcomed the fact that nationalist party lists gained 35 percent of the votes in the March 21 regional elections. Corsican nationalists held several demonstrations in 2010. For example, on January 15, supporters of the Corsica Libera party (CL) and the Comité Anti-répression protested against the transfer of five nationalists, suspected of having attacked the gendarmerie in Vescovato, to Paris. Some of the demonstrators threw Molotov cocktails at the police office in Bastia. On August 21, almost 200 Corsican independence activists protested against another transfer of prisoners to the mainland by blocking the access to the airport of Ajaccio and the port of Bastia. On April 1, a Paris court sentenced four Corsican nationalists to prison terms for an attack against the police of Aléria, Haute-Corse, in 2004. On June 30, the Court of Cassation annulled Yvan Colonna's life sentence for killing Corsican Prefect Claude Érnac in 1997 on the grounds of procedural irregularities. However, on July 30, a Paris appeals court rejected Colonna's request for release due to danger of absconding. On July 8, a Paris criminal court found four people guilty of having aided Colonna during his escape from 1999 to 2003, and convicted them to suspended prison terms. In October, 20 alleged FLNC members suspected of a grenade attack against the prefecture in Ajaccio in 2007 were sent to court in Paris. On November 2, unknown assailants damaged an army recruitment center in Bastia with explosives. (elo)

Georgia (Abkhazia)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the breakaway region of Abkhazia, which had declared its independence in 2008, and Georgia continued. After Russia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, Nauru became the fourth country to recognize Abkhazia's independence on 12/15/09. Abkhazian de-facto President Sergei Bagapsh was reelected on 12/12/09, recognized neither by Georgia nor the international community. On January 27, the Georgian government endorsed the document State Strategy on the Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation concerning the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [→ Georgia (South Ossetia)], which was rejected as a basis for cooperation by the Abkhaz leadership. Negotiations between the conflict parties continued within the framework of the Geneva Process, co-mediated by the UN, EU and OSCE, but yielded no tangible results. Abkhaz representatives declared the negotiations to be deadlocked and threatened to withdraw from the talks at the end of June. On 12/12/09, Russia deployed coast guard boats to Ochamchire port on the Abkhazian Black

Sea coastline. Abkhazia and Russia signed a military cooperation treaty on February 17, allowing the latter to establish a military base with at least 3,000 personnel near the Abkhaz-Georgian de-facto border for the next 49 years. In August, after Russia had announced its plans to station air defense missile systems in Abkhazia, US officials claimed that Russia had already had deployed S-300 air defense missiles in the breakaway region in 2008. Georgia claimed this was a violation of the August 2008 six-point ceasefire agreement [→ Russia - Georgia]. On August 8, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Abkhazia on the occasion of the second anniversary of the August 2008 war, promising full political, economic, and security relations with the breakaway republic. Throughout the year, violent incidents were reported in Abkhazia's Gali district, mainly populated by ethnic Georgians. On January 29, a mine blast in Gali killed a local policeman and two civilians. On June 8, according to Georgian sources, Abkhaz militiamen set several houses on fire in the village of Dikhazurga and arrested several residents. Abkhaz officials blamed Georgian special services for further attacks. Georgia rejected these accusations, claiming that the incidents had been sparked by disputes between Abkhaz servicemen and Russian troops stemming from tax collections in mainly Georgian populated villages. These incidents included the assassination of an Abkhaz customs officer on June 1 and a roadside bombing near the village of Tagiloni on July 22 which left six Abkhaz policemen injured. On June 4, unknown attackers killed Dmitry Katsia, administration head of the village of Rep. Abkhaz security personnel subsequently killed an ethnic Georgian from Rep in interrogations on his alleged responsibility for the killing of Katsia. On June 23, Russian troops launched a three-day military exercise at the Nagvalou military training area in Ochamchire district involving battle tanks, armored vehicles and air defense systems. On September 13, the ICJ opened hearings into the case filed by Georgia against Russia in 2008 over the latter's violations of its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (mak)

Georgia (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between several opposition groups and the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili remained violent. On 12/04/09, parliament approved amendments to the election law stipulating 30 percent plus one vote for a candidate's first-round victory in local elections. Opposition groups criticized the amendment as intended to secure a first-round victory for the candidates of Saakashvili's United National Movement (ENM) in the local elections, scheduled for May 30. On January 18, parliament elected Saakashvili-backed Zurab Kharatishvili as chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC). At the end of February, the opposition parties, deeply divided between a moderate and a radical camp, held talks to unite their efforts, which

yielded no tangible results. Opposition activists held several protests, e.g. when on May 6 several hundred opposition members demonstrated during a police parade in Tbilisi, the capital. Protesters briefly clashed with riot police, leaving three people injured. On May 30, the ENM won the local elections with 66 percent of the vote. In Tbilisi, the incumbent mayor, ENM candidate Gigi Ugulava, remained in office. The OSCE election monitors found systemic irregularities, such as ballot stuffing and uneven competition in favor of the incumbent party. On July 19, the Constitutional Commission formally approved a constitutional amendment cutting the future presidents' powers in favor of the prime minister. The day after, ten opposition parties released an open letter demanding to postpone the adoption of the amended constitution until 2012 and voicing concerns that it would enable Saakashvili to become prime minister after his presidential term. However, in the first reading, the draft constitutional amendments passed the parliament with 123 votes to 4 on September 24. A new opposition party, the Georgian Party (GP), was founded on October 12. Among the founders was Levan Gachechiladze, Saakashvili's closest challenger in the 2008 presidential elections. From mid-October on, relatives of GP leaders were arrested on charges of fraud or having carried out bomb attacks in Tbilisi. On November 4, unknown assailants opened fire on the children of another GP leader. A bomb attack on a Tbilisi office of the opposition Labor Party, staged by unknown perpetrators on November 28, left a woman dead. (jd)

Greece (leftwing militants)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1973
Conflict parties:	leftwing militants, SPF, EA, SE, Sect of Revolutionaries vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system conflict between leftwing militants and the government continued. Leftwing and anarchist militants committed a series of bomb attacks beginning in December 2009. The total number amounted to at least 35 attacks, 23 attributable to organized militant groups, especially the Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (SPF). The bomb attacks were aimed at government institutions and politicians as well as private companies and individuals. The perpetrators usually warned police before detonating devices. A bomb explosion in Athens caused one fatality on March 28. SPF explicitly distanced itself from the attack. On June 24, a parcel bomb sent by unknown perpetrators, supposedly aimed at Civil Protection Minister Michalis Chrysohoidis, left a close aide to the minister dead. Chrysohoidis had pledged to crack down on anarchists and militants when he took office in October 2009. In subsequent investigations, authorities contacted anti-terror units in Italy, France and Spain. From November 1 to 4, militants committed a series of mail bombings against European and South American embassies, various European government leaders, Europol, and the European Court of Justice. While one employee of a courier service was injured, explosives experts brought most of the 14 devices to a controlled explosion. On November 1, police arrested two alleged SPF members

for the attacks; they later claimed responsibility for the bombings. In the run-up to the commemoration of the November 17 Polytechnic Uprising of 1973, unknown assailants detonated an unspecified number of explosive devices in Athens and Thessaloniki. Moreover, leftwing militants assassinated a journalist in Athens on July 19. The Sect of Revolutionaries claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened to turn Greece into "a war zone of revolutionary activity [...] no longer a safe haven for capitalism". Throughout the year, police arrested at least five suspected SPF members as well as seven members of the Revolutionary Struggle (EA) militant group. The latter action sparked violent clashes in Athens between up to 200 protesters and police. Following the arrests, police found a substantial stash of weapons as well as 195 kilograms of explosives. Apart from incidents related to organized militant groups, alleged leftwing and anarchist protesters repeatedly clashed with police, starting on 12/06/09. While the December 2009 riots were sparked by the anniversary of the 2008 police shooting of a youth, a series of clashes from March to November occurred during mass demonstrations against government austerity measures as well as the commemoration of the 1973 Polytechnic Uprising. Protesters targeted police forces with petrol bombs and stones. In response, police used teargas and stun grenades. On May 5, three people died trapped in a bank set on fire by protesters. At least 90 people were injured in the clashes throughout the year. (gm, rdi)

Moldova (opposition)

Intensity: 1	Change: ↓	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	PCRM vs. AEI	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between the former opposition Alliance for European Integration (AEI) and the former governing Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) continued. The AEI, consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), the Liberal Party (PL), the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), and the Alliance Our Moldova (AMN), had won the parliamentary majority in 2009. However, the AEI was unable to elect a president since it lacked the qualified majority of 61 of 101 parliamentary votes, leaving the country in continued deadlock throughout 2010. On 12/07/09, the PCRM blocked the AEI's attempt to elect its presidential candidate. The September 5 referendum on a constitutional amendment stipulating direct presidential elections failed because of the low voter turnout. The PCRM had campaigned against the referendum. Mihai Ghimpu, parliamentary speaker and acting president, subsequently dissolved parliament on September 28 and announced early elections for November 28. Meanwhile, the investigation into the violent escalation of the 2009 protests progressed. On April 7, a policeman was charged with having killed a protester. On April 20, former Interior Minister Gheorghe Papuc and the former police chief were put on trial for negligence with serious consequences. A special committee report presented to parliament on May 7 accused former president and incumbent PCRM head

Vladimir Voronin of abuse of power, and suggested that the authorities had secretly provoked the violence of the 2009 protests. In mid-September, Ghimpu declared that he was starting legal proceedings to put Voronin on trial. Subsequently, prosecutors requested lifting Voronin's immunity. On November 25, Voronin voiced his concern that AEI controlled authorities might falsify the November 28 parliamentary elections. Preliminary results of November 29 saw the AEI ahead of the PCRM with slightly over 50 percent of the vote. However, this left the AEI still short of the necessary majority to elect a president. (fes)

Moldova (Transdniestria)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Transdniestrian separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the breakaway region of Transdniestria and the government continued. Formal negotiations in the 5+2 format involving the two conflicting parties, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as mediator, Russia and Ukraine as guarantors, as well as the US and EU as observers, had been suspended since 02/28/06. Nevertheless, informal negotiations continued throughout 2010, centering on trust-building measures, freedom of movement, and a re-formalization of the negotiating process. Between March and November, the parties held five informal 5+2 negotiation sessions. On February 17, Transdniestrian de-facto President Igor Smirnov called on Russia to raise the number of its peacekeeping troops. Meanwhile, Moldova repeatedly demanded that Russia replace its peacekeeping troops with a civilian mission, which the latter rejected. On May 17, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a joint statement on the settlement of the Transdniestria conflict, stipulating a guaranteed special status for Transdniestria while at the same time affirming Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Medvedev jointly proposed the creation of a new EU-Russia security forum on June 5, which was to work on a solution for the dispute. Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat welcomed this proposal. Meeting on the sidelines of two soccer matches in August and October, Filat and Smirnov agreed on further trust-building measures and the restoration of fixed telephony. Moldova repeatedly called for a status change of the US and EU in the 5+2 negotiations from observer to mediator. In the run-up to Moldova's parliamentary elections on November 28, Transdniestrian police foiled an attempt to set up a polling station in the disputed village of Korzhevo, Dubossary district. (vk, gm)

Russia (Islamist militants/Chechnya)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↘	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Islamist militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession conflict between Islamist rebels in the North Caucasus republic of Chechnya and both the cen-

tral and regional government deescalated. On January 19, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev divided the Southern Federal District to establish the North Caucasian Federal District, comprising the federal republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania as well as the southern region of Stavropol. Medvedev appointed Alexander Khloponin as head of district, serving as deputy prime minister at the same time. Khloponin was to implement a new strategy towards the North Caucasus, i.e. economic development as a means of stabilization for the volatile region. According to the commander of the Russian interior ministry troops, Nikolai Rogozhkin, up to 500 militants were operating in the North Caucasus federal republics [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Dagestan) et al.]. On January 11, Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov created a special unit to capture Dokka Umarov, former Chechen rebel leader and, since October 2007, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. Frequent bomb attacks and violent encounters between security forces and militants resulted in approx. 142 fatalities between December 2009 and August 2010. Responsibility for the attacks was in many cases uncertain but usually attributed to Islamist militants by the authorities. Numerous suicide bombings were reported throughout the year. In a major attack on March 29, two Dagestani women, referred to as Black Widows, blew themselves up in the Moscow metro, killing 38 people. Umarov later claimed responsibility for the attack. On June 30, a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a theater in Grozny, the Chechen capital, which was being visited by Kadyrov at the time. Another suicide bomber wounded ten policemen in Grozny on November 1. In two special operations on 12/17/09 and January 19, government troops killed militant leader Aslan Izrailov in Vedeno district as well as close Umarov associate Gingiskhan Gishaev and three further militants near Grozny, respectively. Fighting between security forces and militants erupted in Urus-Martan district on February 4, leaving six militants and five federal officers dead. In a gunfight in Vedeno district on March 18, six militants, including a close aide to Umarov, and three policemen died. On March 22, Salambek Akhmadov, dubbed the Emir of Grozny, died in a shootout with security forces in neighboring Dagestan. On May 18, the chief of the Chechen operative investigative department died in a bomb blast in Grozny. Some 30 militants launched an attack on Kadyrov's hometown Tsentoroi/Khosi-Yurt on August 29. The attack, which was repelled by security forces, left twelve militants, two security personnel, and five civilians dead. Subsequently, on September 25, Kadyrov announced a major offensive against militant forces across the republic's mountainous areas. On October 19, a militant attack on the Chechen parliament in Grozny claimed six fatalities. In July, Kadyrov stated his approval of the continued intimidation of women not adhering to the Islamic dress code. (lw)

Russia (Islamist militants/Dagestan)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↗	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	Islamist militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The system and secession conflict between Islamist militants and both the central and regional government escalated. Apart from the largest Islamist militant group, Shariat Jamaat, five other groups were operating in the republic. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed these groups received funding from supporters in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Following a proposal by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Magomedislam Magomedov took the office of Dagestan's presidency on February 20. Magomedov pledged to end the violence and voiced plans to pardon militants who laid down their arms. However, up to 272 fatalities in violent incidents involving militants and security forces between December 2009 and August 2010 were reported. Bomb attacks, including some suicide bombings, shoot-outs and ambushes occurred on a regular basis. Responsibility was uncertain in many cases but usually attributed to Shariat Jamaat and other Islamist militants by the authorities. On January 1, a suicide bombing killed six policemen and left some 14 officers wounded in an attack on a police station in Dagestan's capital, Makhachkala. A bomb attack on a gas pipeline on January 12 left more than 200,000 people without gas supplies in Derbent and surrounding districts. On March 29, two female Dagestani suicide bombers, dubbed Black Widows, blew themselves up in the Moscow metro, claiming at least 38 lives. Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the North Caucasus, later claimed responsibility for the attack [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)]. Another twin suicide bombing in front of the local interior ministry and the FSB agency in the town of Kizlyar on March 31 left at least twelve people dead, among them the local police chief and eight policemen, and injured 23. On September 5, a suicide bomber drove a car full of explosive devices into a Russian infantry military training camp near Buinaksk, south of Makhachkala, killing four people and injuring at least 35. On October 24, in a similar attack, a suicide bomber killed a policeman in the town of Khasavyurt. A major attack in Makhachkala on November 11, committed by militants of the Yarmuk Jamaat, left seven police officers dead and seven people injured. In addition to these bomb attacks, security forces and militants were involved in several gun battles, some of which erupted during special operations by government forces. On one of these occasions FSB personnel killed militant field commander and alleged al-Qaeda operative Seyf Islam on February 2. In a shoot-out between militants and security personnel in Makhachkala three days later, the local police chief Ahmed Magomedov and three police officers died. On June 16, a gun battle between Islamist militants and security forces in the village of Kostek left five militants and four security personnel dead. A group of at least ten gunmen armed with automatic rifles and grenade launchers attacked a police post on the outskirts of the village of Leninaul on Au-

gust 6, wounding six police officers. In a special operation on August 21, FSB forces killed close Umarov associate Magomedali Vagabov, who supposedly was behind the Moscow metro bombings and married to one of the suicide bombers. On September 16, security forces killed five suspected militants in a shootout in the village of Gereikhanovo. Special operations near Makhachkala and Kaspysk on September 29 resulted in at least 15 militant fatalities. In a firefight between militants and police forces in Makhachkala on November 11, seven policemen and four militants died. On September 11, Medvedev announced his plans to establish local military units composed of ethnic Dagestanis to fight the militants. (fph)

Russia (Islamist militants/Ingushetia)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Islamist militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession and system conflict between the Ingush Jamaat and both the central and regional authorities continued on a highly violent level. Bomb blasts, gun battles and ambushes against security forces and government officials occurred regularly throughout the year, at times on an almost daily basis. The violence caused at least 156 fatalities between December 2009 and August 2010. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in many cases but usually attributed to Islamist militants by the authorities. According to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the former were subordinated to Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasian Emirate [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)]. On February 1, unidentified attackers fired grenades at the Interior Ministry building in the main Ingush city of Nazran, killing at least one policeman and injuring two. The Sunzha district police chief, Magomed Agiev, was wounded in an attack in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya on February 6. A series of bombings on the outskirts of Nazran on February 19 left two people dead and injured 35, including 22 police officers. On July 5, militants attacked two government trucks, killing two police officers and injuring another five. The same day, unknown attackers killed two security personnel and wounded four in an attack on a military motorcade near Yandare in the Nazran region. On August 4, an unknown attacker killed the former head of security of the Ingush Interior Ministry, Ibragim Yevloyev, in Nazran. Security forces killed militant leader Ilez Gardanov and three of his followers in a shootout on August 24. Unidentified attackers shot dead Ibragim Kalimatov, a Sunzha district authority, in Ordzhonikidzevskaya on September 2. Security forces in Ingushetia conducted special operations throughout the year. On February 12, security forces killed ten alleged militants near the villages of Arshty and Datykh, Sunzha district. Six militants were killed in a special operation in Ekazhevo on March 2 and 3, among them Alexander Tikhomirov alias Said Buryatsky, supposedly involved in the November 2009 bomb attack on a train between the Russian capital Moscow and Saint Petersburg. On June 9, the FSB detained top Ingush militant leader Ali Taziyev alias Emir Magas, suspected of being the military com-

mander of all Islamist jamaats in the Russian North Caucasus republics [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya) et al.]. In a further special operation in Nazran on August 12, special services killed Kharon Pliyev, deputy head of a local armed group. Another local militant leader of the so-called Pliyevo Village Gang was killed by security forces in the district of Nazran on October 21. On January 19, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev established the North Caucasian Federal District comprising the southern region of Stavropol and the Russian North Caucasus republics, except for Adygea. On March 1, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised an additional USD 1.4 billion for the development of Ingushetia by 2016, with USD 70 million for 2010. (kg)

Russia (opposition)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power conflict between the opposition and the government continued. The opposition kept up its protest rallies on the last day of each month with 31 days to draw public attention to article 31 of the constitution, which guarantees the freedom of assembly. In turn, authorities repeatedly detained protesters. On 12/31/09, police arrested between 50 and 100 protesters in Moscow, among them the 82-year-old human rights activist Ljudmila Alekseyeva and several opposition leaders. In protest rallies attended by more than 200 demonstrators in Moscow and Saint Petersburg on March 31, the police detained at least 100 demonstrators including Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Solidarity movement, Maksim Reznik, representative of the Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko, the leader of the unregistered National Bolshevik Party Eduard Limonov, and Oleg Orlov, chairman of the civil rights society Memorial. Further mass arrests followed on May 31 and July 31. On July 16, the parliament passed a bill initiated by President Dmitriy Medvedev which authorized the Federal Security Service (FSB) to arrest suspects for up to 15 days without any legal proceedings. While the authorities claimed that the additional FSB competences were aimed at militant Islamist activity, the opposition accused the government of using them against political dissenters. On September 17, opposition politicians, among them former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, former deputy PM Boris Nemtsov, former deputy minister of energy Vladimir Milov, and former delegate Vladimir Ryzhkov founded an oppositional alliance named For Russia without Arbitrariness and Corruption (FRAC). They furthermore announced the creation of a new party to compete in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012, respectively. On September 17, Nemtsov became the leader of the new political party FRAC. On September 24, a Moscow court ruled that the city authorities acted illegally by refusing opposition groups the right to stage protests. On October 25, Moscow authorities allowed opposition rallies on October 31, under the precondition that not more than one thousand demonstrators take part. Some 800 demonstrators attended the first autho-

rized protest march in Moscow on October 31. Russia held elections in 76 Subjects of the Russian Federation on March 14. Medvedev's United Russia party dominated the elections, while the opposition claimed electoral fraud. (dh, kh)

Russia - Georgia

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1992
Conflict parties:	Russia vs. Georgia	
Conflict items:	international power	

The conflict between Russia and Georgia over international power continued. On January 8, Russia and Georgia resumed direct flights, which had been suspended since their 2008 war. The only border crossing between the two countries situated on Georgian-controlled territory reopened on March 1 after four years of closure. While Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili signaled his country's readiness for bilateral talks without preconditions on June 29, Russia refused any negotiations with the incumbent Georgian government. Russia instead met with Georgian opposition leaders [→ Georgia (opposition)]. Russia continued its calls for an international arms embargo on Georgia, accusing the Georgian government of military buildup. In return, Georgia voiced concerns over France's plan to sell up to four military Mistral vessels to Russia. Furthermore, Russian military cooperation deals with Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the establishment of Russian military bases were considered a violation of the 2008 Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement by Georgia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia); Georgia (South Ossetia)]. Both conflict parties arrested and sentenced individuals on charges of espionage. For instance, on November 5, Georgian authorities arrested 13 persons, including four Russian citizens, suspected of running a Russian military intelligence spy ring. Russia accused Georgia of financing, assisting, and harboring Islamist militants from Russia's North Caucasus region [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya) et al.]. Georgia strengthened its efforts to build relations with the Russian North Caucasus republics' legislative bodies by creating an inter-parliamentary group on February 19. As of October 13, Georgia unilaterally abolished visa requirements for 90-day stays for Russian North Caucasus residents. Subsequently, Russia accused Georgia of destabilizing the region. On March 14, the Georgian pro-government Imedi TV channel aired a fake news report on a Russian invasion of Georgia, sparking panic and anger among viewers. The report was criticized not only by Russia but also the EU and NATO. (mak)

Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)

Intensity: 1	Change: ↘	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	Russia vs. Norway	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The conflict between Russia and Norway over territory and resources in the Barents Sea deescalated. On April 27, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg came to an agreement on the disputed maritime border in the Barents Sea. In

Murmansk on September 15, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Støre signed a treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The treaty was then submitted to the respective national parliaments for ratification. According to Lavrov, both governments hoped that the ratification process would be completed by the end of 2010. (mag)

Russia - Norway et al. (Arctic)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	Russia vs. United States vs. Canada vs. Norway vs. Denmark	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The conflict between Russia, Norway, Canada, Denmark, and the US over territory and resources in the Arctic continued. On March 29, the foreign ministers of the five riparian states of the Arctic met in Chelsea, Canada, to discuss various issues concerning the Arctic region. After Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon had invited the US government to commence negotiations to discuss their territorial claims in the Beaufort Sea in May, talks began between government experts in Ottawa, Canada's capital, on July 22. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for 2011. On August 2, Canada and the US started a five-week joint Arctic survey intended to determine the extent of their respective continental shelves in the Beaufort Sea. Two weeks later, the Canadian government reported that Canadian fighter jets had intercepted two Russian bombers about 56 kilometers from Canada's Arctic coastline. On September 16, Cannon and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed to ask the UN to rule on the two countries' dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater Arctic mountain range which could hold up to 75 billion barrels of oil. Denmark also had made claims concerning parts of the Lomonosov Ridge. At the International Arctic Forum in Moscow one week later, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin defended Russia's claims in the Arctic while at the same time expressing his belief that all existing disputes could be resolved through negotiations. On October 6, the US, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway set up a new Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission in Ottawa to improve mapping of the Arctic. On October 23, the Canadian government announced that it would consider arming the Canadian Coast Guard's icebreakers in order to strengthen Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. (mag)

Serbia (Kosovo)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Kosovar government vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Kosovar government, supported by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the one hand, and the central government of Serbia and parts of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, on the other, continued. The Serbian government insisted on Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, whereas Kosovo continued to view itself as an independent state following its

unilateral declaration of independence on 02/17/08. By late November, 72 states had recognized Kosovo. The UN, especially the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), repeatedly urged the conflict parties to conciliate relations. On July 22, the ICJ delivered its advisory opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, ruling that it did not violate international law. While the Kosovar government endorsed the decision, leading Serbian politicians voiced their disappointment. Contrary to an initial draft condemning Kosovo's declaration of independence, Serbia introduced a resolution to the UN General Assembly assigning the EU a leading role in a future dialogue between the conflicting parties. The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on September 9. However, the dialogue's start was impeded due to discord over a possible discussion of Kosovo's future status. After Kosovar President Fatmir Sejdiu's resignation on September 27 and a successful no-confidence vote of the Kosovo parliament on November 2, the Kosovar government postponed the dialogue until after the Kosovo elections scheduled for December 12. On November 10, Serbia called on Serbs in Kosovo not to take part in the elections as necessary conditions were not met. Kosovska Mitrovica, a town in northern Kosovo divided between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, was the site of frequent protests, some of which resulted in violent incidents. For example, ethnic Albanians clashed with ethnic Serbs after a demonstration of approx. 2,000 ethnic Albanians against local elections organized by Serbia on May 30. Kosovo police, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), and European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) forces separated the groups using teargas. Two members of the Kosovo police were injured. On July 2, thousands of Serbs protested against the Kosovo government's plans to open a civil registry office in the Serb-dominated north as part of a wider attempt to extend its administrative reach into this region. Unknown perpetrators threw two hand grenades at the protest, killing one participant and injuring eleven others. On July 5, an unidentified gunman shot at an ethnic Serb member of Kosovo's parliament. A Kosovo Albanian was shot dead in the predominantly Serb part of Kosovska Mitrovica on September 7. In several unrelated incidents, unknown perpetrators set off at least 17 explosive devices in Kosovska Mitrovica and the nearby communities of Zubin Potok and Zvecan, including an attack on an EULEX vehicle on March 13 and an assault on a KFOR residence on May 19. Additionally, supposedly ethnic Albanian assailants attacked Serb returnees in Kosovo's northwestern Pec district in April, May and August. At least one returnee was injured. After an estimated 100,000 Serbs in Kosovo had been cut off by the dismantling of Serbian telecommunication facilities in late April and September, sparking mass protests, unknown assailants blew up several similar facilities operated by Kosovo Albanian companies. Meanwhile, KFOR reduced its troops from 15,000 to 10,000 by the end of January and announced a further reduction of 5,000 on October 29. (gm)

Slovenia - Croatia

Intensity: 1	Change: •	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Slovenia vs. Croatia	
Conflict items:	territory	

The maritime and land border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, which had slowed down Croatia's EU accession in the past, continued. An agreement allowing international arbitrators to find a binding solution for the border dispute had been reached on 11/04/09 and was ratified by the Croatian parliament on 11/20/09. On March 23, Slovenia's constitutional court ruled that the border arbitration agreement was in line with the constitution, clearing it for parliamentary ratification. Three days later, Slovenia's major political parties agreed to submit the arbitration agreement to a binding referendum after its ratification by parliament. The governing coalition ratified the agreement in parliament on April 19. The opposition parties boycotted the vote, claiming the agreement harmed Slovenian interests. On June 6, in a binding referendum, the Slovenian public accepted the arbitration agreement with a narrow majority of 51 to 48 percent. On November 25, Samuel Zbogar announced that both countries had exchanged notes on the arbitration agreement, which was thus to come into effect on November 29. The appointment of arbiters was set to begin after the signing of Croatia's EU accession treaty. As Slovenia successively withdrew its objections to Croatia's EU accession throughout the first half of the year, Croatia opened the last of its 35 negotiation chapters on June 30. (sth)

Spain (Catalan nationalists/Catalonia)

Intensity: 1	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	ERC, CiU, Catalan regional government vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict concerning the status of Catalonia between the Catalan regional government, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), and the Convergence and Union (CiU) party, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. The Popular Consultation on the Independence of the Catalan Nation, a private initiative, held five referendums on independence in different parts of Catalonia between December 2009 and October. The referendums did not have any legal significance since the central government had not mandated them. On June 28, the Constitutional Court ruled on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. The statute had been adopted by the Spanish parliament and endorsed by Catalan voters in a referendum in 2006 but had later been challenged before the Constitutional Court by the conservative People's Party (PP). Out of the statute's 233 articles, the court declared 14 unconstitutional and changed another 23. The court ruled that while the description of Catalonia as a nation in the statute's preamble did not violate the Spanish constitution, it held no legal value either. The changes drew heavy criticism from Catalan political parties, among them the ERC and CiU. On July 10, more than one million people demonstrated in Catalonia in support of the autonomy statute and against the Con-

stitutional Court's ruling. On July 21, Catalan regional president José Montilla stressed that Catalonia was a nation and reported that he had expressed his view to Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero that the ruling attacked the dignity of Catalans. Several thousand demonstrators protested for Catalan independence in Barcelona on September 11, some of them burning Spanish and French national flags as well as pictures of King Juan Carlos I. In the Catalan regional election held on November 28, the CiU won 62 of the 135 regional parliament seats, gaining 14 seats compared with the 2006 election. (dh)

Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1959
Conflict parties:	ETA, PNV vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) and the government concerning independence for the Basque provinces continued. Throughout the year, Spanish, French, Portuguese, British, and Belgian authorities arrested more than fifty suspected members and supporters of ETA and the Basque pro-independence organization SEGI. Among them were several leading figures of the organizations. For instance, on February 13, the Guardia Civil arrested Ibai Beobide Arza, suspected of having committed a bomb attack against the headquarters of a public broadcaster in 2008. On February 28, French and Spanish police forces detained three ETA members in the French Normandy region, among them Ibon Gogea-coechea, suspected to be ETA's commander and military chief. On May 20, his alleged successor, Mikel Kabikoitz Karrera Sarobe, was also arrested in France. Trials against three suspected ETA members accused of carrying out the Madrid airport bombing in 2006 commenced on May 3. Throughout the year, ETA largely refrained from violent attacks. However, ETA members killed a French police officer near Paris in a shootout during a routine check on March 16. He was the first member of France's security forces ever killed by the group. In reaction, French president Nicolas Sarkozy pledged to exterminate all ETA bases on French territory. In April and September, unknown assailants committed minor bomb attacks in Llodio and Vitoria, causing material damage but no injuries. Throughout August, unknown perpetrators with suspected links to Basque separatists repeatedly set garbage containers on fire and threw petrol bombs in various Basque cities. In Bilbao, thousands of people demonstrated for better prison conditions for ETA members on January 2. On August 15, thousands of protesters, including approx. 5,000 supporters of the banned Basque nationalist Batasuna party, staged a demonstration for an independent Basque Country in San Sebastián. On September 5, ETA declared a unilateral ceasefire. The government dismissed the announcement as insufficient. Emphasizing that ETA had used ceasefires as tactical moves before, authorities demanded that ETA denounce all violence permanently. On September 19, ETA called for international mediation to resolve the Basque conflict. (dh)

Turkey - Armenia

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Turkey vs. Armenia	
Conflict items:	international power, other	

The conflict between Turkey and Armenia over international power and Turkey's unwillingness to recognize mass killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire in the course of World War I as genocide, continued. After the conflict parties had signed protocols on reopening their common border and to establish diplomatic ties as well as a joint commission of independent historians to investigate the genocide issue on 10/10/09, the reconciliation process increasingly stalled throughout 2010. On January 12, the Armenian constitutional court approved the constitutionality of the protocols. According to the court's ruling, these were not to be interpreted as contradicting the Armenian constitution's preamble, which proclaimed the recognition of the genocide as policy priority. Furthermore, the court stated that rapprochement efforts between Armenia and Turkey should have no bearing on the Nagorno Karabakh (NK) peace process [→ Azerbaijan - Armenia; Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)]. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had insisted on the link between the ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia and the solution of the NK issue before, criticized the court's decision. Following a meeting with his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian in London on January 29, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned of a failure of the recent reconciliation efforts. However, on February 12, Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian submitted the protocols to parliament, nevertheless reaffirming that discussion of the documents would only be commenced after approval by the Turkish parliament. On April 22, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian recalled the normalization protocols from parliament, arguing that Turkey did not display any willingness to move forward with the process. Hence, throughout the year, the reconciliation process became increasingly stalled, with both parties refusing to open their common border. While Armenia made the ratification of the protocols a precondition, Turkey demanded the NK issue be solved in advance. In July, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Turkey to open the common border. Following two separate non-binding resolutions of the US House of Representatives and the Swedish parliament recognizing the Ottoman Empire's mass killings of Armenians as genocide on March 4 and March 11 respectively, the Turkish government recalled its ambassadors to both countries. However, subsequent rapprochement efforts of the Swedish and US governments led to their return shortly after. On March 16, Erdogan threatened to extradite 100,000 illegal Armenian migrants, which Sarkisian criticized as hampering their countries' reconciliatory efforts. Erdogan distanced himself from his prior statement on March 20, claiming no immediate plans for deportation existed. On April 24, some 100,000 Armenians marked the 95th anniversary of the mass killings. (jd, sh)

United Kingdom (Nationalists/Northern Ireland)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1968
Conflict parties:	IRA, RIRA, ONH, CIRA, INLA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, DUP, UUP, Orange Order, UDA, UVF, RHC	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the two antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom (UK) continued. On February 5, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin reached an agreement over the devolution of policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland at Hillsborough Castle. Shortly after the agreement had come into effect on April 12, the dissident Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) detonated a car bomb in front of the MI5 regional headquarters outside Belfast. The same day, the Northern Ireland Assembly appointed David Ford of the cross-community Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (Alliance) as the minister in charge of the new Department of Justice. On April 20, a working group, requested by the DUP as part of the Hillsborough Agreement, published a blueprint for a new parades body to rule on controversial marches. Because the Orange Order rejected the working group's proposal, the Minister of State declared on September 28 that the original Parades Commission would continue its work. In the UK general election on May 6, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) retained their seats, while the DUP lost one seat to the Alliance. On January 6, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and, on February 8, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Official IRA, and the South East Antrim UDA declared decommissioning of their weapons completed. On May 28, unknown assailants shot dead Bobby Mofett, a former member of the loyalist Red Hand Commandos. The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reported that the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) leadership had sanctioned the murder. On the day of the annual 12 July parades, approx. 200 rioters clashed with police in north Belfast and Londonderry. 27 police officers were injured, three of them by shotgun fire. Riots continued throughout the following days. On October 25, unknown assailants hijacked a bus as well as several cars and set them on fire in the mainly loyalist area of north Belfast. The dissident republican Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) claimed responsibility for the attempted murder of a police constable on January 8, a car bomb attack on a police station in Londonderry on August 3, and a hand grenade attack on November 5, leaving three policemen injured. On November 8, the RIRA claimed responsibility for at least five gun killings over the previous 13 months. In November, the IMC reported a high level of dissident activity from March to August, designating the RIRA and the ONH as the most active and dangerous republican groups and specifying that RIRA factions were responsible for 18 attacks on security forces. According to the


report, the UDA continued recruitment even though it remained committed to the peace process. (jb)

USA - Russia (missile system)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	USA vs. Russia	
Conflict items:	international power	


The conflict over international power between the USA and Russia continued. On 12/29/09, Russian Premier Vladimir Putin named US plans to build a missile defense system as the main obstacle to the negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Nevertheless, on April 8 both parties signed the treaty allowing both sides to engage in limited missile defense. Two days before, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had stated that Russia had the right to drop out of the treaty if the US missile defense system started to significantly affect the efficiency of Russia's strategic forces. On January 21, the Polish government announced that US Patriot surface-to-air missiles would be stationed at a military base near Morag in northern Poland, bordering the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. In October 2009, the US government had promised Poland to deploy the missiles after shelving initial plans for a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. On May 23, one Patriot battery and 100 US military personnel arrived in Morag. On July 3, the US and Poland signed an agreement on the establishment of a permanent US missile base in Poland. In Romania, the Supreme Defense Council approved to host up to 24 ground-based US SM-3 missile interceptors in early February. The same month, Bulgaria announced preliminary talks with the US on hosting parts of a US missile shield. While all of these actions drew immediate criticism from Russia, Lavrov announced on April 6 that the stationing of interceptor missiles in Romania seemed acceptable to Russia. Since March 27, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had repeatedly proposed a Euro-Atlantic missile defense system in cooperation with Russia. On April 28, he further stated that NATO and the US were seeking to revive the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), suspended by Russia in 2007. Russia signaled interest in a new treaty on conventional weapons in Europe but stressed that negotiations should also include missile defense. At the NATO summit in Lisbon starting on November 19, the NATO member states agreed on establishing a common missile defense system covering all European NATO territory as well as the US. Russia agreed to cooperate on the missile defense system. However, on November 30, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned that a failure by Russia and NATO to reach an agreement could start a new arms race and force Russia to deploy new means of attack. (gp)

Sub-Saharan Africa




Compared to 2009, the number of conflicts in Africa remained constant with a total of 85 cases. While the total number of highly violent conflicts declined by four, from ten to six cases, a further conflict escalated to the intensity of a full scale war. Therefore, two wars were observed in the region: In addition to the continuing war between militant Islamist groups and the government in Somalia [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)], the conflict in the Sudanese region Darfur escalated to the intensity of a war again, after it already had been fought out on this level of intensity between 2004 and 2008 [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. Furthermore, Somali al-Shabaab not only committed attacks in Somalia but also claimed responsibility for the twin bomb attacks in Uganda, the main troop contributor to AMISOM. The number of crises increased slightly by three, leading to a new total of 34. In addition, one new conflict emerged in 2010 as tensions rose between various opposition groups and the government of Paul Kagame in Ruanda prior to the August elections. The most frequent conflict item in the region was resources with 32 cases, often combined with the second-most frequent item, regional predominance (27 cases), or national power (25). As in the years before, two areas of interrelated, highly violent and often border-transcending conflicts characterized the region. In the first area, encompassing the states of Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, most conflicts remained on a highly violent level. The second area of highly violent conflicts contained the states of the Great Lakes region, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the DR Congo. In this region the tendency of conflicts to transcend borders increased, as a Burundian rebel group resumed activities in the eastern DR Congo [→ Burundi (FNL Rwaswa)], while the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army remained highly active in Sudan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-LRA)], as well as in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic [→ Uganda (LRA)]. With a total of four cases, sub-Saharan Africa showed the highest number of attempted or successful coup d'états. While three of them failed [→ Madagascar (TGV - TIM); Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)], military forces led by Colonel Salou Djibo toppled President Madaou Tandja in Niger [→ Niger (opposition)].

Conflict Intensities in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 compared to 2009



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 in sub-Saharan Africa by Intensity Groups



Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Angola (FLEC/Cabinda)	FLEC vs. government	secession, resources	1975	•	3
Angola - DR Congo*	Angola vs. DR Congo	territory, resources, other	2009	•	2
Botswana (Basarwa)*	Basarwa vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1997	•	2
Burundi (FNL Rwanda)	FNL-faction led by Agathon Rwasa vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Burundi (Hutu - Tutsi)*	various Hutu parties vs. various Tutsi parties	national power	1962	•	2
Burundi (opposition)	FRODEBU, UPRONA, FNL-Icanzo, MSD, UPD, CNDD vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Burundi - Rwanda (border)*	Burundi vs. Rwanda	territory	1960	•	1
Cameroon (insurgents/Bakassi)*	insurgents vs. government	autonomy	2006	•	2
Central African Republic (various rebel groups)	APRD, UFDR, FDPC, CPJP vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Chad (ethnic groups)*	Arab ethnic communities vs. African ethnic communities	regional predominance	2003	↘	1
Chad (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	1990	•	1
Chad (various rebel groups)	UFR, PFNR, MPRD, UFDD, RDC, FSR, DMCR, NADC, NRA vs. government	national power, resources	2005	↘	3
Chad - Sudan	Chad vs. Sudan	international power	2003	↘	2
Comoros (Anjouan, Mohéli)*	regional government of Mohéli vs. regional government of Anjouan, federal government on Grande Comore	national power	1997	↑	3
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)	RHDP vs. FPI	national power	2000	↗	3
Côte d'Ivoire (rebels)*	FN vs. government	national power	1999	•	2
DR Congo (Bundu dia Kongo)*	Bundu dia Kongo vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2000	↘	1
DR Congo (CNDP)*	CNDP factions vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2004	•	2
DR Congo (Enyele)	Enyele vs. government	regional predominance	2009	•	4
DR Congo (FDLR)	FDLR vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1997	↘	3
DR Congo (FRF)*	Federal Republican Forces vs. government	regional predominance	1998	•	3
DR Congo (Hema - Lendu)*	Hema vs. Lendu	regional predominance, resources	2000	•	1
DR Congo (Ituri militias)*	Hema militias, Lendu militias vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2004	•	3
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	various Mayi-Mayi groups vs. CNPD, government	regional predominance, resources	2004	•	3
DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UPDS)*	MLC, RCD, UPDS, MPDC vs. government	national power, resources	1997	↘	1
DR Congo - Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	regional predominance, resources	2002	•	1
Equatorial Guinea - Gabon*	Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon	territory, resources	1970	•	1
Eritrea - Djibouti*	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	territory	1995	↘	1
Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya)	OLF vs. government	secession	1974	•	3
Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden)	ONLF vs. government	secession, resources	1984	•	4
Ethiopia (opposition)*	CUD, Medrek, AEUP, EDCF vs. government	national power	2005	↗	3
Ethiopia (Oromo - Somali)*	Oromo vs. Somali	regional predominance, resources	2005	↘	2
Ethiopia (TPDM)*	TPDM vs. government	regional predominance	2002	↘	1
Ethiopia - Eritrea*	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	territory, international power	1998	•	2
Gabon (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2009	↘	2
Guinea (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)	coup plotters vs. government	national power, resources	2008	•	3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³ Int. ⁴
Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC)*	opposition vs. PAIGC (government)	national power	1998	• 1
Kenya (ethnic groups)	Samburu vs. Toposa vs. Turkana vs. Pokot	regional predominance, resources	1991	• 3
Kenya (Mungiki)	Mungiki group vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance	2002	• 3
Kenya (opposition)	ODM vs. PNU	system/ideology, national power	1999	• 2
Kenya (SLDF)*	Soy, Ndorobo, SLDF vs. government	regional predominance	2002	↘ 1
Madagascar (TGV - TIM)	TIM vs. TGV	national power	2009	• 3
Mali (AQIM)	AQIM vs. government	regional predominance	2009	• 3
Mali (Tuareg/Kidal)*	Tuareg vs. government	autonomy, resources	1989	↘ 2
Niger (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	regional predominance	2009	• 2
Niger (opposition)	opposition groups, coup plotters vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↗ 3
Niger (Tuareg/Agadez)*	MNJ vs. government	autonomy, resources	1999	↘ 2
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Boko Haram vs. government	system/ideology	2003	↘ 3
Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)*	Christian groups vs. Muslims groups	system/ideology, regional predominance	1960	• 3
Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists)	farmers vs. pastoralists	regional predominance, resources	1960	↗ 4
Nigeria (MASSOB/Biafra)*	MASSOB vs. government	secession	1967	↗ 3
Nigeria (MEND, Ijaw/Niger Delta)	MEND, JRC, Ijaw, NDV vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1997	↘ 3
Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni/Niger Delta)*	MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government	autonomy, resources	1990	• 1
Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)*	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	territory, resources	1961	• 1
Republic of Congo (CNR, Ninja militias)*	CNR, Ninja militias vs. government	autonomy	1997	• 2
Rwanda (opposition)	UDF, PS, DGPR, ex-RPF vs. government	national power	2010	NEW 2
Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)	FDLR, ex-FAR, oppositional Hutu Groups vs. government	national power	1990	• 3
Rwanda - France*	Rwanda vs. France	international power, other	2004	↘ 1
Rwanda - Uganda*	Rwanda vs. Uganda	international power, resources	2000	• 1
Senegal (MFDC/Casamance)	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	• 3
Sierra Leone (AFRC, RUF)*	RUF, AFRC vs. government	national power, resources	1991	• 1
Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)*	al-Shabaab vs. Hizbul Islam	regional predominance	2009	• 3
Somalia (Islamist groups)	Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab vs. ASWJ, TFG	system/ideology, national power	2006	• 5
Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	territory, regional predominance, resources	1998	• 3
Somalia (Puntland)*	autonomous region of Puntland vs. Transitional Federal Government	autonomy	1998	• 1
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. Transitional Federal Government	secession	1991	• 1
South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal)*	IFP vs. ANC	regional predominance	1990	• 1
South Africa (xenophobes - immigrants)*	xenophobes vs. immigrants	other	2008	• 3
South Africa - Namibia*	South Africa vs. Namibia	territory, resources	1991	• 1
Sudan (Darfur)	JEM, SLM/A-AW, LJM, SLRF, SLA-Unity, SLA-Juba, SLA-BA, URF vs. government, Janjaweed, SLM/A-MM	regional predominance, resources	2003	↗ 5
Sudan (Eastern Front)*	Eastern Front vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	• 1
Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A)	LRA vs. SPLM/A	regional predominance	1994	• 3
Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)	GoSS vs. government of Sudan in Khartoum	territory, secession, resources	1955	• 3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Sudan (various ethnic groups)*	Murle vs. Lou-Nuer vs. Jikany-Nuer vs. Dinka-Bor vs. Mundari vs. Anyuak	regional predominance	2008	↘	3
Sudan - Uganda*	Sudan vs. Uganda	territory, international power, other	1994	•	1
Swaziland (opposition)*	PUDEMO, COSATU, SWAYOCO vs. government	system/ideology	1998	↘	2
Swaziland - South Africa*	Swaziland vs. South Africa	territory	1902	•	1
Tanzania (CUF/Zanzibar)*	CUF vs. regional government	secession	1993	↘	1
Togo (opposition)*	NAC vs. government	national power	2002	•	1
Uganda (ADF/NALU)*	ADF vs. government	national power, resources	1987	•	2
Uganda (Baganda/Buganda)	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	autonomy, resources	1995	•	3
Uganda (LRA)	LRA vs. government	regional predominance	1987	•	4
Uganda - DR Congo (Lake Albert)*	Uganda vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2007	•	2
Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M - ZANU-PF)	MDC-T, MDC-M vs. ZANU-PF	national power	2000	•	3

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Angola (FLEC/Cabinda)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	FLEC vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The secession conflict between the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and the government over the status of oil-rich Cabinda remained violent. On January 8, two people were killed and another ten injured in an attack on the Togolese national soccer team in Cabinda. The team had been travelling to the Africa Cup of Nations hosted by Angola. Two factions of FLEC, FLEC-Military Position and FLEC-Armed Forces of Cabinda, claimed responsibility for this incident. Subsequently, the government deployed 30,000 soldiers to Cabinda. Nine suspected FLEC members were arrested. Furthermore, Angola called on the French government to extradite FLEC top leaders living in exile in France. On July 9, the Angolan government said it was willing to start peace talks with FLEC, responding to an offer of talks proposed by FLEC members on June 29. On August 26, top FLEC leader Henrique N'Zita Tiago turned down the peace offer, declaring that it had been proposed without his approval. Together with other FLEC leaders in exile, he deposed the people responsible for the proposal. Furthermore, he called on his followers to continue operations. A FLEC faction claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy securing Chinese mine workers on November 9, killing two Angolan soldiers. (Imp)

Burundi (FNL Rwasa)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	FNL-faction led by Agathon Rwasa vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between Agathon Rwasa's former Hutu rebel group National Liberation Forces (FNL) and the government intensified. The FNL had transformed into a political party in 2009 and was considered the main rival to President Pierre Nkurunziza's ruling party,

National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), in the general elections. On 12/17/09, the UN Security Council extended BINUB's mandate by another year. In the run-up to the general elections [→ Burundi (opposition)], FNL supporters repeatedly clashed with CNDD-FDD supporters and security forces. Four FNL members were wounded in one such clash with members of CNDD-FDD's youth wing Imbonerakure on January 23. FNL affiliates also clashed with members of the pro-government FNL breakaway faction FNL-Iragi rya Gahutu, led by Jacques Kenese. According to the FNL, 17 of its supporters were killed during the campaign period. After the first round of elections on May 24, the FNL pulled out of the election process. Starting in June, a series of grenade attacks mostly by unknown perpetrators killed at least eight and wounded more than 60. E.g., one grenade killed a local FNL official in Kanyosha town, Bujumbura, and another targeted the home of General Evariste Ndayishimiye, a senior adviser of Nkurunziza, on June 28. Following rumors that security forces would try to arrest Rwasa, clashes involving hundreds of his supporters and police flared up next to his house on June 16, wounding some 15 people seriously and one fatally. At least 30 people were detained. One week later, Rwasa disappeared from Bujumbura, supposedly hiding in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In late June and on July 8, Rwasa accused the government of attempting to kill him. On August 1, an FNL congress replaced Rwasa with Emmanuel Miburo. While the interior minister recognized Miburo as new FNL leader, Rwasa threatened with consequences. Fears concerning the reemergence of warfare increased when 50 unidentified gunmen attacked two villages near the Rukoko swamps, a former refuge of FNL rebels on the DRC border. However, security forces repeatedly denied the existence of any rebel activities, speaking of armed bandits instead. For instance, in early September, police killed four armed men in Cibitoke province. On September 9, the army reported a major and three other officers missing, all of whom were former FNL

fighters integrated into the army. In mid-September, security forces launched a large-scale operation in the Rukoko swamps. From September 12 to 22, a total of 14 bodies, among them one police officer and four FNL members, were discovered in the Rusizi River. A local human rights group accused the security forces of extra-judicially executing 22 FNL members in September alone, which was denied by police and secret service. On November 2, a government spokesman claimed the armed groups responsible for the recent series of killings and attacks had been defeated. On November 4, unknown assailants killed a local FNL leader in Bujumbura Rural. The same day, Congolese troops clashed with supposed FNL fighters in South Kivu, DRC. Two civilians were killed. A joint attack of FNL fighters and DRC-based Rwandan Hutu rebels [→ DR Congo (FDLR)] on an army post in Mibunda, South Kivu, on November 7 and 8, left ten soldiers dead. In late October, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC had allegedly agreed on a common strategy for joint operations against rebel groups. According to a UN report, FNL numbered 700 fighters in South Kivu. On November 9, a civilian was killed in an hour-long gun battle between armed assailants and security forces in the Rugazi region, Burundi, another former FNL stronghold. (hlm)

Burundi (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	FRODEBU, UPRONA, FNL-Icanzo, MSD, UPD, CNDD vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between several opposition parties and the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, continued. The run-up to the general elections was marked by violent incidents. For instance, a leader of the Union for Peace and Development (UPD) was killed in Bubanza province on January 10, and a member of the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) was injured by a grenade in Cankuzo the same day. The CNDD-FDD's youth wing Imbonerakure repeatedly clashed with opposition supporters, especially those of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). After the CNDD-FDD announced its own victory with 64 percent of the vote in the local elections held on March 24, 13 opposition parties of both Tutsi and Hutu ethnicity accused the government of electoral fraud. Forming the umbrella Alliance of Democrats for Change, they announced a boycott of both the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for June 28 and July 23, respectively. Among the six opposition leaders withdrawing their candidacy were former President Domitien Ndayizeye of FRODEBU, Alexis Sinduhije from MSD, and Agathon Rwasa from the National Liberation Front (FNL) [→ Burundi (FNL Rwanda)]. The EU and AU voiced concerns about Nkurunziza being the only candidate in presidential elections. In June and July, unknown assailants launched 60 grenade attacks and assaulted members of the opposing parties. Both sides accused each other of being behind the attacks. Security forces detained

scores of opposition supporters, especially from the MSD and FNL. By July, Rwasa, Sinduhije, and Leonard Nyangoma of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) had fled the country fearing arrest. Nkurunziza won the June 28 presidential election with 91 percent of the vote. The opposition again accused the government of electoral fraud. The attacks against both government as well as opposition supporters continued throughout the election process. On November 3, following international pressure, the government announced it would set up a commission to investigate the allegations of extra-judicial executions of opposition supporters by security forces. (bs)

Central African Republic (various rebel groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	APRD, UFDR, FDPC, CPJP vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between various rebel groups and the government remained violent. The government was supported by the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), deployed in 2008. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, had sought to revive the 2006 national peace agreement throughout 2008 and 2009. However, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) continued to fight the government. On 12/07/09, several CPJP fighters were killed when government forces attacked a rebel base near Ngarba close to the Chadian border. On 12/14/09, the UN mission MINURCAT deployed soldiers to guard a Sudanese refugee camp in the northeast Central African Republic (CAR) against rebel attacks. One day later, ECCAS military observers arrived to monitor the disarmament process in accordance with the national peace agreement. However, disarmament was halted due to the deteriorating security situation. In late December 2009, government forces captured CPJP leader Charles Massi in the border triangle of Chad, Cameroon and the CAR. On January 15, opposition parties, including the APRD, announced they would quit the election process due to rumors of planned ballot rigging by President François Bozizé. In late January, Bozizé confirmed the death of Massi. The CPJP claimed that Massi had been killed by the government. In March, the disarmament process resumed. On March 27, Bozizé agreed to a postponement of elections postulated by the Mixed Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), consisting of opposition parties, members of civil society and former rebel groups, and set May 16 as the new date of the election. On April 2, CPJP fighters took the northeastern town of Ndélé, demanding talks with the government concerning the death of Massi. The government claimed ten CPJP fighters had been killed when government forces recaptured the town the following day. On April 29, Bozizé declared the indefinite postponement of the presidential elections. On May 28, the Con-

stitutional Court validated a bill concerning the extension of Bozizé's term. Parliament had passed the bill on May 10. In early June, Bozizé denied involvement in Massi's death. On June 10, government forces clashed with CPJP fighters in Ndélé, thereby ending a series of CPJP attacks that had started in late May. The government claimed that several rebels had been killed. On June 17, the CEI announced elections would be held on October 24. A UFDR faction and CPJP members attacked an army base in Birao on July 19. The government claimed that 13 assailants and one soldier had been killed in the attack. On August 11, the CEI approved January 31, 2011 as the new election date. The CPJP stated it had attacked an army base on August 30. On September 18, the CPJP occupied the town of Yalinga. However, the government recaptured the town on October 4. CPJP refuted the reports. On September 24, the government accused opposition leader Martin Ziguélé of being the new CPJP leader. On October 6, five people were killed when UFDR fighters clashed with LRA fighters mainly operating on CAR territory [→ Uganda (LRA)]. The government claimed that CPJP fighters had abducted 21 CEI members near Birao in late October. CPJP denied the allegations. On November 15, MINURCAT withdrew from the CAR. On November 24, CPJP fighters took over Birao, northeast CAR, which had been protected by MINURCAT. At least four soldiers were killed. Two days later, the government claimed the recapture of Birao, and stated that five soldiers as well as several CPJP fighters had been killed, which the CPJP denied. On November 30, the CPJP stated it had retreated from Birao. According to CPJP, the Chadian Army, supported by tanks, had crossed the border into CAR and attacked CPJP fighters in Birao. CPJP accused the Chadian army of having conducted air strikes in the attack on Birao, leading to fatalities among the residents. The Chadian army declared the operation in Birao had been conducted in order to pursue renegade Chadian soldiers supporting the CPJP, and denied having carried out air strikes. The CAR government, in turn, denied the Chadian army had intervened and captured Birao. (ng)

Chad (various rebel groups)

Intensity: 3	Change:	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	UFR, PFNR, MPRD, UFDD, RDC, FSR, DMCR, NADC, NRA vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power, resources	

The conflict over national power and resources between several rebel coalitions and the government deescalated. This development was closely linked to the significant rapprochement between Chad and Sudan, which resulted in the abandonment of support for rebel movements in the respective bordering state as well as the establishment of a Joint Border Force in early February [→ Chad - Sudan]. Various rebel groups were forced to leave Dafur, Sudan, which had served as their rear base in the past. On 12/15/09, government forces clashed with rebels of the Union of Forces for Resistance (UFR) near the towns of Adé and Tissi in the east of the country. In early January, the Chadian army arrested southern rebel commander Colonel Djibrine Dassert, head of the

rebel Movement for Peace, Reconciliation and Progress (MPRD). On January 16, the Chadian Air Force bombarded rebel positions of the UFR near the village of Tissi. On April 2, a Chadian government delegation contacted UFR rebels in Sudan, seeking to start peace negotiations. Between April 24 and 28, fighting erupted between the Popular Front for National Rebirth (PFNR) and government troops. In Tamassi, near Chad's border with Sudan, the army reportedly killed more than 100 rebels, arresting another 80, while sustaining nine casualties itself. The PFNR confirmed the fighting but rejected the government's death toll. On May 17, the rebel group Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), the Revolutionary Democratic Council (RDC), the Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FSR), and the Democratic Movement for Chadian Renovation (DMCR) formed the National Alliance for Democratic Change (NADC). Against the backdrop of decreasing support by the Sudanese government, more than four batches of Chadian rebels left Darfur. Between April 1 and 4, the government held talks with UFR and the National Resistance Army (ANR) in Khartoum mediated by Sudan. On October 12, a number of UFR members renounced the armed struggle and accepted an amnesty offered by the government. Chad rejected the extension of the MINURCAT mandate, which would lead to the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers by the end of the year. According to government sources, 4,000 fighters from UFDD, UFR and RDC laid down their arms during a demobilization ceremony at the town of Moussoro in the Bahr al-Gazel region on November 8. (jk)

Chad - Sudan

Intensity: 2	Change:	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	Chad vs. Sudan	
Conflict items:	international power	

The conflict between Chad and Sudan over the support of rebel groups as well as the violation of sovereignty through cross-border military operations abated significantly. Both governments normalized their bilateral relations by stopping their support for rebel groups fighting in the respective neighboring country. This happened against the backdrop of upcoming elections in Sudan in April and in Chad in February and April 2011 as well as the referendum on self-determination in Southern Sudan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)] scheduled for January 2011. On 12/25/09, Sudan and Chad agreed to revive a security protocol from 2006 to control joint borders and ban any activities by armed opposition groups in the two countries. On January 7, Sudanese and Chadian delegations discussed a number of border security issues. Talks were concluded on January 15 with an agreement that provided for a joint force of 3,000 troops deployed at the common border. The conflict parties also agreed to deny rear bases in the respective countries to rebel movements. The border force was deployed on February 20. On April 13, the border was re-opened. It had been closed since 2003 in the context of the evolving Darfur conflict [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. On May 27, Chadian President Idriss Déby attended the inauguration of Omar al-Bashir as the re-elected Sudanese president. Despite

being required by the ICC statute to arrest and extradite al-Bashir, Chad did not comply when the Sudanese president visited Chad on July 23. Sudan stopped its support of Chadian rebel groups on its territory, holding talks with the rebels on the issue on October 4 [→ Chad (various rebel groups)]. (jk)

Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2000
Conflict parties:	RHDP vs. FPI	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between the opposition, mainly represented by the Houphouëtist Rally for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), on the one hand, and the government, led by President Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), on the other, escalated. The RHDP mainly consisted of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire, led by former President Henri Konan Bédié, and the Rally of the Republicans, led by former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. In December 2009, presidential elections were scheduled for late February or early March. Over the year, the UN extended the UN-OCI mandate three times, most recently until December 31. On January 9, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) ended its process of reviewing one million contentious names on voting lists, annulling 429,000 of them. The issue of voter eligibility had already played a central role during the civil war [→ Côte d'Ivoire (rebels)]. On February 10 and 11, Gbagbo accused the CEI of manipulating voter registration lists and dissolved both it and the government the following day. These decisions sparked protests between February 12 and 19, leaving seven people dead and dozens injured. Talks, mediated by Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, resulted in the forming of a unity government on February 23 with eleven posts assigned to opposition members. On March 4, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro installed a new government and appointed a new CEI. Tensions rose again at the end of March as the FPI called for a revision of voter registration lists. On May 10 and 17, Soro and Gbagbo held meetings with the oppositional leaders Bédié and Ouattara. On October 31, presidential elections were held, supported by UNOCI and an EU Electoral Observation Mission. A run-off election between Gbagbo and Ouattara was scheduled for November 28. In the run up to the second round, tensions intensified, especially after Bédié, who had received 25 percent of the vote in the first round, called on his supporters to vote for Ouattara in the run-off vote. In late August, the UN had increased UNOCI's force levels to a total of 8,500 peacekeepers. Furthermore, the government deployed 2,000 additional troops all over the country in mid-November. Nevertheless, supporters of both presidential candidates reportedly clashed in Abidjan on November 22. In the week prior to the run-off election, protests against Gbagbo turned violent in Abidjan and left at least seven people dead. The government imposed a night-time curfew, which was denounced as illegal by Ouattara. The elections were held as scheduled but the electoral commission was prevented from

publishing the first results until the end of the observation period. (rb, nch)

DR Congo (Enyele)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	Enyele vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict concerning regional predominance between the Enyele fighters, led by Odjani Mangbama, and the government in the northwestern Équateur province remained violent. Odjani's group had killed over 200 people, mostly from the Boba ethnic group, in the town of Dongo, Sud-Ubange district, in October and November 2009. Enyele forces were allegedly supported by former fighters of Équateur-based Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of the Congo [→ DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UPDS)]. Throughout the year, Odjani's troops clashed with government forces several times. In December 2009, President Joseph Kabila deployed 600 elite troops to Dongo and Sud-Ubange's capital, Gemena, supported by 120 additional police officers from the UN mission MONUC. The government army, the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), engaged Enyele forces in Popito, Tandala, and Bozene, approx. 60 kilometers from Gemena, on 12/08/09, killing several fighters. On 12/13/09, FARDC recaptured Dongo without fighting, as Odjani's militia had already withdrawn. Clashes between Enyele forces and FARDC near Dongo on 12/15/09 left 47 Enyele fighters dead, while 32 soldiers were wounded. The following day, MONUC deployed approx. 6,000 troops to the region. FARDC launched a heavy attack on the village of Enyele on New Year's Eve, killing 157 fighters. On February 27, Enyele fighters allegedly occupied the Makanza region, about 200 km north of Équateur's capital Mbandaka and, later, the town of Bomongo, approx. 100 km from Mbandaka, without fighting. On March 30, Équateur province's governor declared the Enyele rebellion had ended. However, on April 4, dozens of Enyele fighters attacked the governor's mansion in Mbandaka, before occupying the city's airport. FARDC and MONUC recaptured the airport the same day, prompting the Enyele to withdraw from the city. According to the government, the fighting claimed the lives of six FARDC soldiers, three UN personnel, and twelve Enyele. Other sources reported civilian fatalities and the destruction of houses by shells. Approx. 3,000 people were displaced. A Congolese human rights group accused FARDC of executing 49 people, mainly civilians, during the fighting. The government denied the allegations. Since the beginning of the conflict, up to 200,000 people were displaced. On May 4, Odjani apparently surrendered to police near Impfondo, Republic of Congo (ROC). He was transferred to ROC's capital, Brazzaville. DRC demanded his extradition. (sk)

DR Congo (FDLR)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↘	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	FDLR vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources

between the rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government deescalated. FDLR were a Hutu rebel group that originated from the Interahamwe, who were held responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda [→ Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)]. On January 1, the government army Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) launched "Operation Amani Leo" against the FDLR. On 12/23/09, the UN Security Council extended MONUC's mandate until May 31. The UN Security Council renamed MONUC to MONUSCO on May 28 and extended its mandate until 06/30/11. MONUSCO was to support "Operation Amani Leo" under the condition that operations were planned jointly and the FARDC adhered to international humanitarian law. As the FARDC repeatedly failed to meet these conditions, the UN forces frequently abstained from supporting the FARDC. In the preceding "Operation Kimia II", which ended on 12/31/09, 1,400 FDLR had been captured. The FDLR had avoided direct confrontation with the FARDC and retreated to remote areas, such as Walikale territory in Nord-Kivu. Military observers estimated the FDLR was 5,000 strong in February. On March 11, the government reported it had killed or captured 271 FDLR members since the beginning of "Amani Leo". President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, allegedly decided to deploy Rwandan troops to eastern DRC on September 6 [→ Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)]. Reportedly, Rwandan troops were spotted in Walikale territory, DRC, in October. The Rwandan army, however, denied these allegations on November 10. On October 11, French authorities arrested senior FDLR leader and ICC indictee Callixte Mbarushimana in France. Violent activities of the FDLR in the Kivu provinces continued throughout the year. In Nord-Kivu, the FDLR attacked the Nyange refugee camp in Masisi territory on January 22, leaving three dead. On March 22, Noboka Rashidi, leader of Nord-Kivu based Rally for Unity and Democracy, a 400-men-strong FDLR splinter group, surrendered to MONUC. The FDLR was especially active in the minerals-rich Walikale territory, Nord-Kivu, where they formed an alliance with a Mayi-Mayi group, the Mayi-Mayi Cheka [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. On February 24, MONUC stated that the Irameso mining site in Walikale was under the control of the FDLR. On July 24 and September 1, the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka attacked an air strip used for the transportation of minerals from the Bisie mine, kidnapping three pilots. Between July 30 and August 3, approx. 200 FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka occupied several towns and villages in Walikale territory, and raped more than 300 women, men, and children. On August 18, the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka took over the Bisie mine, previously controlled by the FARDC, leaving two government soldiers and one attacker dead. In September, Kabila banned all mining activities in the Kivus and Maniema province. At the same time, the FARDC started an offensive against the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka in order to end their illegal mining activities. By September 29, the mines closest to Walikale town and the nearby air strip were under control of former fighters of the National Congress for the Defense

of the People (CNDP), which had been integrated into FARDC [→ DR Congo (CNDP)]. On October 15, the UN accused FARDC troops of killing and raping villagers in Walikale territory. In Sud-Kivu province, 350 FDLR fighters rejoined the army in February. They had defected to the FDLR in December 2009. On June 9, the government confirmed alliances between the FDLR, the Federalist Republican Forces (FRF), and Mayi-Mayi groups in Sud-Kivu [→ DR Congo (FRF)]. From November 7 to 8, clashes in Fizi territory, between FDLR, FRF, and the Burundi-based National Liberation Forces (FNL), on the one hand, and FARDC, on the other, left ten FARDC members dead [→ Burundi (FNL Rwanda)]. (sk)

DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	various Mayi-Mayi groups vs. CNDP, government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict concerning regional predominance and resources between several Mayi-Mayi militias and the government remained violent. Mayi-Mayi was a general term used to describe various self-organized local defense units in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Different Mayi-Mayi militias were active in the eastern Kivu provinces as well as the northeastern Orientale province. Mayi-Mayi groups in both Kivu provinces repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the pace of their reintegration following the 2009 Goma peace accord. However, Kakule Sikuli, also known as General Lafontaine, leader of a non-integrated Mayi-Mayi faction of the Coalition of Congolese Resistant Patriots (PARECO), surrendered to the government army (FARDC) in late February and expressed his willingness to integrate his faction into the FARDC. Most violent Mayi-Mayi activities concentrated on the vicinity of the Bisie mine in Walikale territory, Nord-Kivu, where fighters of the Mayi-Mayi group led by Ntabo Ntaberi Cheka formed an alliance with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). On April 30, Mayi-Mayi militiamen looted shops in Mubi, Walikale territory, killing five civilians. Between July 30 and August 3, Mayi-Mayi Cheka and FDLR committed mass rapes against 300 women, men, and children. The groups took over the Bisie cassiterite mine on August 18 but were dispelled by FARDC troops in September [→ DR Congo (FDLR)]. The Mayi-Mayi Cheka handed over a leading rebel to MONUSCO on October 5, who had been accused by the UN of having commanded the Mayi-Mayi Cheka during the mass rapes. On October 15, the UN accused FARDC troops of killing, raping, and robbing villagers in Walikale territory. Furthermore, Mayi-Mayi in Nord-Kivu attacked several FARDC and MONUSCO army camps on April 24, August 18, and October 23, leaving 19 dead. Mayi-Mayi activities in Sud-Kivu concentrated on the northeastern shore of Lake Tanganyika. On February 18 and 19, members of a Mayi-Mayi group killed seven FDLR fighters in clashes in Uvira territory. On April 13, clashes between a Mayi-Mayi group led by Yakutumba Amuli and FARDC allegedly left three FARDC soldiers and 15 Mayi-Mayi dead and prompted

most of the residents of Fizi to flee the town. In Opienge, Orientale province, FARDC troops attacked the stronghold of another Mayi-Mayi group on January 5, wounding the group's leader Luc Yabili and leading to the displacement of hundreds. (jog, sk)

Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1974
Conflict parties:	OLF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the government remained violent. In early January, six OLF leaders surrendered along with 250 fighters. According to Lucho Bukhura, a former OLF representative, the OLF had splintered into three factions. In late January, the OLF stated that their struggle against the government would continue despite the surrenders. In April, 15 members of the party Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) were sentenced to lengthy prison terms and, in one case, to death. The government alleged that the convicts had links to the OLF and had plotted against the government. The OLF opposed the court rulings, claiming the convicts were innocent. On May 1, the government announced the arrest of OLF fighters for trying to enter the country via Somaliland. On June 8, the government sentenced 24 alleged OLF fighters to jail. The OLF declared the unification of its factions on October 4. The Kenyan and Ethiopian government launched a military operation against OLF fighters in Moyale County, northeastern Kenya. According to Kenyan government officials, six OLF fighters were arrested and two Kenyan security officers injured. On November 9, the OLF called on Ethiopian opposition groups [→ Ethiopia (opposition)] to unify. (ng)

Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1984
Conflict parties:	ONLF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The conflict between the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the government remained highly violent. The ONLF fought for the independence of the predominantly Muslim-inhabited Ogaden region bordering Somalia. In mid-December 2009, the Somali Islamist rebel movement al-Shabaab claimed to have killed some ONLF fighters and destroyed their strongholds situated in the Lower Juba region, southern Somalia [→ Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)]. According to the ONLF, several Ethiopian soldiers were killed in a series of heavy clashes between the ONLF and government forces between January 3 and 18. On January 31, al-Shabaab claimed that heavy clashes had broken out between their members and ONLF fighters in the Afmadow district of Lower Juba, killing some ONLF fighters. According to the ONLF, the government had committed extra-judicial killings and tortured civilians in the Ogaden region throughout February. The ONLF claimed to have destroyed two government military camps on February 3. Two days later, the ONLF called upon the AU to investigate human rights violations by government

troops in Ogaden. The ONLF claimed several soldiers had been killed in a series of attacks against government troops between March 5-15. On March 28, the government rejected a report from the US State Department accusing the Ethiopian administration of committing atrocities against opposition members, including ONLF members. On March 30, the ONLF accused the government of having destroyed twelve towns and hamlets in Ogaden between March 17-20. According to the ONLF, 239 government soldiers were killed in an offensive from April 11 to 22. On May 8, the government claimed to have killed ONLF deputy commander Abdukerim Sheik Mussie and another 17 ONLF fighters in a raid near the town of Deghabur. According to the ONLF, 94 soldiers were killed and an army base captured on May 17. The government denied the seizure, claiming the attack had been repelled and 59 ONLF fighters killed. On May 29, the ONLF stated it had seized a gas field owned by a foreign oil company in Hilala. The government denied the incident. On June 11, the ONLF alleged the government had killed 71 civilians throughout May, which the latter denied. On August 8, the ONLF announced its fighters had killed 100 soldiers in a series of attacks on government forces between July 14 and August 7. On August 19, the ONLF announced the killing of 44 soldiers in attacks on army bases in Shilabo, Garbo, Denan, and Gode. On August 25, the ONLF accused the government of having burned down several towns in Jijiga province on August 18. On September 6, ONLF repeated warnings against oil and gas companies not to start exploring in Ogaden. The following day, the ONLF claimed to have killed 24 soldiers in an ambush against a government military convoy. In early September, the government of the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland stated that around 200 presumed ONLF fighters had landed with two boats in Zeila, a coastal town in northwestern Somalia. According to Somaliland officials, the ONLF fighters were heading for the border triangle of Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The ONLF denied this. Later that month, the Ethiopian government claimed to have killed 123 ONLF fighters in a military campaign in the Ogaden region. In addition, Ethiopia stated that approx. 90 ONLF fighters had been surrounded by Somaliland soldiers in a Somaliland mountain area bordering Ogaden. The ONLF denied both claims, saying that the government attack had been repelled. According to Somaliland officials, Ethiopian government forces arrived in Somaliland on September 14 in order to pursue ONLF fighters in a joint military campaign with Somaliland security forces. In mid-September, the ONLF claimed to have killed several military officers, among them a leading general, in an attack against a military garrison in Shinile Province. According to the ONLF, the attack was part of a six-day campaign against several provinces in Ogaden which left 183 soldiers dead. On September 21, Ethiopia claimed that some 200 ONLF fighters who had intruded into Somaliland in early September had surrendered to its security forces. The ONLF denied this claim. On October 12, the government signed a peace deal with an ONLF splinter group led by Salahadin Ab-

dulrahman. The ONLF rejected the peace deal, stating that the participating ONLF faction was irrelevant. According to government statements, ONLF members were released from prison on October 17 after a meeting between government officials and representatives of Salahadin's faction three days earlier. On October 21, Ethiopian and Somaliland officials announced cooperation in security matters. On October 31, the ONLF accused government forces of having committed atrocities against Ogaden residents between October 5-19. On November 9, the ONLF stated it had killed 200 soldiers in an offensive against military targets between October and November. The government denounced the statement, claiming the ONLF had disintegrated. (ng)

Gabon (opposition)

Intensity: 2	Change: ▾	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between various opposition groups and the government deescalated. The conflict erupted the year before when Ali Bongo, son and successor of former President Omar Bongo, had been accused of electoral fraud. On February 10, three opposition parties, the Gabonese Union for Democracy and Development, the National Republican Rally, and the African Development Movement, merged into the National Union (NU). Furthermore, several former members of the ruling Gabon Democratic Party (GDP) joined the NU. In May, opposition groups accused Ali Bongo of embezzling large portions of the national budget. In mid-June, the GDP won the majority of parliamentary seats contested in by-elections. The results were challenged by opposition groups, accusing the government of electoral fraud. (sab)

Guinea (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict between the opposition and the military government, which had gained power in a 2008 coup, remained violent. An ICC delegation investigated the September 2009 massacres and announced that the crimes amounted to crimes against humanity. On 12/03/09, coup leader Moussa Dadis Camara was wounded by his bodyguard and left the country for medical treatment. During his absence, Defense Minister General Sékouba Konaté took over government affairs. Konaté signed the Ouagadougou Agreement on January 15, which provided for the formation of a transitional government to include members of the oppositional Forum of the Forces Vives of Guinea. The signing was attended by Burkinabe President and ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré. On January 26, opposition leader Jean-Marie Doré took office as prime minister. In April, Acting President Konaté sacked Camara's allies in the military, including the chiefs of the armed forces, air force, and navy. In May, he issued a new constitution and announced presidential elections for June 27. In the run-up

to the elections, violent protests were repeatedly staged. As none of the candidates reached the absolute majority in the first round, the second round was postponed three times. It was finally carried out peacefully on November 7 and considered free and fair by international observers. Condé was declared winner on November 15. Three days of violent clashes between security forces and Diallo supporters followed, leaving at least twelve civilians dead and more than 200 injured. Interim president Konaté imposed a curfew and declared a state of emergency on November 17, banning any kind of political demonstration. The Supreme Court is expected to present the final election results early December. On November 27, the government closed all borders and sacked the army deputy chief of staff. (som)

Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	coup plotters vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power, resources	

The power conflict between military coup plotters and the government remained violent. Former navy chief Na Tchuto, accused of having led a failed coup attempt in 2008, returned to the country and took refuge at a UN office on 12/28/09. On April 1, military forces arrested Jose Zamora Induta, head of the army, as well as Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. The coup was led by Antonio Indjai, the army's deputy chief of staff, who had allegedly led the group of soldiers that killed President Joao Bernardo Vieira in January 2009. Na Tchuto was reportedly picked up from the UN compound by a group of soldiers shortly before the coup, and was alleged to be one of the key figures in the plot. Gomes was released and put under house arrest after just a few hours. When hundreds demonstrated in support on Gomes and violently clashed with soldiers, Indjai threatened to kill the prime minister and to crack down on the demonstrators. One day later, Gomes was taken to meet President Malam Bacai Sanha. After the meeting, he vowed not to step down, and resumed his office the next day. At the end of April, Gomes travelled to Portugal, stating health reasons. Also in April, the US froze Na Tchuto's assets, suspecting him of involvement in international drug trafficking. Guinea-Bissau was supposed to be one of the main transit routes for South American cocaine destined for Europe [→ Mexico (drug cartels); Colombia (paramilitary groups) et al.]. However, on June 9, Guinea-Bissau's Military Supreme Court definitely abandoned investigations both on Na Tchuto's drug connections and on his involvement in the 2008 coup attempt. Gomes returned on June 14 and met with Indjai the following day. On June 16, Gomes stated that he would not step down from his office. Indjai was inaugurated as army chief amidst international protests on June 29. The US announced the withdrawal of their support for a reform of the country's security sector. In August, the government and the army controversially discussed a possible foreign stabilization mission to be deployed in the country by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. Na Tchuto was rein-

stated as chief of the navy on October 13, while former army chief Induta remained in detention. (hlm, ab)

Kenya (ethnic groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Samburu vs. Toposa vs. Turkana vs. Pokot	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The violent conflict over resources and regional predominance between various ethnic groups in northeastern Kenya continued. On March 22, members of the Pokot ethnic group raided villages of the Samburu ethnic group in Samburu Central District, killing one person and injuring another two. Over 200 heads of cattle were stolen. On May 31, alleged Sudanese members of the Toposa ethnic group attacked a Turkana village in Turkana North District, resulting in two dead villagers and four dead raiders. Subsequently, government forces were deployed to the area. In mid-June, 200 suspected members of the Turkana ethnic group killed three Pokot villagers in a raid. Furthermore, they stole about 460 heads of cattle. On July 23, 500 pastoralists from the Pokot ethnic group and members of the Turkana ethnic group clashed. In a series of cattle raids on 26 Turkana villages by several hundred members of the Pokot ethnic group armed with automatic weapons, seven Turkana villagers were killed on August 17. In late September, raiders killed a herdsman and injured three more in Turkana while stealing over 500 sheep and goats. Shortly afterwards, some 100 alleged Toposa raiders attacked a village in Turkana West District, stealing more than 100 livestock. In another incident, three people were killed in a Turkana village when armed men of the Pokot ethnic group stole livestock. (oa)

Kenya (Mungiki)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2002
Conflict parties:	Mungiki group vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the banned traditionalist Mungiki group and the government continued. On 12/06/09, former Mungiki leader Maina Njenga was baptized together with hundreds of former Mungiki members in Nairobi declaring their withdrawal from the banned sect. On January 15, Muslim clerics accused Mungiki members of colluding with police forces to crush protests by Muslims against the detention of a Muslim cleric in Nairobi. At least one person was killed in the riots. Four days later, four alleged Mungiki members abducted two people in Nairobi and killed one. In an operation against suspected Mungiki members, police killed seven on March 10. One month later, Prime Minister Raila Odinga held talks with Njenga about converted members supporting the constitutional referendum scheduled for August 4. Campaigning in favor of the proposed constitution, Njenga launched the National Youth Movement for Yes on May 27. On June 30, police arrested 74 suspected Mungiki members after a crackdown on the group in Nairobi's city slums and bus terminals. On July 12, the Select Committee on the Activities of Illegal Organizations in Kenya published a re-

port accusing politicians of supporting the Mungiki for their political aims, especially in election campaigns [→ Kenya (opposition)]. In August and September, more than 1,600 former Mungiki members were baptized and reintegrated into local communities in Nyeri district, Central Province. On September 8, President Mwai Kibaki dismissed Police Chief Hussein Ali over alleged extrajudicial killings of 500 suspected Mungiki members and 400 political demonstrators by police forces during the post-election crisis in 2008. Two weeks later, police forces started an operation against Mungiki and arrested 500 suspected Mungiki members in Kitengela, Ngong, Huruma, Kariobangi, Kayole, and Embakasi. (kaa)

Kenya (opposition)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	ODM vs. PNU	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict concerning national power and a new constitution between the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU), both part of the coalition government, continued. The main issue of contention was the future government system, with PNU opting for a presidential system while ODM favored a parliamentary system. Following negotiations between ODM and PNU in late 2009, a joint committee published a draft constitution 11/17/09. However, PNU rejected the draft immediately, supported by an ODM breakaway faction. On January 28, ODM and PNU finally reached an agreement on the constitution draft, which abolished the post of prime minister while increasing checks and balances on presidential power. The draft was to be submitted to a referendum on August 4. Nevertheless, tensions between President Mwai Kibaki from the PNU and Prime Minister Raila Odinga from the ODM heated up again in February over the issue of the right to dismiss government officials. Following mediation by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and pressure by the EU and the US, on February 23, Kibaki and Odinga announced their common support for the draft constitution. On April 1, parliament approved the draft constitution as outlined in late January. In the August 4 referendum, a two-thirds majority voted in favor of the new constitution. On March 3, Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo submitted a report to the ICC naming 20 politicians and businessmen as responsible for the 2008 post-election violence. According to the report, PNU had mainly used state agencies and ODM had employed criminal gangs. In late March, the ICC approved the formal investigations. (kaa)

Madagascar (TGV - TIM)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	TIM vs. TGV	
Conflict items:	national power	

The crisis over national power between former President Marc Ravalomanana and his party I Love Madagascar (TIM), as well as the former Presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy and their respective followers, on the one hand, and the current interim government led by President Andry Rajoelina and his party

Young Malagasies Determined (TGV), on the other, continued. Rajoelina had toppled Ravalomanana in March 2009. The interim government postponed elections several times. On 12/22/09, Rajoelina dismissed Prime Minister Eugene Mangalaza, whose appointment had been part of last year's power-sharing deal. Throughout the year, plans for a unity government between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana repeatedly failed. Between August 9 and 11, Rajoelina held talks with members of the opposition including representatives of Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy. A road map was set up, scheduling local elections for December 20, parliamentary elections for March 2011, and presidential elections for May 2011. This road map resulted from the August 13 Ivato agreement, signed by 160 participants, and the National Conference in September, which Ravalomanana, Zafy, and Ratsiraka refused to join. Furthermore, they set a constitutional referendum for November 17 and agreed that Rajoelina should stay in office until a new president was elected. Although Rajoelina had announced he would not take part in the 2011 presidential elections, the November referendum legitimized his rule by reducing the age qualification for becoming president from 40 to 35 years. On October 11, Rajoelina established a new transitional parliament, only appointing members who had signed the Ivato agreement. In January, the US removed Madagascar from the list of the African Growth and Opportunity Act beneficiary countries. On March 17, the AU imposed sanctions on Rajoelina and other officials, and suspended Madagascar's membership. The EU withdrew its development aid on June 7. Several violent attacks against Rajoelina's interim government had been staged throughout the period observed. On 12/02/09, an attempt to assassinate Rajoelina failed. On 12/22/09, oppositional protesters clashed with police forces loyal to the government, leaving several people injured. In late April, an explosive device was thrown at the house of Justice Minister Christine Razananahaso. The house of Foreign Minister Hypolite Ramaroson was hit by two grenades in October. Approx. 1,500 people demonstrated against Rajoelina and his interim government on October 18. Police used teargas to crack down on the protest. On April 18, the military foiled a coup attempt by seven military officers and civilians in the capital Antananarivo. A gun fight between mutineers of the military forces and soldiers loyal to the government left at least one person dead and several injured on May 20. On November 17, a group of military officers led by Colonel Charles Andrianasoavina declared they had taken over power, which was denied by the government. After three days of shootouts, military forces loyal to Rajoelina stormed the mutineers' barracks. Subsequently, a fresh round of talks between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, mediated by Mozambique's former President Joaquim Chissano, started in late November. (dt)

Mali (AQIM)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	AQIM vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict between the al-Qaeda Organization in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government remained violent. AQIM fighters still used the northern Malian desert as a staging area and support base. Furthermore, AQIM continued to abduct foreigners in Mali to receive ransom and to effect the release of al-Qaeda fighters. On February 22, the government released four AQIM fighters in exchange for an abducted French national who had been kidnapped by AQIM in northern Mali on 11/25/09. In reaction, Algeria [→ Algeria (AQIM)] and Mauritania [→ Mauritania (AQIM)] recalled their ambassadors to Mali the following day. A Spanish hostage who had been kidnapped by AQIM in Mauritania on 11/29/09 was released in Mali on March 10. In a similar incident, two Italians abducted by AQIM in Mauritania on 12/18/09 were released on April 16. The government and representatives of several other North African states gathered in Algiers on April 13 to coordinate regional security issues including common efforts against AQIM. "Operation Flintlock", a joint military exercise by the US and several Sub-Saharan African states, including Mali, was launched in early May. The maneuver aimed to improve the common regional security measures against AQIM. On July 22, French and Mauritanian forces raided an AQIM camp in Mali in order to free a French hostage, killing several AQIM fighters. The operation failed and the hostage was killed by AQIM two days later. On July 27, France declared "war" on AQIM and announced it would intensify its military support for the governments of the region. On July 29, Algeria reinstated full diplomatic relations with Mali. A soldier and a Malian customs officer were abducted by AQIM in Kidal on August 11. The latter was killed by AQIM the next day, whereas the soldier was released on August 16. Two Spanish hostages abducted in 2009 were released by AQIM on August 23. On September 19, Mauritanian aircrafts and ground forces attacked AQIM positions in northern Mali. A number of soldiers and militants were killed and three AQIM vehicles destroyed. On September 26, military chiefs from Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger held a meeting concerning the coordination of future actions against AQIM. (fr)

Niger (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition groups, coup plotters vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The power conflict between opposition groups and the government of President Madaou Tandja resulted in a violent military coup. Tandja's 2009 attempt to change the constitution in order to run for presidency for a third time had sparked protests by the opposition as well as the international community. Negotiations between the opposition and Tandja on 12/21/09, mediated by ECOWAS, did not yield any tangible results. The conflict escalated when contingents of the armed forces stormed the presidential palace and detained Tandja on February 18. Three people were killed in the coup. The following day, the coup plotters, under the leadership of Colonel Salou Djibo, announced the creation of the Supreme Council of the Restoration of Democracy (SCDR), pledging the

establishment of a new constitution reversing the contentious constitution of August 2009 and a return to civilian rule within one year. While the AU condemned the coup and suspended Niger's membership on February 19, most opposition parties and civil society groups cautiously welcomed the overthrow. The SCDR named Mahamadou Danda as transitional prime minister on February 23 but retained sole executive and legislative powers. On May 5, the SCDR revealed a timetable for the return to civil rule, including a referendum on a new constitution scheduled for October 31, as well as presidential elections on December 26. The latter was later postponed to 01/31/11. On October 16, senior SCDR member Colonel Abdoulaye Badie and another officer were arrested on charges of plotting against SCDR leader Djibo. Nevertheless, the referendum on the new constitution was held on October 31, with 90 percent of the vote in favor of the proposal. (rs)

Nigeria (Boko Haram)

Intensity: 3	Change:	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	Boko Haram vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system and ideology conflict between the Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) and the government continued. In early March, 17 police officers were arrested on charges of extra-judicial killings of BH members in July 2009. On March 28, BH announced its plan to extend its area of operation beyond Nigerian borders. Subsequently, police forces set up checkpoints around the city of Maiduguri in Borno state. Between August and November, several drive-by attacks were staged, mainly at night. In response, the army and police forces banned riding motorcycles at night in the area. Approx. 20 people were killed by BH members throughout the year. In one such BH attack on a prison in Maiduguri on September 7 two security forces and two residents were killed and another six injured. The assault allowed 732 inmates to escape, among them 150 suspected BH members. In early October, a senior opposition politician and a police officer were shot dead by the militants. Two days later, alleged BH members threw petrol bombs at a police station in the Gamboru suburb, injuring three. In early November, approx. 700 immigrants allegedly linked to BH were deported to their countries of origin in the course of a security crackdown on the group. On November 8, 23 militants were arrested. On November 19, BH for the first time attacked a mosque during the Friday prayers, killing two people and injuring one. Police arrested 13 suspected attackers. On November 22, police forces arrested another 152 alleged BH members in house-to-house raids. (nch)

Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists)

Intensity: 4	Change:	Start: 1960
Conflict parties:	farmers vs. pastoralists	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between farmers, predominantly Christian Berom, and pastoralists, mainly Muslim Fulani, escalated. While the conflict centered on arable land, the

conflict parties were also divided by religious and political issues. Two thirds of the grazing fields officially demarcated for the nomads' cattle were under cultivation by resident population. The government had designated livestock routes and further grazing land in September and October 2009. Furthermore, farmer-nomad reconciliatory committees had been established in some northern states. Nevertheless, on 12/06/09, a peasant was killed in clashes between farmers and pastoralists after the latter had led their cattle into rice fields. Twelve days later, a group of pastoralists attacked the village of Udeni Gida, killing 32 farmers. In reaction, military and police forces were deployed to the region. Heavy clashes between Christian and Muslim youth gangs broke out in the city of Jos on January 17 [→ Nigeria (Muslims -Christians)] and spread beyond the city boundaries in the following days. In this context, the Fulani settlement of Kuru Karama was raided on January 19. Approx. 150 people were killed and set on fire by the mainly Berom attackers, armed with machetes and machine guns. The same day, authorities imposed a general curfew, which was lifted again two days later. On January 21, President Goodluck Jonathan announced that the military forces would take over security in the affected areas. According to officials, a total of 326 people had been killed and another 20,000 had fled at the time. Subsequently, more than 300 suspected attackers were arrested. On March 7, hundreds of Fulani pastoralists simultaneously attacked the villages of Dogo Nahawa, Zot, and Ratsat, killing at least 109 people with machetes and setting them on fire. Thereafter, further troops and military vehicles were deployed to the city of Jos and the surrounding areas. On March 8, Jonathan dismissed National Security Advisor Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar. The police arrested approx. 200 suspects, and 49 were charged with murder. Further attacks were reported on an almost daily basis. At least ten were killed with machetes in an attack on a village in the Riyom area in mid-March. On July 17, eight people were killed in a machete attack on the village of Mazah. In late October, Fulani attackers killed at least six people in the village of Ranwihnu. Altogether, approx. 1,000 people were killed throughout the year. (nch)

Nigeria (MEND, Ijaw/Niger Delta)

Intensity: 3	Change:	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	MEND, JRC, Ijaw, NDV vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over autonomy and the distribution of oil revenues between various Ijaw rebel groups and the government in the Niger Delta deescalated. Senior leaders of various Ijaw rebel groups had accepted a presidential amnesty offer in 2009. Up to 15,000 militants surrendered their arms and joined the governmental demobilization and reconciliation program. However, President Umaru Yar'Adua's long absence for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia since November 2009 hampered the implementation of the post-amnesty program. On 12/19/09, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for an attack on an oil pipeline. On January 17, three British and one

Colombian oil worker were abducted by unknown gunmen and released three days later. Sporadic abductions continued throughout the year. On January 29, MEND announced the end of a three-month ceasefire and threatened new attacks. Two days later, sabotage on the Trans-Ramos pipeline, Bayelsa state, forced Shell to shut down three flow stations. On February 10, militants of the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) attacked a trunk line near Obunoma in Rivers state. Five days later, the spokesman of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan announced that the disarmament process in the Niger Delta had been completed. On March 15, MEND militants launched three explosives near the state governor's office in Warri, Delta state, where talks about the implementation of the amnesty program were held. On March 26, Jonathan met former militant leaders to discuss the progress of the amnesty program. An attack on an oil pipeline in the town of Brass, Bayelsa state, by unknown militants on April 25 reduced the oil output by 12,000 barrels a day. On June 10, MEND claimed to have clashed with the army near Ogulagha, Delta state. According to Shell, at least three acts of sabotage were committed against their pipelines in August. On October 1, MEND militants planted three car bombs at the parade of Nigeria's 50th anniversary of independence, killing at least twelve people and leaving 17 injured. Following the attack, former MEND leader Henry Okah was detained in South Africa. In two similar attacks on oil rigs in Akwa Ibom state on November 8 and 15, MEND militants abducted 15 oil workers. Furthermore, MEND militants carried out a bomb attack on the home of Special Adviser to the President on Niger-Delta and coordinator of the post-amnesty program Timi Alaibe in Bayelsa State on November 12, causing material damage only. Five days later, army forces started a land, air, and sea operation against MEND militants and captured two MEND camps in Delta state, two in Bayelsa state as well as three in Rivers state. No casualties were reported. Security forces freed 19 hostages in the camp of MEND faction leader Commander Obese in Rivers state. According to the government, former senior MEND leaders Boyloaf and Farah Dagogo supported the offensive and informed the military about the location of the camps. On November 19, Commander Obese was arrested along with more than 50 militants after a shootout with military forces near Bonny in Rivers state. Notwithstanding, MEND militants attacked the Warri-Escravos pipeline in Bayelsa state on November 21. (de)

Rwanda (opposition)

Intensity: 2	Change: NEW	Start: 2010
Conflict parties:	UDF, PS, DGPR, ex-RPF vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

A new conflict emerged between various opposition groups and the Tutsi-dominated government of President Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, scheduled for August 9. The opposition parties Democratic Green Party (DGPR), Parti Social (PS) Imberakuni, and United Democratic Forces (UDF) were not allowed to register for the election. On April 21, the po-

lice arrested Hutu opposition and UDF leader Victoire Ingabire on charges of collaboration with the Hutu rebel group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) [→ Rwanda (Hutu rebel groups)]. US lawyer Peter Erlinder, lead defense counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), who intended to defend Ingabire, was detained from May 28 to June 17. Ingabire's Rwandan lawyer Theogene Muhayeyezu was detained from June 24 to July 9. On June 24, the government imprisoned PS Imberakuni presidential candidate Bernard Ntaganda, accusing him of ethnic divisionism and attempted murder. When Kagame registered for the poll on June 24, the police arrested some 20 demonstrators, according to police information, whereas the opposition spoke of 100 detainees. Andre Kagwa Rwisereka, deputy leader of the DGPR, was found murdered near Butare on July 14. The government accused Kagame critics Kayumba Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegeya, former chiefs of staff in the Rwandan army, and Deogratias Mushayidi, former RPF chief and exiled journalist, of having committed two grenade attacks which hit the Rwandan capital Kigali on February 19 and March 4, killing one and injuring at least 46 people. On June 18, an assassination attempt in his exile Johannesburg, South Africa, left Nyamwasa severely injured. Nyamwasa, Karegeya and Mushayidi were accused of membership in an FDLR-affiliated terrorist network. Mushayidi was later handed a lifelong prison term by the High Court. The independent Umuseso and Umuvugizi newspapers were banned for six months on April 15, and the editor and two journalists of Umurabyo, a newspaper critical of the government, were arrested in mid-July. Umuvugizi editor Jean Leonard Rugamba, who had investigated the assault on Nyamwasa, was assassinated on July 25. On August 9, incumbent President Kagame was reelected with 93 percent of the vote. On August 31, UDF, DGPR and PS Imberakuni demanded the formation of a transitional government and new elections. Ingabire was taken into custody again on October 14, after she had been accused of genocide denial and working with a terrorist organization. (am)

Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	FDLR, ex-FAR, oppositional Hutu Groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between Hutu-dominated rebel groups and the Tutsi-dominated government of President Paul Kagame remained violent. Against the backdrop of grenade attacks which hit the Rwandan capital Kigali on February 19, March 4, April 10, May 15, and August 11, killing at least seven people and injuring more than 110, former Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) commander Vital Uwumuremyi was arrested on October 13 on charges of terrorism. Furthermore, the authorities detained senior FDLR commanders Noel Habiyaambere, Tharcisse Nditurande and Jean Marie Vianney Karuta. In September, the government allegedly deployed at least two battalions to Walikale, eastern DR Congo (DRC), possibly to fight the

FDLR, according to government and Congolese rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) sources [→ DR Congo (CNDP); DR Congo (FDLR)]. The police arrested prominent Hutu opposition leader Victoire Ingabire on April 21, accusing her of collaborating with the FDLR [→ Rwanda (opposition)]. In late October, "Hotel Rwanda" manager Paul Rusesabagina was charged with transferring money to the FDLR. Proceedings against the 1994 genocide suspects continued. In the course of 2010, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted five genocide suspects. On 12/14/09, a local court sentenced Valerie Bemeriki, one of the main voices of Milles Collines radio station, to lifelong imprisonment. On March 2, Agathe Habyarimana, widow of the former Rwandan president, was arrested in France, accused of participating in the planning of the genocide. Moreover, the French police also detained former mayor Octavien Ngenzi on June 3 and FDLR executive secretary Callixte Mbarushimana on October 11. Mbarushimana's arrest followed a warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in the DRC. The government announced it would charge him for genocide crimes after the ICC trial. On October 1, the UN published a report on human rights abuses in the DRC, suggesting systematic attacks against Hutu refugees by the Rwandan army between 1996 and 1998, which could constitute acts of genocide. The government protested vehemently. Also in October, Rwandan troops were reported to operate in Walikale territory, DRC, an area of FDLR activity. The Rwandan army denied these allegations. (am)

Senegal (MFDC/Casamance)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1982
Conflict parties:	MFDC vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the government continued on a violent level. In mid-December 2009, suspected MFDC rebels attacked the village of Baraca Banao, killing one soldier and one civilian. In early January, suspected MFDC fighters killed a former government soldier near Ziguinchor, suspecting him of being an army informant. On January 29, MFDC rebels forced nearly 600 people to leave their homes as they attacked at least four villages and carried out lootings. On February 15, two soldiers were killed and two injured as suspected MFDC rebels clashed with an army patrol. Another soldier was killed on March 3 in a suspected MFDC rocket attack on an army position at Diaboudior village near the Gambian border. On March 16, army forces started an offensive against MFDC bases near Ziguinchor, capturing two local MFDC commanders. Two days later, they also attacked two rebel hideouts using heavy artillery and a helicopter. The fighting was discontinuous and lasted until early April, leaving four soldiers and one civilian dead as well as eleven soldiers injured. An unknown number of civilians were displaced. In response, the MFDC issued a statement signed by the rebel leader of southern MFDC César Badiate on March 25, calling for an immediate

ceasefire and negotiations. On April 22, Prime Minister Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye signaled willingness for peace talks. Nevertheless, one soldier died in clashes between the army and MFDC militants near Ziguinchor on July 18. On October 31, MFDC fighters ambushed a military regiment near Diarone village, killing three soldiers and injuring two. (jos)

Somalia (Islamist groups)

Intensity: 5	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab vs. ASWJ, TFG	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between the Islamist rebel groups Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab, on the one hand, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ), on the other, was fought out as a war for the fifth year running. ASWJ, a Sufi militant group, had started its fight against Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab in 2008. Al-Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni Brigade, an Islamist militia from southern Somalia previously linked to Hizbul Islam, merged in late January. On 12/05/09, the TFG and ASWJ signed an agreement on security cooperation in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Moreover, they signed a power-sharing deal in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on March 15. The TFG promoted an ASWJ Islamic cleric to the rank of deputy commander of the country's armed forces on May 6. However, ASWJ pulled out of the government on September 25, stating the TFG had failed to comply with the March 15 agreement. It nevertheless vowed to continue its fight against al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. This was preceded by the resignation of the Minister of Culture and Higher Education Mohamed Abdullahi Omar and two other ministers on June 8, among them warlord Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad Inda'ade. Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke had resigned on September 21. In June, negotiations over a power-sharing deal between the TFG and Hizbul Islam were allegedly underway. This led to a rapprochement between Hizbul Islam's militant factions and al-Shabaab. In Beledweyn region, Hizbul Islam splinter groups joined ranks with al-Shabaab on June 13 [→ Somalia (Al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)]. In July, talks between TFG and Hizbul Islam yielded no tangible results. However, talks about a possible merger between Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab also failed on August 2. On 12/03/09, an al-Shabaab member committed a suicide bombing at a student graduation ceremony in Mogadishu, killing 22 people, among them four ministers, and injuring more than 70. Starting on January 10, four days of heavy fighting between Hizbul Islam and ASWJ in Beledweyn left approx. 138 people dead and 344 injured, and displaced more than 63,000. Clashes resumed on January 25. Starting on March 11, three days of intense fighting between government forces and al-Shabaab militants in Mogadishu claimed at least 75 fatalities and injured more than 170. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the July 11 twin explosions in the Ugandan capital Kampala with more than 80 casualties. Uganda was the main troop contributor to AMISOM and was therefore declared a military target by al-Shabaab. Three days later, Ugan-

dan President Yoweri Museveni declared all-out war on Somali militant groups. Shortly afterwards, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development decided to immediately increase the AMISOM contingent from 6,100 to 8,100 soldiers. Starting on July 18, clashes between government forces and Islamist militants claimed at least 19 fatalities and injured 34. Between August 23 and September 6, heavy fighting in Mogadishu between the TFG and AMISOM, on the one hand, and al-Shabaab, on the other, resulted in approx. 245 fatalities, more than 430 injured and at least 23,000 displaced people. Fighting peaked on August 24 when al-Shabaab attacked a hotel, killing 33 people. Renewed fighting in Mogadishu between AMISOM-backed TFG forces and al-Shabaab militias in early October resulted in more than 30 deaths and 50 injured people. TFG forces fought against Islamist militants in the central Hiran region in mid-October, claiming 20 lives and injuring 30 people. At the same time, clashes between the warring sides left more than 30 dead and injured 40 in the southern Gedo region. According to Mogadishu's ambulance service, 2,171 civilians were killed in fighting between January and the end of October in the capital alone. (tg)

Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	
Conflict items:	territory, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland over control of the Sanaag, Sool, and Cayn regions remained violent. Since 2007, most of the disputed regions had been controlled by Somaliland. From October 2009 to February, a series of bombings against Somaliland authorities was reported. After the governor of Sool had been injured by an explosion on January 28, Somaliland deployed additional security forces to Sool's capital, Las Canood. On February 5, demonstrations against the Somaliland presence turned violent. Reportedly, two people died and 60 protesters were arrested. Puntland's information minister condemned Somaliland's actions, announcing that troops had been mobilized in order to recapture Sool. Somaliland's deputy governor of Sool denied rumors of tensions in the disputed regions on February 10. According to local sources, pro-Somaliland clan militias gathered near the Sanaag regional capital, Ceerigaabo, in early February. In response, Puntland announced the deployment of troops to the region. According to Puntland media, the president of the Puntland administration Abdirahman Mohamud Farole held talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi over security issues in Sanaag, Sool, and Cayn in March. In mid-June, several thousand people were displaced by clashes between Somaliland troops and a militia led by former Puntland presidential candidate Saleban Adam in the Cayn region. Puntland repeatedly warned Somaliland not to hold presidential elections in the disputed regions, and reportedly reinforced its troops again in late June. On the eve of the June 26 elections in Somaliland, Puntland troops seized

ballot boxes in the town of Hadaaftimo in Sanaag, local sources reported. On the day of the election, four people were killed in an attack by a pro-Puntland militia on a polling station in Sool. Somali media reported an exchange of gunfire between Puntland and Somaliland officials in the town of Hadaaftimo in Sanaag on June 27. One day later, Somaliland accused Puntland of attacking an armed forces base near Galgala in Sanaag. In late September, Somaliland and Puntland agreed on security cooperation against common security threats as Islamist movements extended their activities to Somaliland and Puntland [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Yet, local media reported that Puntland had accused Somaliland of cooperating with militants in the Galgala region in late October. Somaliland rejected these claims and intensified its operations against suspected militants. (kaa)

Sudan (Darfur)

Intensity: 5	Change: ↗	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	JEM, SLM/A-AW, LJM, SLRF, SLA-Unity, SLA-Juba, SLA-BA, URF vs. government, Janjaweed, SLM/A-MM	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over secession and resources in the Darfur region between several rebel movements, on the one hand, and the government as well as Janjaweed forces, on the other, escalated to a war again. The only rebel group that had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), Minni Minnawis's Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-MM), remained allied to the government but refused to be integrated into the armed forces. Military confrontations intensified in January when forces of Abdel-Wahid al-Nur's Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-AW) clashed with government forces in the Jebel Marra region, displacing approx. 1,500 people. On January 13, SLM/A-AW forces conquered the town of Gulu. Shortly thereafter, government forces attacked Souk Fruk in northern Darfur, killing 18 people. Fighting continued at the town of Deribat in the Jebel Marra region in February, leaving 40 civilians and 73 soldiers dead. Due to the fighting, most humanitarian agencies left the Jebel Marra in February. In May, 440 people were killed in fighting around the towns of Kidingeer, Laibei, Feina, Deribat, and Dobo. On May 15, government forces conquered the Jebel Moon region, a stronghold of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in western Darfur. The army's claim that it had killed over one hundred rebels was denied by JEM. In July, fighting between JEM and government forces peaked in Um Kadada, al Dirra, and Lwabit in northern Darfur. According to army sources, fighting at the Adola Mountains in southern Darfur resulted in 374 fatalities, including 74 soldiers. On September 2, suspected government militias killed 37 people and displaced 3,000 in an attack on the village of Tabarat, northern Darfur. In November, fighting spilled over to the neighboring region of North Kordofan, where heavy clashes between JEM and government forces were reported from Hamari, south of Ghibaisha. Peace talks between JEM, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), and the government in Doha resulted in two ceasefires between the govern-

ment and the respective rebel groups as well as in a prisoner exchange with JEM. The agreement with JEM was concluded on February 23, the ceasefire with LJM on March 3. JEM opposed the government's agreement with LJM, demanding to be the government's sole negotiating party. The LJM consisted of Sudan's Liberation Revolutionary Force (SLRF), also known as the Tripoli group, and the so-called Addis Ababa group, which comprised SLM/A-Unity, SLM/A-Juba, United Resistance Front (URF), and SLM/A-Babikir Abdalla (SLM/A-BA). On March 13, negotiations between JEM and the government stalled over the rebels' demand for a postponement of the national elections scheduled for April 11, which was refused by the government. Amid mutual allegations of ceasefire breaches, JEM suspended the negotiations on May 2. Despite preparatory talks between SLM/A-AW, Darfur's second largest rebel group, and the Qatari foreign minister on July 5, the former abstained from the Doha peace talks. On September 17, the government revealed a new strategy on Darfur, prioritizing security and development over national justice and peace agreements. The strategy included plans to shift peace negotiations from Doha, Qatar, back to Sudan and earmark USD 1.9 billion for Darfur's development. On October 19, the governments of Sudan and Qatar, together with Joint AU-UN mediator for Darfur Djibril Bassolé, agreed on the Timetable for the Finalization of the Darfur Peace Process in Doha, foreseeing the conclusion of an Outcome Document (OD) by December 19. The OD was planned to serve as basis for the Darfur Political Process under the auspices of UNAMID and the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP). Plans for the Darfur-Darfur Conference on the adoption of a comprehensive peace agreement, scheduled for early 2011, were rejected by JEM and SLM/A-AW, as well as by the government-aligned SLM/A-MM. Tensions between the government and the UN continued after the ICC had issued a second arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide. This followed the 2009 ICC arrest warrant on accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. UNAMID encompassed a total of 17,200 peacekeepers in Darfur, some of which were severely underequipped, according to the UN. Relations between UNAMID and the government deteriorated on July 24 when UNAMID refused to hand over three persons seeking refuge in a UNAMID police center. On October 27, the UN Panel of Experts, monitoring the 2005 arms embargo against Sudan, accused the government of unauthorized deployment of troops and ground attack jets. On July 30, the UN Security Council extended UNAMID's mandate by another year. As in prior years, UNAMID personnel were the target of several deadly attacks. In one incident, three Rwandan peacekeepers were killed in western Darfur on June 26, increasing the mission's death toll to 73. (rs)

Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	LRA vs. SPLM/A	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), constituting the autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS), remained violent. The LRA had originated in Uganda but shifted its operations to Sudan and other neighboring countries in recent years [→ Uganda (LRA)]. In March, SPLM/A stated that it expected a rise in LRA attacks in connection with the national elections scheduled for April [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)]. On April 6, LRA forces raided settlements in Ezo district, killing two people. An LRA attack on a village in Tambura County left several people dead. Another three were killed on May 18 when the LRA attacked GoSS officials in Western Equatoria state. In July, clashes between LRA forces and the SPLM/A as well as contingents of the Ugandan army were reported. Ugandan troops supported all military operations against LRA rebels in the region. LRA attacks continued throughout July and August. On September 8, the Darfur rebel group Liberation and Justice Movement [→ Sudan (Darfur)] claimed its forces had been attacked by LRA groups in Davaq, South Darfur. LRA leader Joseph Kony was allegedly hiding in the Darfur region. By November, LRA forces had carried out 22 attacks in Western Equatoria state, forcing approx. 45,000 people to flee. On September 27, the parliament of South Sudan decided to earmark USD 2 million for training and equipping local vigilante groups, called Arrow Boys, to fight the LRA. At a meeting in the Central African Republic (CAR) on October 16, Uganda, the DRC, Sudan, and the CAR agreed on a closer cooperation against the LRA. On May 25, US President Barack Obama signed the Lord's Resistance Army and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, allowing the US to support actions directed against the LRA, including the use of force. (rs)

Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1955
Conflict parties:	GoSS vs. government of Sudan in Khartoum	
Conflict items:	territory, secession, resources	

The secession conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), constituting the autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the central government, led by the National Congress Party (NCP), continued. Tensions rose ahead of the two referenda scheduled for January 2011 concerning the possible independence of South Sudan and the future affiliation of the oil-rich Abyei province. In 2010, the conflict centered on national elections, the two referenda and the implementation of the post-referendum arrangements. The issues of border demarcation, the future status of Abyei, voting eligibility, and citizenship remained highly contested. However, the conflict parties agreed upon the rules governing the referendum on independence, i.e. a 60 percent turnout and a 51 percent vote in favor of independence for the referendum to succeed. On January 30, the SPLM/A also agreed to accept the previous year's contentious census results in exchange for 40 additional seats for the South in the National Assembly, to be filled by appointment after the national elections. On March 11, the EU launched its Elections Observer Mis-

sion to Sudan (EU EOM), part of a 780-strong contingent of international observers. Elections of the president of Sudan, the president of GoSS, the National Assembly, the Assembly of South Sudan as well as elections for nearly all gubernatorial posts and regional assembly seats were scheduled for April. The SPLM/A withdrew its candidate for national presidency, Yasir Arman, on March 31. On April 6, the SPLM/A withdrew from the election for the National Assembly in all northern states with the exception of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, while still participating in all elections in the southern territories. Between April 11 and 15, the national elections led to the re-election of Omar Hassan al-Bashir as President of Sudan and Salva Kiir Mayardit as President of GoSS. On April 29, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIS for another year. In May, Sudanese Foreign Minister and SPLM/A member Deng Alor stated that 80 percent of the North-South border demarcation was completed. However, significant differences remained concerning border territories between the White and Upper Nile states, between the South Kordofan and Unity states as well as between West Bahr el-Ghazal state and the Darfur region, respectively. Despite a July 2009 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on Abyei's boundaries which had initially been accepted by the conflict parties, the demarcation process also stalled in oil-rich Abyei. Interethnic violence between groups in favor of the Abyei region belonging to the North or South, respectively, increased throughout the year. SPLM/A and NCP disagreed as to whether the completion of border demarcation was a prerequisite for holding the referendum. SPLM/A insisted the referendum be held timely, even without a completed demarcation process. This demand was continuously rejected by NCP. Although it had renewed its sanctions on Sudan on October 27, the US government, on November 8, offered to remove the country from its terror list if the referendum was conducted timely and transparently. On June 23, the conflict parties reached a Memorandum of Understanding concerning post-referendum arrangements, leading to the establishment of working groups on wealth-sharing, security, international instruments, and citizenship on July 19. On September 21, Sudan's Information Minister Kamal Obeid fueled concerns about massive migration by stating that Southerners residing in the North would not be provided citizenship in case of Southern secession. In the framework agreement of November 13, the conflict parties however agreed upon the right of all Sudanese nationals to live anywhere in the country, including the right of access to public services for an interim period after the referendum, regardless of the South's future status. In October, SPLM/A complained that Sudan's Armed Forces (SAF) were allegedly building up troops in the North-South border region, demanding the creation of a buffer zone in that area from UNMIS. On November 6, the UN denied any troop enforcement by the North. Tensions further heated up in late November when SPLM/A accused SAF of having attacked a voting registration center with helicopters in Malual County in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.

Three SPLM/A soldiers and two civilians were wounded in the attack. (rs)

Uganda (Baganda/Buganda)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The autonomy conflict between the Kingdom of Buganda and the government remained violent. Buganda kingdom represented the country's largest ethnic group, the Baganda. The Buganda monarch Ronald Mutebi demanded more autonomy and the control over resources in his realm. On March 17, violence erupted between members of the Baganda ethnic group and government forces when President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni announced his intention to attend the site of Buganda royal tombs which had been burned down the day before. Some people were killed and at least two injured. Members of the Baganda claimed that the government had burned down the tombs. The government denied these allegations. In early November, a radio station operated by members of the Buganda kingdom resumed broadcasting after 14 months. (Imp)

Uganda (LRA)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1987
Conflict parties:	LRA vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government remained highly violent. Although the conflict originated in Uganda, its location changed to the border triangle of southern Sudan [→ Sudan (LRA – SPLM/A)], the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). After a major cross-border military operation in the DRC by government troops of the DRC, South Sudan (GoSS), and Uganda had failed in late 2008, the LRA shifted its main base of operations from the DRC to northern CAR. Authorized by the CAR government, the Ugandan army conducted several operations against the LRA in the northern CAR throughout the year. The frequent LRA attacks against villages in northern, northeastern, and southeastern CAR displaced an estimated number of 180,000 people between January and June. The Ugandan government claimed to have killed 397 LRA fighters between July 2009 and June 2010 alone. Moreover, the LRA staged several attacks in the DRC. Early in December 2009, several hundred people were killed when alleged LRA fighters attacked DRC villages. However, the LRA denied its involvement in any of these killings. LRA fighters attacked the village of Mabanga in northeastern DRC on January 13, killing hundreds of people. On January 19, four civilians were killed and several abducted when LRA fighters raided the town of Dungu in DRC's Orientale province. Further attacks in Orientale were reported between March 11-14. LRA fighters killed eleven people and eight soldiers in the attacks. The Ugandan government claimed to have killed LRA senior commander Bok Abudema in the CAR on January 1. In April,

Ugandan government forces claimed that LRA's leader Joseph Kony and several of his fighters had crossed the border to the CAR, where LRA activities increased significantly soon thereafter. For instance, between March 20 and May 6, LRA fighters raided villages in the east of the CAR, killing 36 people and forcing 10,000 to flee. On May 18, the CAR government deployed 600 soldiers to protect civilians against LRA attacks. The following day, LRA fighters attacked a town in the northeastern CAR, killing two people and abducting 31. In various operations in the CAR, Ugandan government forces killed at least twelve LRA fighters in April and May. On May 6, three people were killed and two injured when LRA fighters attacked a relief truck near the village of Dembia in eastern CAR. Subsequently, relief agencies suspended their deliveries to Congolese refugees. On July 8, LRA fighters raided a village in southeastern CAR, killing four people. Ugandan forces clashed with LRA fighters on July 12, killing three LRA members. Between September 6 and 7, LRA members raided two towns in northern CAR, which left 16 people and nine LRA fighters dead. The following day, Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) fighters [→ Central African Republic (various rebel groups)] freed 45 LRA hostages captured in August. Early in October, five people were killed when UFDR fighters clashed with LRA members in northeastern CAR. On September 13, LRA members called upon the UN to reinstate the Juba peace talks, a demand refused by the Ugandan government. Uganda signed a border agreement with GoSS in early August which included preventive measures against LRA. It also agreed with the DRC on joint efforts against the LRA on September 19. In mid-October, the governments of the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda met in the CAR and declared their commitment for a joint offensive against the LRA. The CAR had called for US support in the fight against the LRA in July. On May 25, US President Barack Obama signed a law providing for the containment of LRA attacks against civilians. (ng)


Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M - ZANU-PF)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2000
Conflict parties:	MDC-T, MDC-M vs. ZANU-PF	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between factions of the former opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), part of a power-sharing government since 2009, and President Robert Mugabe with his party Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), remained violent. One of the MDC factions was led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), the other by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). The conflict was characterized by a lack of progress in the implementation of the General Political Agreement (GPA) signed by the parties in 2008, which had led to the unity government of ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions. The GPA provided for a new constitution and electoral law before new elections. The two


MDC factions and ZANU-PF irregularly held negotiations under the auspices of South African President Jacob Zuma. ZANU-PF demanded the lifting of targeted sanctions by the EU and US as a precondition for further advancing the GPA. MDC-T accused Mugabe of violating terms of the GPA by unilateral decisions. For example, on March 1, a law committing all businesses to achieve majority indigenous shareholding came into force despite Prime Minister Tsvangirai's protests. In addition, Mugabe made several key assignments without consulting his coalition partners, among them five High Court judges, six ambassadors, and ten provincial governors. The latter prompted Tsvangirai to reject all of Mugabe's assignments. While Tsvangirai called on South Africa, the UN, and various European countries to refuse to recognize said ambassadors, Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara sided with Mugabe. In mid-October, Mugabe stated the unity government should end in February 2011. He also called for a referendum on a new constitution and early elections in 2011. The constitutional committee scheduled the constitutional referendum for 06/10/11. Mutambara challenged Mugabe's right to dissolve parliament and call early elections. In mid-October, Zuma said he would not support elections without provisions to avert intimidation, violence and irregularities. Tsvangirai threatened an MDC-T boycott of the election in case of harassment and violence against his followers on October 12. He filed a lawsuit against Mugabe at the Harare High Court on November 24 with the intent to nullify the appointment of the ten provincial governors. On May 10, a court acquitted Roy Bennett, MDC-T treasurer, designated deputy minister for agriculture, and expropriated former farmer, of planning the assassination of President Mugabe in 2006. The main witness against Bennett claimed to have been tortured into testifying by security forces. However, on May 12, the Attorney General's office filed an appeal against the ruling at the Supreme Court. Bennett was denied the right to assume office. Throughout the year, assaults on MDC supporters and members of the civil society continued. The attacks intensified when the public consultations on the new constitution as laid down in the GPA started on June 16. Reportedly, ZANU-PF supporters repeatedly interrupted the meetings, prevented alleged MDC supporters from attending, and assaulted participants. For instance, on September 19, ZANU-PF supporters armed with iron bars inflicted injuries on five participants of such a meeting in the capital, Harare. One of the victims, a MDC-T member, died of his injuries on September 22. On September 20, the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee announced it would defer the Harare gatherings due to increasing violence. After the process was concluded, MDC-T spokesman Nelson Chamisa declared the document resulting from the public consultations should be of transitional character and called for the final constitution to be negotiated after elections in 2011. Evictions of white farmers continued throughout the year and increased in October. (am)

The Americas




In the region of the Americas, the total number of conflicts increased by one from 44 to 45. While two conflicts ended in 2010 [→ Paraguay - Bolivia; Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay River)], one new conflict erupted at the level of a manifest conflict [→ Chile (Rapa Nui/Easter Island)]. Compared to 2009, the number of highly violent conflicts decreased from three to two. However, of those two, one escalated to the level of a war [→ Mexico (drug cartels)], constituting the first war in the Americas since 2003. The Mexican war on drugs and the violence between the drug cartels claimed the lives of at least 10,000 people in 2010. In addition, clashes, especially between security forces and drug gang members, rose dramatically in comparison to past years, adding up to several hundred incidents all over the country. As in previous years, Colombia was the country with the highest number of violent conflicts to be observed in the Americas, with one highly violent and three violent conflicts [→ Colombia (FARC)]. The Colombian government further strengthened its efforts to fight FARC, executing several combined air and ground attacks, such as "Operation Sodom", which involved the use of one third of the country's air force. In total, violent conflicts decreased slightly from 19 in 2009 to 17 in 2010. Nevertheless, some of these conflicts reflected a strong and organized level of violence, as could be observed in Peru [→ Peru (Shining Path)]. Moreover, violence in most conflicts of the Americas was predominantly related to the continuing growth of drug trafficking. Two non-violent conflicts turned violent in 2010, and four violent conflicts decreased in intensity to a non-violent level. In addition, the number of manifest conflicts saw a 33 percent increase from twelve in 2009 to 16 in 2010. As in previous years, the insecure and tense economic situation in various countries of Central and South America presented the main source of instability in the Americas. Accordingly, system/ideology and resources both were the predominant conflict items, followed by territory.

Conflict Intensities in the Americas in 2010 compared to 2009



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 in the Americas by Intensity Groups



Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2010

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Argentina - Iran (AMIA)*	Argentina vs. Iran	other	1992	•	1
Argentina - United Kingdom (Falkland Islands)	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1945	↗	2
Bolivia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, national power, resources	1983	•	3
Bolivia - Chile (border)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Brazil (MST)*	MST vs. government	resources	1995	↘	1
Canada (Bloc Québécois/Quebec)*	Bloc Québécois vs. government	secession	1945	•	1
Chile (Mapuche/Araucanía)*	Mapuche groups vs. government	secession, resources	2008	↘	2
Chile (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	1
Chile (Rapa Nui/Easter Island)	Rapa Nui vs. government	secession	2010	NEW	2
Chile - United Kingdom (Antarctica)*	Chile vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	2007	•	1
Colombia (ELN)*	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC - ELN)	FARC vs. ELN	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Colombia (FARC)	FARC, government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1964	•	4
Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)	paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1995	•	3
Colombia (various indigenous groups)*	various indigenous groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2005	•	2
Colombia - Ecuador*	Colombia vs. Ecuador	international power	2005	•	2
Colombia - Venezuela (Monjes Islands)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Colombia - Venezuela (system)	Colombia vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2004	•	2
Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)	Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua	territory	1945	↗	2
Dominican Republic - Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	other	2009	↘	2
Ecuador (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	1980	•	3
Guatemala (various drug cartels)*	drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2009	•	3
Guatemala (various opposition groups)*	rightwing militant groups vs. leftwing militant groups	system/ideology, national power	1960	•	2
Guatemala - Belize (territory)*	Guatemala vs. Belize	territory	1981	•	1
Haiti (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	1986	•	3
Honduras (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↘	2
Mexico (APPO)*	APPO vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↗	3
Mexico (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2006	↗	5
Mexico (EPR/Guerrero)*	EPR vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1995	↘	2
Mexico (EZLN/Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	•	3
Mexico (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2006	•	1
Nicaragua (various opposition groups)*	various opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)*	Nicaragua vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1945	↗	2
Panama (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2008	↗	3
Paraguay (various opposition groups)	various farmers organisations, various indigenous groups, EPP, landless people vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Paraguay - Bolivia*	Paraguay vs. Bolivia	territory	1945	END	1
Peru (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	•	3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³ Int. ⁴
Peru (Shining Path)	SL vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1980	↘ 3
Peru - Chile (border)*	Peru vs. Chile	territory, resources	1945	• 2
Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay River)	Uruguay vs. Argentina	resources	2006	END 1
USA - Cuba (Guantanamo)*	USA vs. Cuba	territory	1959	• 1
USA - Cuba (system)*	USA vs. Cuba	system/ideology, international power	1959	• 2
USA - Mexico (border fence)	USA vs. Mexico	other	2001	• 2
USA - Venezuela (system)*	USA vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2001	• 2
Venezuela (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2000	• 3

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Argentina - United Kingdom (Falkland Islands)

Intensity: **2** Change: ↗ Start: 1945
 Conflict parties: Argentina vs. United Kingdom
 Conflict items: territory, resources

The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the territory of the Falkland Islands as well as resources escalated, but remained non-violent. At the beginning of the year, tensions rose over proposed drillings for hydrocarbons by British oil companies north of the Falkland Islands. On February 2, Argentina's Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana summoned the UK's ambassador. Taiana protested against the drilling plans and declared them to be a violation of Argentina's sovereignty. UK Secretary of State David Miliband rejected the allegation and declared all UK oil explorations in the area to be completely in accordance with international law. On February 16, Argentina's President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner issued a decree requiring all vessels heading towards the Falkland Islands through Argentine territorial waters to seek prior permission. Two days later, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that all necessary preparations to protect the Falkland Islands had been met. UK media reported the deployment of a naval task force to the Falklands, including the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Sceptre. While excluding the use of military force, Argentina intensified its diplomatic efforts to pressure Britain into negotiations. On February 23, one day after a British rig had begun drilling for oil in the waters of the Falkland Islands, the summit of Latin American and Caribbean nations backed Argentina and urged both countries to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. In early May, oil was reportedly found in the disputed area. On June 2, two British fighter jets and a tanker airplane, based on East Falkland, violated Argentina's airspace on their way to an air show in Chile. Argentina protested but retrospectively approved the fly-over on June 4. The British government, on October 8, announced plans to carry out a military maneuver at the Falkland Islands, including the launch of surface-to-surface missiles. Argentina accused the UK of militarizing the South Atlantic, declared the maneuver to be a provocation, and demanded the plan be abandoned.

(hef)

Bolivia (opposition)

Intensity: **3** Change: • Start: 1983
 Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, national power, resources

The system conflict concerning national power, the new constitution, and the reallocation of profits between the opposition movements of the wealthy eastern lowland provinces and the central government of President Evo Morales continued. As the right-wing opposition continuously disintegrated, the central government faced growing dissatisfaction of its supporters. In the general elections on 12/06/09, Morales was reelected with over 64 percent, and his governing party Movement for Socialism (MAS) achieved a two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislative. MAS also won the regional and municipal elections on April 4, whereas the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Beni remained under oppositional legislation. Starting on April 26, the residents of Caranavi, La Paz department, blocked an important supply road to the city of La Paz, demanding the installation of a factory promised by Morales. 700 police forces unsuccessfully tried to clear the blockade on May 7, using rubber bullets and tear gas. The police forces were attacked with sticks, stones, and, according to the police, explosives and fire arms. Four protesters were killed and 60 people injured, four of them police officers. In addition, the local police school building was burned down. When the government increased the public sector's wages by 5 percent, the main trade union Bolivian Workers Central (COB), as well as teachers and factory workers demanded an increase of at least 9 percent instead and announced protests. On May 4, protesters took to the streets across the nation. In La Paz, demonstrators threw explosives at the Labor Ministry. At least one person was injured, and 15 protesters were arrested. The same day, the COB, one of Morales' former key allies, called for an indefinite national strike for the first time since the MAS government took office in 2006. Nevertheless, the strike receded after one day. At the end of June, the main indigenous organizations staged marches against the government, demanding the increase of the quota of indigenous seats in the legislature and criticizing the government for not fulfilling their autonomy demands. In December 2009, the

interim president of the Supreme Judicial Court (CSJ) proposed that the six remaining CSJ judges should appoint twelve temporary judges to fill in the vacant seats. However, the government denounced this as unconstitutional as the new constitution demanded all Supreme Court judges to be elected by popular vote. After the parliament passed a corresponding law, Morales nominated 18 temporary judges on February 18. The right-wing opposition and the National Council of Lawyers accused Morales of overriding the new constitution and jeopardizing the separation of powers. On March 29, the senate approved an anti-corruption law against illicit enrichment, mismanagement of public resources, and acts against the state. The right-wing opposition condemned the bill as an act of political persecution. (hef)

Chile (Rapa Nui/Easter Island)

Intensity: 2	Change: NEW	Start: 2010
Conflict parties:	Rapa Nui vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

A secession conflict erupted between the Rapa Nui, the indigenous group on Easter Island, and the central government. On August 4, the President of the Easter Island Assembly, Leviante Araki Araki, threatened to form an alliance aimed at secession from Chile. At that point, 500 Rapa Nui people had already been occupying more than 20 official buildings since July 30. In response, on August 6, Interior Minister Rodrigo Hinzpeter proposed establishing a committee to ease tensions. One day later, the Regional Governor of Valparaíso, Raúl Celis, sent a team of police officers and navy marines to the island. On August 13, the Rapa Nui parliament, representing half of the island's indigenous population, issued an official letter to President Sebastián Piñera demanding the right to secede from Chile. On September 7, police forces were sent to Easter Island to evacuate the Hanga Roa hotel, which was occupied by an armed group of Rapa Nui people. In order to support the police forces, a military plane with SWAT teams arrived on Easter Island on September 29. (kcr)

Colombia (FARC - ELN)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	FARC vs. ELN	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) over regional predominance and resources continued on a violent level. On 12/16/09, FARC and ELN released a joint statement, announcing their intention to unite forces against the government. Allegedly, the two guerilla organizations met three times on Venezuelan soil in order to negotiate a ceasefire. However, at least nine rebels were killed in violent clashes between the 10th Unit of the FARC and an ELN faction in the department of Arauca on June 1. Local media reported that FARC unit leader German Briceño alias Grannobles had declared an all-out war against the ELN in early June. On September 14, FARC and ELN renewed their cease-

fire agreement in the departments of Arauca, Casanare, Boyacá, parts of Santander, and Norte de Santander. A week earlier, FARC and ELN had launched a joint operation against the government in Nariño department, killing six police officers and taking two hostages. On September 8, a bomb exploded in the department's capital, Pasto, killing at least twelve people. The bombing allegedly was a joint action of FARC and ELN. On September 28, ELN expressed solidarity with FARC over the death of its leader Mono Jojoy. (meq)

Colombia (FARC)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1964
Conflict parties:	FARC, government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The regional predominance conflict between the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government remained highly violent. Throughout the year, government forces intensified the persecution of FARC leaders and air raids on their camps. In an airstrike in Meta on January 1, security forces killed 25 FARC members. In Putumayo, the army killed twelve FARC fighters and arrested another four at the border to Ecuador on January 20. Security forces killed at least 48 rebels and arrested another 17 in various operations throughout February. The air force bombed a FARC camp in the southern department of Putumayo on September 19. They killed Sixto Antonio Cabana Guillén, alias Domingo Biojó, one of the seven members of the FARC's secretariat, along with 21 other rebels. The government launched "Operation Sodom" in the Meta department on September 21. "Operation Sodom" involved 30 military airplanes and 25 helicopters, about a third of the country's air force. The following day, 27 rebels were killed, including FARC's military leader and second-in-command, Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Mono Jojoy. Over the course of the year, FARC launched various bomb attacks across the country. Outside the town hall of Buenaventura in the southwestern department of Valle del Cauca, a car bomb killed nine civilians on March 24, leaving at least 55 wounded. On August 12, a car bomb injured at least nine people close to one of the main radio stations, Caracol Radio, in Bogotá. Another bomb exploded in front of the intelligence agency's local office in the city of Pasto on September 8, wounding 13 people. The southern departments of Caquetá, Meta, and Putumayo were most affected by the conflict. In Caquetá, the governor Luis Francisco Cuéllar was abducted and killed by FARC fighters on 12/21/09. A FARC attack on the car convoy of José Alberto Pérez Restrepo, candidate for governor of the department of Guaviare, left four policemen dead on February 14. In the southwestern departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca, known as key collection points for drug trafficking, police and army launched counter-narcotics operations in February. Twenty tons of marijuana reportedly belonging to FARC were seized. In response, FARC launched an operation in eight Cauca municipalities, killing at least two civilians, two soldiers, and three policemen. In the run-up to the midyear presidential

elections, FARC launched frequent attacks on security forces. On May 1, at least five soldiers died and six were injured in a mine field set up by FARC in Putumayo. FARC ambushed security forces in Caquetá on May 23, killing nine marines and taking one hostage. In the same department, four soldiers died in clashes with FARC on May 30, the day of the election. Also in Caquetá, security forces killed six FARC fighters in an air raid on a camp the following week. A week before the new government took office, FARC called for peace talks. On August 7, former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos took over the presidency from Álvaro Uribe. FARC ambushed a police patrol in Caquetá on September 1, killing 14 officers and wounding nine. After this attack, President Santos ruled out preliminary negotiations. On September 10, when FARC attempted to take over the city of San Miguel in Putumayo, two rebels and eight policemen were killed. Four members of the security forces died in roadside attacks on their patrols in the department of Nariño and at least 22 sustained injuries within the first week of September. On November 14, four soldiers and at least eight FARC members were killed in clashes in Arauca. As in previous years, the conflict spilled over to neighboring countries. In January, FARC fighters clashed with the security forces of Ecuador and Panama. Alleged FARC camps on Venezuelan territory caused renewed tensions between the two countries in July [→ Colombia - Venezuela (system)]. FARC released two soldiers from captivity in March. On June 13, Special Forces freed four high-ranking members of the security forces held hostage by FARC since 1988. (ird)

Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources between several paramilitary groups and drug cartels, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. After the demobilization of the largest part of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2007, Héctor José Buitrago, the last active founding member of the paramilitary umbrella organization, was arrested on April 6. Although the AUC ceased to exist, former fighters rearmed and formed new antagonistic paramilitary groups operating in 27 of the country's 32 departments. These newly-emerged paramilitary groups, labeled by the government as "bandas criminales" (BACRIM), took control of a large share of the illegal narcotics market. The government identified at least six major groups, including Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, Aguilas Negras, and the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC). Estimates of the total number of their members ranged from 2,750 to 10,200. Throughout the year, at least 500 BACRIM members were arrested. On October 16, alleged members of Los Rastrojos attacked a store in Nariño with grenades, killing 13 people. When the police went after the attackers, a police officer was killed by another grenade. Alleged members of the group Los Urabeños

threw a grenade at a police patrol and exchanged fire with the officers in the department of Córdoba on March 19. In January, the national ombudsman for human rights announced that Los Rastrojos and Aguilas Negras were also targeting civilians in Norte de Santander. In August, a death list of 80 people from the town Puerto Asís appeared on Facebook. One of the local paramilitary groups was suspected to be the initiator. Three people on the list were killed. Throughout the year, human rights groups repeatedly received death threats from paramilitary groups, and various relief workers were assassinated. About 60 families had to flee their homes after clashes between the Aguilas Negras and Los Rastrojos in Córdoba department in late October; the government deployed an additional 600 soldiers to the region. In reaction to rising inter-gang violence, the government sent 1,000 additional police officers to Medellín to re-establish control. The national police captured Manuel Esteban Córdoba Tabares, leader of Los Rastrojos on July 8. On August 29, the U.S. embassy announced that it would provide equipment and resources in order to support the government's effort to fight BACRIM. In early October, 34 members of Los Urabeños were arrested in a joint operation of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and local authorities. On October 9, the government accused Los Rastrojos of joining forces with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [→ Colombia (FARC)]. In late August, an indigenous leader and his wife were killed by alleged paramilitaries in Nariño. According to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, although indigenous peoples only made up around 3.4 percent of the population, they accounted for 7 percent of Colombia's total displaced population. (meq)

Colombia - Venezuela (system)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Colombia vs. Venezuela	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The system and international power conflict between Colombia and Venezuela continued. On 12/04/09, Venezuelan troops blew up a provisional bridge crossing the border between the two countries and arrested a Colombian soldier on Venezuelan soil. Venezuela stated the bridge had been used for smuggling. Colombia's Defense Minister Gabriel Silva condemned the action. On 12/19/09, Silva announced the installation of a new military base with 1,000 soldiers in Guajira, in the border region. In reaction, Venezuela deployed 40 tanks and combat helicopters to the border. The following day, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez accused Colombia of launching spy drones over Venezuelan territory. Colombia immediately rejected the allegations. The Colombian Ministry of Defense claimed a Venezuelan helicopter had violated Colombian air space near a military base in the department of Arauca on January 27. On June 4, Venezuelan security forces arrested eight Colombian citizens, accusing them of spying and taking pictures of potential military targets. Colombia denied the accusations. On July 15, Colombia renewed its accusations that two high-ranking members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [→ Colom-

bia (FARC)], Iván Márquez and Rodrigo Granda, were hiding in Venezuela. In reaction, Venezuela recalled its ambassador in Bogotá. On July 21, the Colombian ambassador to the OAS Luis Alfonso Hoyos accused Venezuela of tolerating the presence of 1,500 FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) fighters in about 87 camps. Hoyos presented detailed evidence such as coordinates and photographs. He called for an OAS international verification commission to investigate the sites. Colombia threatened to appeal to the International Criminal Court. In response to the accusations, Venezuela froze diplomatic ties and all trade relations with Colombia on July 22. Chávez shut the Venezuelan embassy in Bogotá and ordered the Colombian embassy in Caracas to close within 72 hours. On August 8, one day after taking office, Colombia's new President Juan Manuel Santos reestablished diplomatic ties. Chávez assured he would not tolerate any FARC and ELN presence on Venezuelan territory. On October 10, Colombia deployed 2,000 soldiers near Cúcuta in cooperation with Venezuela to guarantee the safety for the population. (evk)

Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)

Intensity: 2	Change: ↗	Start: 1945
Conflict parties:	Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua	
Conflict items:	territory	

The border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the Rio San Juan flared up again, despite a 2009 ICJ ruling which both conflict parties had accepted. In early October, a group of alleged members of the Nicaraguan military led by Eden Pastora entered the disputed eastern part of Calero Island. Pastora, a former Sandinista guerrilla commander, had been in charge of a dredging project of the San Juan River. Pastora claimed that he had not entered Costa Rican soil, since the respective part of the island was Nicaraguan territory, as indicated by the border demarcation displayed by Google Maps. On October 21, Costa Rica sent a protest note to Nicaragua due to the incursion as well as the environmental damage caused by the dredging project. Since Costa Rica had no army, it deployed 70 heavily armed police officers to the border area on October 22. Nicaragua condemned the deployment as a provocation and rejected Costa Rica's accusations, stating that its troops had been in the region in order to fight drug-related crime. On October 27, Nicaragua's Foreign Minister Manuel Coronel Kautz accused Costa Rica of repeated violations of Nicaraguan territory. On October 31, Costa Rica stated that Nicaragua had been dumping sediment on its territory and that the dredging was an attempt to change the course of the San Juan River and thereby shift the border. Two days later, Costa Rica called for an urgent OAS meeting. In response, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega accused Costa Rica of attempting to take over the San Juan River. At the OAS meeting held on November 3 and 4, representatives of both countries agreed to OAS Secretary-General Miguel Insulza visiting the disputed region. On November 10, Costa Rica demanded Nicaragua withdraw its troops from Calero Island within 48 hours. Denying the accusations, Nicaragua announced the perma-

nent deployment of their troops to the border with Costa Rica. On November 13, the OAS approved a resolution urging both conflict parties to withdraw their security forces and to hold talks to settle the border dispute. Nicaragua opposed the resolution and threatened to withdraw from the OAS. On November 18, Costa Rica called on the ICJ to settle the border dispute, rejecting any bilateral talks as long as Nicaraguan troops were stationed on Calero Island. (mgm)

Ecuador (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1980
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system and ideology conflict between various opposition groups and the government under President Rafael Correa continued. The opposition mainly consisted of indigenous groups, represented by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), who protested against laws on media, water, and mining. Two of Correa's ministers resigned and joined the oppositional National Federation of Indigenous Afro-Ecuadorians and Peasants (FENOCIN). On 12/17/09, the national telecommunication agency revoked the license of the radio station La Voz de Arutam, accusing it of supporting revolutionary movements. A few days later, the institution took the oppositional TV station Teleamazonas off air for three days. Thereupon, Correa's main political opponent, Jaime Nebot, mayor of Guayaquil, initiated a demonstration against the government with about 250,000 participants on February 11. On February 26, CONAIE president Marlon Santi called for a national uprising against the government to protest against lacking representation of indigenous interests. A week later, 3,000 indigenous people demonstrated against proposed reforms of mining and water laws, fearing the privatization of water supplies. 12,000 CONAIE supporters demonstrated in various places for the same reason on April 8. In early May, indigenous groups surrounded the congress and blocked streets to protest against the approval of a new water bill by the parliament. Police forces used tear gas to disperse the protesters who were throwing rocks at parliamentarians' cars. Some policemen and protesters were injured. Additionally, indigenous groups blocked the Pan-American Highway in the provinces of Pichincha, Imbabura, and Cotopaxi from May 10 to May 12. Police forces used tear gas to clear the roads. The following day, the parliament postponed the decision on the water law. (jas)

Haiti (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1986
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between followers of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was ousted in February 2004, and the government, backed by the UN mission MINUSTAH, continued on a violent level. After fifteen political groups, including Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL), had been banned from parliamentary elec-

tions in late November 2009 by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), they threatened to disrupt the upcoming legislative contests. They accused the CEP of favoring President René Prével's new political party, Inite, and accused Prével of attempting to push through constitutional changes, thus extending executive powers and enabling him to run for another term. On 12/16/09, supporters of Aristide demonstrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince, demanding the accreditation of FL in next year's elections, the demission of Prével, and the return of Aristide. After the January 12 earthquake had killed more than 200,000 people, the government asked the US to ensure security and stability in the country. The US deployed about 22,000 troops in January, ending the major relief operations in June. On January 19, the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to deploy a further 3,500 peacekeepers for a six month period. Aristide offered to return from exile in order to support the reconstruction of the country. On February 2, the legislative elections planned for February 28 and March 3 were postponed for an indefinite period of time by the CEP. On May 10, about forty political parties demonstrated against the senate's approval of a law allowing Prével to remain in office for a further three months if presidential elections could not be held in a timely manner. Due to the canceled legislative elections, the lower house and a third of the senate seats were vacant as of May 10. Demonstrators feared that the rump upper house, dominated by Prével supporters, might pass constitutional reforms, including a reform concerning presidential re-election. The protests were disrupted by police forces. Throughout the following weeks, several demonstrations called for the replacement of the CEP, the demission of Prével, and the return of Aristide. In June, the UNSC issued a resolution authorizing an additional 680 police officers to join MINUSTAH during the electoral period. Presidential and legislative elections were set by Prével for November 28. On August 20, the CEP published its approved list of presidential candidates, accepting 19 and rejecting 15. On October 14, UNSC extended MINUSTAH's mandate for another year. Violent protests against MINUSTAH started in Cap Haitien and Hinche on November 15. Protesters threw stones at peacekeepers, blocked roads, and torched two police stations, blaming the Nepalese UN peacekeepers for the cholera outbreak and demanded their withdrawal from Haiti. At least three demonstrators were killed and more than a dozen injured. Three days later, the protests spread to Port-au-Prince. In the afternoon of the election day, twelve of the candidates issued a joint statement denouncing electoral fraud and calling on the election council to void the results. Subsequently, protests broke out throughout the country. At least two died in clashes between rival party supporters. (mgm)

Honduras (opposition)

Intensity: 2	Change: 	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between the opposition and the government continued. On 12/02/09,

congress voted against the restitution of Manuel Zelaya, who had been ousted as president in a military coup on 06/28/09. Three days before the congressional vote, the de-facto government under Roberto Micheletti had held presidential elections, won by Porfirio Lobo Sosa of the right-wing National Party (PN). Despite previous refusals to step down, Micheletti resigned on January 21. Six days later, Lobo was sworn in as president. His first presidential act was to sign a decree lifting abuse of power charges against Zelaya. While the amnesty did not extend to the allegations of embezzlement against the latter, it granted protection to the coup plotters. Immediately thereafter, Zelaya left the Brazilian embassy in the capital Tegucigalpa for a de-facto exile in the Dominican Republic. On April 13, congress set up a truth commission to investigate the previous year's coup. In mid May, three former Supreme Court judges went on hunger strike to protest against their dismissal and the impunity of the coup plotters. On July 10, Zelaya was appointed head of the main umbrella opposition group National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP) under the auspices of national trade unions. He called on the Liberal Party (PL) to expel Micheletti and to support the opposition. On August 18, various opposition groups including FNRP marched in solidarity with the country's striking teachers in Tegucigalpa. Protesters blocked the capital's main streets, demanding a reform of the 1982 constitution. Police used tear gas to disperse protesters. On September 9 and November 11, the FNRP led further national strikes. On July 29, a special session of the assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) discussed the conditions for readmitting Honduras to the OAS. While the international community remained divided on the recognition of the government, Chile and Mexico recognized Lobo's presidency in late July. (ivg)

Mexico (drug cartels)

Intensity: 5	Change: 	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	drug cartels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The regional predominance conflict between the main drug cartels Sinaloa, Golfo, Los Zetas, La Familia, and Beltrán Leyva, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a full scale war. In the first four months of 2010, 151 clashes between security forces and members of drug cartels were reported. Altogether, more than 10,000 people were killed in drug-related violence in 2010. However, 90 percent of the fatalities resulted from inter-gang violence, not from fighting between security forces and cartels. Nevertheless, gangs seemed to change their *modi operandi*. Starting in early December 2009, an increasing number of clashes between heavily armed cartel members and security forces occurred. As in previous years, most of the fighting took place in the north of the country. On March 11, cartel members and security forces clashed in the southern state of Chiapas, leaving 28 people dead. The attackers threw grenades at the Public Attorney's Office. On March 14, in another outbreak of drug-related violence 14 people were killed in Acapulco, among them five police men. At least 18 cartel members were killed in an attack on

two military bases in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León on March 31. On June 10, up to 85 people were killed, the highest death toll within 24 hours up to that point. In a wave of violent incidents between June 12 and 18, 300 people were killed, among them 29 policemen and two soldiers. On June 14, members of La Familia ambushed a police convoy in downtown Zitácuaro in broad daylight, killing 15 federal police officers. The attackers established roadblocks to ensure that no military backup and emergency service would interrupt their attack. In reaction to the arrest of a local drug boss on July 15, a car bomb containing 10 kg of C-4 explosives detonated in Ciudad Juárez's main street. The bomb exploded when police forces and a medical team arrived to help a wounded police officer, killing two police men, two aid-workers and injuring at least 16 people. On September 2, military forces discovered a Los Zetas training center at the border of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas. The army stormed the facility in a 90 minute heavy fight, killing 27. On September 15, military forces broke up a road block in Tamaulipas, killing 22 gang members. Two days later, the army killed another 22 while attacking a ranch belonging to cartel members in the same state. Throughout the year, security forces arrested and killed a number of high-ranking drug bosses. Mexican drug gangs operated in 47 countries and had a business volume of approx. USD 25 billion per year. The Sinaloa cartel supposedly controlled over 45 percent of the regional drug-trafficking and had 150,000 people on its payroll. On 12/16/09, marines killed Marcos Arturo "boss of the bosses" Beltrán Leyva, senior boss of the Beltrán Leyva cartel, in a two hour military operation south of Mexico City. Only two weeks later, federal police forces arrested his brother, Carlos Beltrán Leyva, at a checkpoint near Culiacán. On June 9, Hector Raúl "El Tori" Luna Luna, senior boss of Los Zetas, was arrested by soldiers in Monterrey city. In response, his followers blocked several main roads, thereby causing a standstill in the country's third most populous city. On August 30, federal police forces arrested Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal of the Beltrán Leyva organization in the Estado de México. In an operation on July 29, 150 Special Forces and several helicopters hunted and killed Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel, "King of Crystal", a senior boss of the Sinaloa gang. The following day, his nephew, Mario Carrasco "El Gallo" Coronel, also was killed. Few days later, police forces seized about 200 tons of chemicals for the production of synthetic drugs in the state of Colima. On November 5, 600 marines were deployed to arrest Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cárdenas Guillén, senior boss of the Golfo gang. After a six-hour shootout in the city of Matamoros, Cárdenas was killed along with four soldiers. In a series of killings in the run-up for local and regional elections, several mayors and candidates were gunned down by cartel members. On September 27, Gustavo Sanchez, mayor of Tancitaro in Michoacán state, was stoned to death. He had dismissed some 60 policemen accused of corruption charges and replaced them with federal police forces. On March 27, Heriberto Cerda, deputy police chief of Nogales in the state of Sonora, was found with his head cut off. Members of the Golfo gang were

held responsible. On April 24, cartel members assaulted Public Safety Secretary of Michoacán Minerva Bautista with assault rifles and a grenade launcher, wounding her and killing two bodyguards and two bystanders. On October 18, security forces seized 134 tons of marihuana in Tijuana. In response, members of the Sinaloa gang killed 13 people in a drug rehab center and threatened to kill 134 people via police radio. On August 30, the federal police announced that 10 percent of their 33,000 forces had been dismissed due to corruption charges and supposed links to cartels. President Felipe Calderón repeatedly condemned the USA for their high consumption of illegal drugs and their lax gun laws. In reaction, the head of the US Department of State Hillary Clinton admitted co-responsibility for drug-related violence in Mexico. In addition, on March 24 she pledged further efforts to tackle social problems due to drug-fueled violence. Mexican Public Security Minister Genaro García Luna estimated that the murder rate would continue to rise within the next years. (fs)

Panama (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system and ideology conflict between the opposition and the government turned violent. On June 12, the government passed a law limiting the rights of the trade unions. Subsequent violent clashes starting on July 8 left three protesters dead as well as 140 demonstrators and policemen injured in the northwestern province of Bocas del Toro. Hundreds of protesters and leading trade unionists were imprisoned. Police enforced a curfew to regain control over the streets. The same day, plantation workers set a regional police station on fire and injured several police officers. On July 14, trade unionists and social movements arranged a nationwide general strike, urging the government to reconsider the most controversial parts of the disputed law. President Ricardo Martinelli agreed to a congressional commission and a dialogue committee including trade unionists as well as government officials. After 90 days of discussion, on October 7 the president announced that he would replace the disputed law with a new initiative, leaving out the most controversial parts of the original bill. Additionally, on October 4, the main umbrella trade union group, Frenadeso, announced that it was about to register its own political party in order to strengthen trade unions' influence in parliament. (peh)

Paraguay (various opposition groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	various farmers organisations, various indigenous groups, EPP, landless people vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, resources	

The system conflict over land reform between the left-wing People's Army of Paraguay (EPP), several farmers' organizations, indigenous groups, and landless people, on the one hand, and the government, on the other,

continued on a violent level. The opposition groups upheld their demands for integral agrarian, social, and political reform. Throughout the year, the EPP repeatedly clashed with government forces. On April 14, EPP leader Severiano Martínez injured a police officer and a farm worker, after police forces had tried to arrest him. EPP members clashed with police forces, killing two farm workers, one guard, and one police officer in the border region of the departments of San Pedro and Concepción on April 21. In response, President Fernando Lugo declared a state of emergency for 30 days in five northern departments three days later. On May 6, military forces arrested a suspected EPP member in an operation. After the state of emergency expired, two members of police special forces were killed in the region of Concepción on June 17. On August 27, Martínez was killed by Special Forces. In another incident a police informant was killed by EPP members in the department of Canindeyú on September 2. The following day, police forces shot dead EPP's third-in-command, Gabriel Zárate Cardozo. In late September, one further EPP member was killed. On August 10, around 2,000 landless farmers occupied two farms in San Pedro, urging the government to buy the land and to redistribute it among landless farmers. Meanwhile, Lugo promised indigenous groups the entitlement to 55,730 hectares of land and the implementation of various social programs.

(ank)

Peru (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, resources	

The conflict between various opposition groups and the government over President Alan García's free-market and natural resources policies continued to be carried out violently. On April 4, unlicensed miners clashed with the police, leaving six demonstrators dead and about twenty miners and nine police officers injured. Police opened fire after being pelted with stones by protesters. The Federation of Informal Miners rejected the Emergency Decree 012-2010. The latter allowed the establishment of mining exclusion zones in the Amazon region of Madre de Dios, prohibited unregulated gold panning and dredging of rivers, and introduced the taxation of mining as well as environmental licenses. The protesters voiced their fears of being edged out in favor of large private mining companies. Local indigenous groups repeatedly demanded a share of the benefit from the extraction of natural resources. On April 13, five indigenous organizations demanded that the government approve the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 on indigenous rights, stipulating that the state had to consult indigenous communities about issues concerning their territories. Congress approved the law on May 5. However, on July 25, García refused to sign the bill, stating that particular interests of indigenous groups were not to hinder national growth. On August 27, the Constitutional Court acknowledged the indigenous groups' right to consultation. On April 15, farmers blocked highways in objection to the Tia Maria cop-

per mine project, fearing the contamination of water supplies and environmental pollution. On the following day, police forces fired shots and used tear gas to clear the road, injuring two protesters. The blockades ended after the government temporarily suspended the project and promised to build a dam to ease the farmers' concerns. On August 1, a state of emergency was declared in Echarate, after a confrontation between protesters and police had left one dead and dozens injured. During the protest, the mainly indigenous agricultural workers took the regional governor hostage and damaged the monitoring system of the gas pipeline. The protesters feared that exporting gas would lead to a shortage in Peru. In early August, protesters burned down part of a private natural gas extraction company's workers camp, threw stones at police forces, and took two workers of the consortium hostage. At least 18 people were severely injured. On August 9, the government and the protesters reached an agreement that promised local gas delivery. On September 16, at least one demonstrator was killed and 18 were wounded in clashes with the police. In late May, Alberto Pizango, a senior indigenous leader, returned to Peru and immediately got arrested on charges of sedition and mutiny owing to last year's Bagua clashes. In August, Pizango announced the formation of the political party Alternative Alliance of Humanity, aimed at protecting the rainforest and indigenous rights in the Andes and the Amazon region. (mgm)

Peru (Shining Path)

Intensity: 3	Change: ▾	Start: 1980
Conflict parties:	SL vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (SL) and the government over regional predominance deescalated but remained violent. The rebels were divided in two factions. Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, known as "Comrade Artemio", led the Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH), numbering around 100 fighters. The second faction, the Center Regional Committee (CRC), operated in the valleys of the rivers Apurímac and Ene (VRAE) and consisted of an estimated 300 to 600 fighters. The government accused both factions of being involved in drug-trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels. Throughout the year, police forces killed at least five alleged SL members and arrested another 50. In addition, seven soldiers were killed and ten injured. On January 11, rebels killed an officer and wounded another; 15 suspected SL members were arrested. On January 26, Artemio announced the CRH was suspending offensive armed actions and called for dialogue with the government. Prime Minister Javier Velásques Quesquén promptly rejected the proposal. In a SL attack on a military base in the VRAE region on February 26, one soldier was killed and another injured. On April 27, SL killed a police officer and two eradication workers who were destroying coca plantations. Approx. 60 SL fighters assaulted a military base in Ayacucho two days later, wounding one soldier in a missile attack. The same day, three suspected SL fighters

and a soldier were killed in a clash in the VRAE region. On May 15, the government declared a 60-day state of emergency, reacting to increasing attacks. Police killed second-in-command of the CRH "Comrade Ruben" and another SL fighter in a clash on May 20. Authorities captured at least eleven SL members in September. An army captain and a SL member were killed in a skirmish on October 5. In an operation eight days later, police forces detained CRH top commander Edgar Mejia, also known as "Comrade Izula", and killed two SL fighters. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, a police officer died in a mine field on November 5. Two days later, CRH members killed a coca eradication worker. (mgm)

Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay River)

Intensity: 1	Change: END	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	Uruguay vs. Argentina	
Conflict items:	resources	

The conflict between Uruguay and Argentina over the construction of a paper mill on the Uruguay River was settled by an ICJ ruling on April 20. Both parties accepted the judgment. The ICJ ruled that Uruguay had violated several articles of the River Uruguay Treaty of 1975 by failing to inform the River Uruguay Executive Commission (CARU) of its intentions to build the mill. Nevertheless, the ICJ did not support Argentina's claim that the mill had polluted the river. On April 28, Argentina's President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her Uruguayan counterpart José Mujica reached an agreement to establish regulation for the oversight of the mill's environmental impact on the Uruguay River. Although the Argentine environmental assembly of Gualeguaychú decided to hold its regular blockades of the San Martín International Bridge in protest of the paper mill, President Fernández de Kirchner announced that her government did not support these actions and would bring them to an end. On November 14, both governments further specified the supervision of the environmental impact of the paper mill. (kcr)

USA - Mexico (border fence)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	USA vs. Mexico	
Conflict items:	other	

The conflict between the USA and Mexico over illegal im-


migration and the construction of a border fence on US territory continued. Mexican President Felipe Calderón harshly criticized the US state Arizona's the new immigration enforcement bill of April 23, and a regular bilateral meeting between the governors of Arizona and the Mexican state Sonora was canceled. The law required police officers to question suspects about their immigration status. On July 28, a US federal judge issued a preliminary injunction against parts of the disputed immigration law. On June 10, Mexican President Felipe Calderón demanded US investigations of the deaths of two Mexican citizens. One of them was shot dead by a US Border Patrol on June 6. The Mexican government also sent an official note expressing its concern over the incident. US Attorney General Eric Holder stated the border incident would not affect bilateral relations between the two countries. The US deployed 2,500 additional border guards and launched drones in order to improve border security. (akn)

Venezuela (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2000
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	


The national power conflict between various opposition parties and the government continued. The opposition consisted of student organizations and a coalition of various political parties, Table for Democratic Unity (MUD). On 12/08/09, detractors and supporters of the government clashed, leaving one oppositional student dead and at least ten others injured. The protesters criticized cuts in social spending, alleged mismanagement of public funding and deficits in electric infrastructure as well as other public services. On January 24, the government shut down six cable TV channels, including the pro-opposition Radio Caracas Televisión Internacional, which had refused to broadcast President Hugo Chávez' weekly show. In response to the government's measures, pro- and anti-government groups clashed the following day. Two protesters were killed. On September 26, legislative elections were held. President Chávez' ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela won 60 percent of the seats with nearly 47 percent of the popular vote, while the MUD achieved 45 percent of the votes, gaining 40 percent of the seats. (nms)

Asia and Oceania




With a total of 114 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the world's conflicts. Most conflicts concerned system/ideology, followed by regional predominance, national power, and secession. The most violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology and national power, while conflicts regarding territory and international power were comparatively peaceful. In 2010, one war was observed in the region, compared with three in the last year: In Pakistan, the most conflict-ridden country in Asia together with India, the war between the government and Islamist militants continued for the fourth year running [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants)]. In addition, eight severe crises were fought out in Asia in 2010: The intrastate conflicts between Taliban and various tribes in FATA [→ Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)], Sunni groups and religious minorities [→ Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP – variuos religious groups)] as well as between Mohajir people on the one hand and Sindhis, Pakhtuns, and Baloch on the other [→ Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch)] were conducted with a massive amount of violence. In India, the extensive conflict between the government and the Naxalite movement [→ India (Naxalites)] continued unabatedly, while the conflict in Indian-administered Kashmir escalated from a crisis in 2009 to a severe crisis [India (JeM et al./Kashmir)]. Two further severe crises were observed in Southeast Asia [→ Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State); Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)]. The conflict in Myanmar mentioned turned highly violent in the aftermath of the first general elections in more than 20 years. In Kyrgyzstan, the political situation worsened considerably. After President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted [→ Kyrgyzstan (opposition)], the tensions between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks became highly violent [→ Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz - Uzbeks)]. In addition, the relations between North and South Korea were on the brink of war when, after a series of aggravating events, North Korea shelled the island of Yeonpyeong on November 23.

Conflict Intensities in Asia and Oceania in 2010 compared to 2009



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 in Asia and Oceania by Intensity Groups



Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2010

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Bangladesh (AL - BNP)*	AL, government vs. BNP	national power	1991	↗	3
Bangladesh (JMB)	JMB, HuJI-B, ICS vs. government	system/ideology	2005	•	3
Bangladesh (PCJSS - UPDF)*	PCJSS vs. UPDF	regional predominance	1997	↗	3
Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF/Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	Tribes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UPDF, PCJSS vs. government	autonomy	1971	↗	3
Bangladesh - India*	Bangladesh vs. India	territory, resources, other	1971	•	1
Bangladesh - Myanmar*	Bangladesh vs. Myanmar	territory, resources, other	1991	↘	1
Cambodia (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	2
Cambodia - Vietnam*	Cambodia vs. Vietnam	territory	1969	•	1
China (Falun Gong)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	2
China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)	Hong Kong pro-democracy parties vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1999	•	1
China (Hui - Han)*	Hui ethnic minority vs. Han Chinese	system/ideology, regional predominance	2000	•	3
China (Taiwan)	government of the People's Republic in Beijing vs. government of the Republic of China in Taipei vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups	secession	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)	Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1912	•	3
China (Uighurs/Xinjiang)	ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han	secession, system/ideology	1990	•	3
China - India*	People's Republic of China vs. India	territory, international power	1947	•	1
China - USA*	USA vs. People's Republic of China	international power	1949	•	1
China - Vietnam et al. (Spratly Islands/Paracel Islands)*	China (People's Republic of China) vs. China (Republic of China/Taiwan) vs. Brunei vs. Vietnam vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines vs. Malaysia	territory, resources	1945	↗	2
Fiji (indigenous Fijians - Indo-Fijians)*	indigenous Fijians vs. Indo-Fijians	national power, regional predominance	1970	•	2
Fiji (traditionalist - non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians)*	traditionalist indigenous Fijians vs. non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	2
Fiji - Australia, New Zealand*	Fiji vs. Australia, New Zealand	international power	2006	•	1
India (ANVC et al./Meghalaya)*	ANVC, GNLA, HNLC, LAEF, PLF-M vs. government	secession	1992	•	3
India (ATTF et al./Tripura)	ATTF, BNCT, NLFT vs. government	secession	1980	•	3
India (Bodos - Santhals)*	Bodos vs. Santhals	regional predominance	1994	•	1
India (DHD - HPC-D)*	DHD vs. HPC-D	regional predominance	1986	•	1
India (Hindus - Christians)*	VHP, Bajrang Dal, Hindus vs. Christians	regional predominance	1999	•	2
India (Hindus - Muslims)*	Hindus vs. Muslims	regional predominance	1853	•	3
India (Hmar / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)*	HPC - D, HNA vs. government	secession	1986	•	2
India (JeM et al./Kashmir)	JeM, LeT, HM vs. government	secession	1947	↗	4
India (LTTE)*	LTTE, government	other	1987	•	1
India (MPLF et al./Manipur)	MPLF, ZRA, KCP vs. government	secession	1964	•	3
India (Nagas - Kukis)*	KNF, KNA, KLA vs. NSCN, UNPC	regional predominance	1947	↘	2
India (Naxalites)	CPI-M vs. government	system/ideology	1997	•	4
India (NSCN et al./Nagaland)	NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-U, ANSCM, NUC vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (NSCN-K - NSCN-IM)*	NSCN-K vs. NSCN-IM	regional predominance	1988	•	3
India (PULF)*	PULF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1993	•	3
India (Sikhs - DSS)*	Sikhs vs. DSS	regional predominance	2007	•	2
India (Sikhs/Punjab)*	Akali Dal, KLF, BKI vs. government	autonomy	1929	↗	2
India (TJAC/Telangana)	TJAC vs. government	autonomy	1969	•	2

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³ Int. ⁴
India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)*	ATTF, ULFA, NLFT vs. Biharis, Bengalis	regional predominance	1981	• 2
India (ULFA et al./Assam)	ULFA, NDFB, BW, DHD vs. government	autonomy	1979	• 3
India (various Islamist militants)*	JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI vs. government	system/ideology	2001	↗ 3
Indonesia (Bugis - Dayaks/Kalimantan)	Bugis vs. Dayaks	regional predominance	1999	↗ 3
Indonesia (GAM/Aceh)*	GAM, KPA, Partai Aceh vs. government	autonomy, resources	1953	• 3
Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah)*	Jemaah Islamiyah vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1981	• 3
Indonesia (Lintas Tanzim)	Lintas Tanzim vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2010	NEW 3
Indonesia (Muslims - Christians/Moluccas)*	Muslims, Laskar Jihad vs. Christians	regional predominance	1998	• 3
Indonesia (Muslims - Christians/Sulawesi)*	Muslims vs. Christians	regional predominance	1998	• 2
Indonesia (OPM/Papua)	OPM vs. government	secession, resources	1949	• 3
Indonesia (RMS, FKM/Moluccas)*	RMS, FKM vs. government	secession	1950	• 2
Indonesia - Timor-Leste*	Indonesia vs. Timor-Leste	territory, other	2002	↗ 2
Japan - China (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands)	Japan vs. China (Republic of China/Taiwan), China (People's Republic of China)	territory, resources	1972	• 2
Japan - Russia (Kuril Islands)	Japan vs. Russia	territory	1945	↗ 2
Japan - South Korea (Dokdo/Takeshima Islands)*	Japan vs. South Korea	territory	1948	• 2
Kazakhstan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	• 2
Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz - Uzbeks)	ethnic Uzbeks vs. ethnic Kyrgyz	regional predominance, resources	1990	↑ 4
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	↗ 3
Laos (Christians)	Christians vs. government	system/ideology	1975	• 2
Laos (Hmong, Royalists)	Hmong, Royalists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	• 3
Malaysia (KMM)*	KMM vs. government	system/ideology	1998	• 1
Malaysia (Malay - Chinese, Indian, and Indigenous Malaysians)*	Malay Malaysians vs. Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysians	regional predominance	1946	↗ 2
Malaysia (opposition)*	Pakatan Rakyat, DAP, PAS, PKR vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	↘ 1
Malaysia - Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)*	Malaysia vs. Indonesia, Philippines	other	1998	• 2
Myanmar (Arakan Army, NUFA/Rakhine State)*	Arakan Army, NUFA vs. government	secession	1948	• 2
Myanmar (CNA, CNF/Chin State)*	CNA, CNF vs. government	secession	1988	• 2
Myanmar (KIA, KIO/Kachin State)*	KIA, KIO vs. government	autonomy	1961	↗ 3
Myanmar (KNPP et al./Kayah State)*	KNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. government	autonomy	1948	• 2
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)	KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs. government, DKBA	secession	1948	• 4
Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP/Mon State, Karen State)*	MNLA, NMSP vs. government	secession	1948	↗ 3
Myanmar (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1962	↗ 3
Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO/Rakhine State)*	Rohingyas, ARNO vs. government	other	1948	• 2
Myanmar (SSA-S et al./Shan State)*	SSA-S, SSNA, SSA-N vs. government	autonomy	1952	↗ 3
Myanmar (UWSA et al./Shan State)*	UWSA, UWSP, MNDAA, NDAA-ESS vs. government	autonomy	1988	• 3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Nepal (CPN-M)*	CPN-M vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	•	3
Nepal (Madheshis/Terai)	MJF, JTMM-R, JTMM, ATMM vs. government	autonomy	2006	•	3
Nepal (NDA, Ranabir Sena)*	NDA, RS, Bhishma Unity Council, NDP, Hindu Youth Federation vs. government	system/ideology	2007	↘	2
Nepal (various ethnic groups)	various ethnic groups vs. government	autonomy	2008	•	2
Nepal - Bhutan*	Bhutan vs. Nepal	other	1985	•	2
North Korea - South Korea	North Korea vs. South Korea	territory, system/ideology, international power	1948	•	3
North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan	North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan	system/ideology, international power, other	1990	•	2
Pakistan (BLA et al./Balochistan)	BLA, BRA, BLF, BLUF vs. government	secession, resources	1998	•	3
Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch)	Mohajirs vs. Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch	regional predominance	1947	↗	4
Pakistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	1998	•	3
Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)	various tribes vs. Taliban	system/ideology, regional predominance	2001	↘	4
Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups)	TTP, LeJ, SSP vs. various religious group	system/ideology, regional predominance	1998	•	4
Pakistan (various Islamist militants)	various Islamist militants vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	5
Pakistan - India*	Pakistan vs. India	territory, international power	1947	•	3
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	↘	3
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3
Philippines (MILF/Mindanao)	MILF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1977	↘	3
Philippines (MNLF/Mindanao)*	MNLF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1969	•	3
Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah)*	Jemaah Islamiah vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	1
Singapore - Malaysia*	Singapore vs. Malaysia	territory	1963	•	1
Solomon Islands (ethnic groups)*	Islanders of Guadalcanal, IFM vs. Islanders of Malaita, MEF	regional predominance, resources	1978	↘	1
Sri Lanka (Buddhists - Hindus, Muslims, Christians)*	Buddhists vs. Hindus, Muslims, Christians	regional predominance	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (Jamiyathul Ulama - Sufis)*	Jamiyathul Ulama vs. Sufis	regional predominance	1978	•	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)	LTTE vs. government	secession	1976	↓	2
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese nationalists)*	Sinhalese nationalists, conservative Buddhist clergy, JHU vs. government	system/ideology, other	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (Tamils - Muslims)*	Tamils vs. Muslims	regional predominance	1976	•	1
Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*	Upcountry Tamils vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Tajikistan (opposition)	IRP, IMU vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↑	3
Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)	Muslim separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	4
Thailand (Northern Hill Tribes)*	Northern Hill Tribes vs. government	other	1955	•	1
Thailand (opposition)	PTP, UDD vs. PAD, government	national power	2006	•	3
Thailand - Cambodia (border)	Thailand vs. Cambodia	territory, international power	1954	•	3
Thailand - Myanmar	Thailand vs. Myanmar	territory, other	1948	↑	3
Timor Leste (opposition)*	FRETILIN vs. CNRT	national power	2006	↘	1

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Timor-Leste (Loromonu Veterans)*	Loromonu veterans vs. Lorosa'e, government	national power	2006	↘	1
Timor-Leste - Australia*	Timor-Leste vs. Australia	resources	2002	•	1
Tonga (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1970	•	1
USA - Pakistan	USA vs. Pakistan	international power	2003	↗	3
Uzbekistan (IMU)*	IMU vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	↘	2
Uzbekistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	1
Uzbekistan - Tajikistan	Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan	resources	2010	NEW	1
Vietnam (Montagnards)	Montagnards vs. government	system/ideology, other	1958	↗	3

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Bangladesh (JMB)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	JMB, HuJI-B, ICS vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict over ideology and the orientation of the political system between the Jama'atul Mukahideen Bangladesh (JMB), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (Jel), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The JMB, the HuJI-B, the ICS, and the Jel aimed at establishing an Islamic state. Throughout the year, the government continued to arrest and sentence JMB, ICS, and HuJI-B members for their alleged involvement in various acts of violence. Leading JMB cadres were among the detainees. However, the JMB remained active across the country and was believed to have stashed a large amount of explosives and firearms in the north. The JMB denied the accusation. In July, an acting JMB chief, Anwar Alam, declared during an interrogation by police personnel that the JMB aimed at killing twelve top politicians. On February 9, ICS students clashed with members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student wing of the ruling Awami League, at the Rajshahi and Chittagong Universities. One BCL student was killed. In reaction, around 200 Jel and ICS leaders and activists were arrested by the police in Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, and several other districts. In addition, several hundred more were taken into custody over the next months. In an encounter in Chapai Nawabganj District on February 11, the police shot dead an ICS leader. Between March and November, ICS and BCL activists were killed and injured in several violent clashes between the two groups. On April 13, the police filed a case accusing 1,500 to 2,000 Jel and ICS members of having attacked a police station in Anderkilla the previous before. Between April and July, police forces and ICS members clashed numerous times. On April 16, an ICS cadre was killed in a gunfight. On June 29, hundreds of Jel and ICS members were arrested while blocking several roads outside the capital, protesting against the arrest of some of their top leaders. The next day, two police officers and five ICS activists were injured in violent encounters. In July, Jel and ICS cadres demonstrated in Chittagong city, destroying over 100 vehicles. (cs)

China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)

Intensity: 1	Change: •	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	Hong Kong pro-democracy parties vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology	

The conflict between Hong Kong's pro-democracy parties and the government over democratic reforms persisted. On January 1, thousands attended the 2010 Hong Kong New Year March, demanding universal suffrage. Five pro-democracy members resigned from their Legislative Council posts on January 29, following the publication of the "Consultation Document on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012" by the government on 11/18/09. With this move, dubbed the "Five Constituencies Resignation", they intended to bring about by-elections, which were held on May 16. Since all Hong Kong citizens were allowed to participate, the elections constituted a de-facto referendum. The five members who had resigned were re-elected. While thousands of pro-democracy supporters demanded full democracy in the March for Universal Suffrage on May 2, the Hong Kong government launched the Act Now campaign in early June in order to gain popular support for the government's proposal to reform the election law. On June 19, Chinese President Hu Jintao approved compromise proposal of the pro-democracy Democratic Party (DP) in order to prevent a political stalemate. On June 24 and 25, the revised amendments regarding the selection of the Hong Kong Chief Executive as well as the formation of the Legislative Council were passed by the latter with 46 to 13 and 12 votes, respectively. After the Chief Executive had assented to the June amendments, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China ratified them on August 28. The Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats opposed the decisions. (jd)

China (Taiwan)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1949
Conflict parties:	government of the People's Republic in Beijing vs. government of the Republic of China in Taipei vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the Chinese government in Taipei on the island of Taiwan and the Chinese government

in Beijing regarding the political status of the island of Taiwan continued despite substantial progress in economic relations between the two entities. The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) insisted on the 1992 Consensus indicating that both governments had recognized the existence of only one China. While the government of the PRC continued to claim to be the only legitimate government of all China, the government of the ROC strove to maintain the status quo. Although there were indications of the ROC upholding its *de jure* claim over all of mainland China, the government in Taipei recognized the *de-facto* restriction of its authority to the island of Taiwan. Opposition groups in Taiwan, most notably the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continued to demand the explicit recognition of Taiwan's independence. However, DPP announced a revision of their approach towards the government of the PRC without further elaboration. On January 29, a US arms sales package of USD 6.4 billion to the ROC caused the postponement of inter-military dialogue between the US and the PRC. However, the package did not provoke actions by the government in Beijing against the government in Taipei. Ma Ying-jeou, President of the ROC, welcomed the arms sales as a symbol of the US's continuing commitment to Taiwan's security. The Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation had been set up by the two governments to deal with technical and business matters between the two entities. On June 29, the chairmen of both boards met in Chongqing for the fifth time and signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which included the establishment of a bilateral free trade agreement. The DPP continued to oppose the agreement, voicing concerns over influence by mainland China. They launched a peaceful anti-ECFA rally on June 26, which, according to Taipei police, was attended by 32,000 protesters. On May 17, ROC participated at the World Health Assembly as an observer under the name of Chinese Taipei for the second time since 2009. On September 23, western media reported Wen Jiabao, the prime minister of the PRC, to have stated that approx. 1,500 missiles targeting Taiwan would eventually be removed. Wu Den-yih, prime minister of the ROC, welcomed his counterpart's reputed comment. Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the DPP, described Wen's remark as vague and meaningless. The US appreciated Wen's statement. (mr)

China (Tibet)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1912
Conflict parties:	Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology, resources	

The secession conflict between Tibetan separatists and the Tibetan government-in-exile over the province's status, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. On February 19, US President Barack Obama met with Tibet's spiritual leader and head of state in exile, the Dalai Lama, at the White House in Washington D.C. The People's Republic of China, which

considered the Dalai Lama a threat to domestic stability, condemned the meeting. During the 51st anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959 and the anniversary of the March 2008 riots, between 20 and 600 students repeatedly launched peaceful protests in the autonomous region of Tibet and Gansu Province, stating their support for the Dalai Lama. In reaction, more than 3,000 security officers were deployed to the areas. Protests against Chinese mining companies continued, and stand-offs with the police, which left dozens injured, occurred repeatedly. In August, security forces in Sichuan province fired into a crowd of Tibetans protesting against gold mining operations in Palyul County in the Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, killing one and injuring dozens according to Western media reports. State media confirmed the death but attributed it to a misguided bullet. On October 19, approx. 9,000 students launched a protest in Rebkong/Tongren, in the east of Qinghai Province, against an education reform which would promote Mandarin Chinese over the Tibetan language. The protests spread to Tibetan communities in Chabha in Qinghai Province and Tawu in Sichuan Province but remained peaceful. On October 21, approx. 500 students of the Minzu University protested peacefully in Beijing. (mr)

China (Uighurs/Xinjiang)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession conflict between the Uighurs, the Muslim minority in the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, and the government remained violent. Between December 2009 and January, courts sentenced 14 Uighurs to death for their role in the riots of July 2009, which had left 197 people dead and some 1,700 injured. In total, 25 death sentences had been imposed by the end of January, nine of which were executed. On January 18, the authorities gradually began to restore text messaging services and internet access in Xinjiang, which had been blocked since the July 2009 riots. Internet access was restored in May. On April 24, the government replaced Wang Lequan, the party secretary and ruling official in Xinjiang, with Zhang Chunxian. Wang's handling of the July 2009 violence had sparked public anger. Compared to the previous year, the government doubled the 2010 security budget for Xinjiang, increasing its security measures in the run-up to the first anniversary of the 2009 riots. A new development strategy for Xinjiang was to provide an additional USD 1.5 billion for the region. On January 6, a Han man stabbed a Uighur restaurant worker to death in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, after a quarrel. On June 20, the Xinjiang police launched a thirty-day-campaign against crime, deploying some 1,000 additional police forces. Four days later, the police arrested ten men and seized explosives which, according to authorities, were intended for attacks in several cities in Xinjiang. The detainees were also charged with being responsible for an attack in Kashgar, western Xinjiang, in August 2008 which left 16 police officers dead. On August 19 in the same area, a bomb

blast killed seven military police and injured 14 others in Aksu. According to officials, a Uighur man had driven a three-wheeled vehicle carrying explosive devices into a group of security forces. The local government imposed martial law and deployed large numbers of police personnel to Aksu. In March, the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, voiced his support for the Uighur minority in Xinjiang [→ China (Tibet)]. (jd)

India (ATTF et al./Tripura)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1980
Conflict parties:	ATTF, BNCT, NLFT vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT), and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The ATTF and the NLFT had hide-outs in Bangladesh, while the latter announced plans to build camps in the Arakan area of Myanmar. Over the year, at least 100 militants surrendered. On 12/24/09, eight NLFT members were arrested by the government-controlled Assam Rifles (AR) and police in the North District of Tripura. Another three were arrested at the border to Bangladesh on September 11. ATTF and NLFT recruited new members primarily in Tripura, among them teenagers and women, and trained them in various camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. On January 12, Bangladesh and India signed an accord ensuring actions against Tripura rebels on Bangladeshi territory. On January 22, NLFT and Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) clashed in Dhalai District. One month later, a soldier was wounded in a gunfight with suspected NLFT rebels in Kakuirojapara. NLFT members clashed with government forces on May 22 after having extorted money from 123 employees of a company in the village Shermoon. On August 6, two soldiers were killed in an NLFT explosion in the outskirts of Ratia. On August 29, five villagers were abducted by NLFT rebels in Dhalai District. The next day, the NLFT demanded the payment of INR 1,000 per year from the village chief. On September 3, Bangladeshi security forces destroyed three NLFT camps. (ve)

India (JeM et al./Kashmir)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↗	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	JeM, LeT, HM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgent groups, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. Constituting one of the highest soldier-to-civilian ratios in the world, India upheld approx. 700,000 military forces on the ground in J&K [→ Pakistan - India]. In December 2009, three members of the ruling party Jammu and Kashmir National Conference were killed by militants. On 12/30/2009, militants opened fire at a road opening ceremony, killing four members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Hizb-ul-Mujahideen claimed re-

sponsibility for the attack. Between January and November, some 250 militants, 67 security forces, and 34 civilians were killed in violent incidents. On January 6, an attempted suicide attack resulted in a 22-hour exchange of gunfire between two Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants and police forces in the Lol Chowk area in Srinagar. Both militants, a policeman, and a civilian were killed and at least twelve people injured. On February 23, militants and security forces clashed in the Baramulla District, killing five militants and three soldiers. Militants attacked police forces in the same area on March 16, killing three civilians, three members of the CRPF and injuring eight. On the anniversary day of the Lahore resolution on March 23, some 5,000 protesters gathered in Kotli in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to signal their support for the Muslim population in J&K. In May, the army launched several search and cordon operations in the Bandipora and Baramulla districts to cast out militants and prevent their infiltration along the Line of Control (LoC). In the operation, some 19 militants and at least six army soldiers were killed. In another operation in the Bandipora, Pulwama, and Kupwara districts between September 5 and 16, about 23 militants and two soldiers were killed. On June 11, a wave of protests, strikes and curfews started in Srinagar after a civilian had been killed by troops. The protests subsequently spread to other parts of J&K. In reaction, the central government increased the number of CRPF units and mobilized ground forces. In summer, 4,000 CRPF members and 504 civilians were injured in violent clashes. On September 25, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced an eight-point formula for Kashmir, including the easing of the disputed Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the institutionalized process of an all-party dialogue and financial support by the central government for education. On September 26, the curfew was eased in the major cities. Schools were reopened, public transport was restored, and the CRPF removed 16 bunkers from various parts of Srinagar. (kld)

India (MPLF et al./Manipur)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1964
Conflict parties:	MPLF, ZRA, KCP vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between various separatist groups in Manipur and the central government continued on a violent level. The ethnic Meitei groups United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), and People Liberation Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK), all united under the label Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), tried to enforce an independent Manipur state. The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) aimed at Manipur independence, whereas the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) sought to unite all Zomi people in one state under the Indian Union. Allegedly, the police arrested around 80 UNLF, 100 PLA, 170 PREPAK, 300 KCP, and six ZRA members during the period observed. Additionally, several members of each group surrendered. In clashes between militants and security forces, 13 UNLF, six PLA, at least twelve PREPAK, 14 KCP, and two ZRA members were shot dead and several weapons were confiscated. In late January, two

police officers were injured by an improvised KCP explosive. In an encounter between a group of allegedly 100 PLA members and the government-controlled Assam Rifles (AR), the militants killed one member of the AR and wounded another on March 8. The groups also threatened the local residents throughout the year by abducting several government officials as well as civilians, demanding ransom. To stress their claims, KCP and PREPAK used hand grenades against the homes and shops of those refusing to pay. All outfits called for a boycott of the national Independence Day celebrations on August 15 as well as of the anniversary day of the Manipur merger agreement on October 15. On both days, shops remained closed and the public transport services shut down. In February, India and Myanmar agreed on bilateral cooperation to cast out the militants' hideouts in Myanmar. On August 6, central and state governments signed a peace deal with one KCP faction. (jah)

India (Naxalites)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	CPI-M vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the government continued on a high level of violence. The Naxalites operated in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, also known as "Red Belt", as well as Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal, and Kerala. Nearly daily encounters between security forces and the Maoists, bomb attacks and abductions resulted in some 1,000 fatalities, especially in West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. According to media sources, the Naxalites had an arsenal of approx. 20,000 weapons comprising rifles in different calibers, shotguns and light machine guns. Reportedly, the Naxalites ran several local arms factories, which assembled makeshift weapons and produced homemade mortar rounds and IEDs. The government operation Green Hunt, launched against Naxalites in several states from October 2009 onwards, continued and comprised 50,000 federal paramilitary troops and an equal number of policemen. In the operation, security forces killed 200 Maoist rebels and arrested another 1,000. On March 2, the police arrested top Maoist leader Venkateswar Reddy in Calcutta. In an offensive in Jharkhand on June 14, police killed ten Maoist rebels and destroyed eight rebel camps. On July 2, top Maoist rebel leader Cherukuri Rajkumar was killed by the police in a shootout in Andhra Pradesh. Security forces killed another top Maoist leader, Sidhu Soren, and six other rebels in an encounter in West Bengal on July 26. In response to Green Hunt, the Naxalites called out Operation Peace Hunt. On February 15, Maoist militants attacked a camp of paramilitary forces, killed at least 24 troops and looted weapons. On April 4, suspected Maoist rebels attacked a bus in Orissa using a roadside bomb, killing at least ten policemen and injuring another ten. Two days later, more than 350 rebels attacked 120 paramilitary troops in an ambush in which more than 75

soldiers were killed. On May 17, at least 30 people were killed by the detonation of a Maoist explosive device under a bus in Chhattisgarh. According to government officials, Maoist militants derailed two trains in West Bengal on May 28. The crash left 148 dead and 145 injured. However, the militants denied the government's accusations. Dozens of Maoist rebels attacked members of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force in Chhattisgarh on June 29, killing at least 26. Maoist militants called for the boycott of the assembly elections in Bihar the next day. (vk)

India (NSCN et al./Nagaland)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-U, ANSCM, NUC vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K), the NSCN - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the NSCN - United (NSCN-U), the All Naga Students Union Manipur (ANSCM) and the United Naga Council (UNC), on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. All groups share the common aim of an independent "Greater Nagaland" in northeastern India, comprising all territory inhabited by the people of the Naga tribe. The NSCN-K pursued nationalist secession, whereas the NSCN-IM envisioned a Christian-Maoist state. The NSCN-U was formed in 2007 to unite the NSCN-K and the NSCN-IM. Throughout the year, four NSCN cadres were killed in clashes with police forces, and 37 NSCN-IM and NSCN-K activists were arrested. One police officer was killed and six policemen were abducted. Beginning in March, the central and federal government held peace talks with the NSCN-IM. The talks resulted in an extension of an existing ceasefire agreement until April 2011. Protesting against council elections as well as demanding better living conditions, various Naga-groups, dominated by the ANSCM and the UNC, imposed blockades of major roads in Manipur from April to mid-June. The blockade led to a shortage of essential goods, medical supplies among them, and was ended by federal police forces. Five weeks later, however, the blockade was reimposed on a smaller scale. On May 6, the NSCN-IM General-Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah was denied entry to Manipur. Subsequently, at least three Nagas were killed in violent clashes with police forces. (alb)

India (TJAC/Telangana)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1969
Conflict parties:	TJAC vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between the Telangana Joint Action Committee (TJAC), a changing coalition of parties supporting the formation of an autonomous Telangana state in Andhra Pradesh, and the government continued. On 12/09/09, the central government announced the formation of an autonomous Telangana state. After the announcement, opponents staged strikes throughout Andhra Pradesh, hundreds of women went on hunger

strike and at least 13 ministers of the regional cabinet as well as at least 50 members of the state assembly in Andhra Pradesh handed in their resignation. On 12/24/09, the central government announced that all-party talks were needed to decide on the issue of an autonomous Telangana state, thus taking back the earlier declaration. In reaction, supporters of autonomy burned over 100 buses and attacked shops. Subsequently, 100,000 security personnel were deployed and public transport was suspended. Shops, businesses, and schools remained closed. More protests and strikes took place in mid- and late January, after consultations between eight political parties on January 5 had ended without consensus on the issue of autonomy. In clashes between protesters and police forces, at least 26 people were injured. On February 3, the central government constituted a committee to discuss the issue of bifurcating Andhra Pradesh. The committee was supposed to hand in a report by the end of 2010. (thw)

India (ULFA et al./Assam)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	ULFA, NDFB, BW, DHD vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the two Dimasa groups of the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and its breakaway faction, the Black Widow (BW), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The central government initiated talks with the pro-talks faction of the ULFA, after the ULFA announced it would demand greater autonomy instead of secession. Though the number of attacks decreased in the second half of the year, the ULFA continued to use violent means. On 12/12/09, ULFA militants killed six people at Singirmari in Nagaon District. Between January and May, ten combatants were killed in eight reported ambushes with the Security Forces (SF). 40 militants were arrested. On February 5, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, the Intelligence Bureau, and Assam Police decided to continue counter-insurgency operations against ULFA until the outfit would agree to peace talks. From June until November, six encounters were reported, leaving seven ULFA cadres dead. Between January and May, 15 civilians and three SF personnel were killed in approx. 20 NDFB attacks. In reaction, SF conducted counter-militancy operations in which 34 NDFB members were killed and approx. 45 arrested. In May, however, Ranjan Daimary, chairman of the NDFB who had been arrested, announced he was prepared for unconditional peace talks and instructed his commanders to halt any violent attacks. Over the following months, violence decreased. Yet eleven people had been killed in violent encounters by October. Between November 8 and 10, the anti-talks faction of the NDFB killed 24 people in several encounters. Compared to the last year, less violent actions by both Dimasa groups were reported. On May 6, the United People's Federation of Assam (UPFA) urged the central government to expedite the peace talks with the NDFB, pro-talks ULFA, DHD, BW, and other outfits all of whom already

had agreed upon a ceasefire. On August 25, Assam's government announced that the state's security situation had improved significantly. (ds)

Indonesia (Bugis - Dayaks/Kalimantan)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	Bugis vs. Dayaks	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the Bugis and the Dayaks turned violent. While the members of the Bugi transmigrant minority generally held important political and economic positions, the Dayaks felt discriminated due to the loss of their land and culture. On September 26, a group of young men from the local Bugi community killed a member of the Tidung, a native Dayak tribe, in the city of Tarakan. In reaction, a group of armed Dayaks burned down two houses in search of the assailants. The violent clashes that followed in the next three days left five people dead and dozens injured. During the clashes, up to 32,000 people of both ethnic groups had fled their homes and sought refuge in local school buildings, police stations and military barracks. On September 29, an army battalion and hundreds of police officers were deployed to the region to quell the protests by imposing a curfew and a ban on weapons on the streets. Later that day, the Dayak and Bugi communities signed a peace accord. While most of the internally displaced returned to their homes after the peace accord, some families continued to leave Tarakan for South Sulawesi. (nr)

Indonesia (Lintas Tanzim)

Intensity: 3	Change: NEW	Start: 2010
Conflict parties:	Lintas Tanzim vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

A new power conflict emerged between an Islamic militant network known as Lintas Tanzim (LT) and the government. The network was formed by break-away members of Islamist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jemaah Anshoru Tauhid (JAT), and Mujahideen KOMPAK. The LT demanded the formation of an Islamic state of Indonesia. Many of their members had formerly been linked to suicide bombings. Nevertheless, LT rejected such measures and had been formed to employ other tactics, such as targeted assassinations of state officials. From February 23 to March 13, Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) and anti-terror Special Detachment (Densus 88) units besieged a paramilitary training camp on the slope of Jantho Mountain, Aceh Besar regency. They also raided nearby villages in search for suspected Islamic militants. It turned out that the LT had set up an operational base in the region no later than the end of 2009. Several firefights during the operation left three police officers, four alleged militants, and two civilians dead, and at least ten officers wounded. In total, police forces arrested 31 militants on terrorism charges. 14 suspected militants remained fugitive, some of which were either arrested or killed together with other suspects in police crackdowns all over Aceh province and in neighboring districts of northern Sumatra throughout the following

months. Information gathered from those arrested in Aceh led to several police raids in Java, leading to the detainment or killing of several suspected militants. On March 9, Densus 88 units killed three suspects in a raid in Pamulang near Jakarta. Among them was Dulmatin, alias Joko Pitono, who had been one of the masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bomb attacks conducted by JI [→ Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah)]. Since late 2007, Dulmatin had played a major role in organizing the new LT network and in running the paramilitary base in Aceh. In a series of raids in early May and late June, police killed six and arrested over 20 suspected LT militants at different locations in Greater Jakarta, West Java, and Klaten regency, Central Java. On August 11, police arrested the influential Islamist cleric and head of JAT, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. On August 18, a group of LT members killed one Brimob officer in a bank robbery in Medan, North Sumatra. On August 27, the West Jakarta District Court began trials against 21 of the 102 suspected militants arrested since the February siege of the Aceh camp. Further indictments followed in September and October. In May and September, various NGOs criticized Brimob for its high rate of killings and other human rights violations in operations against suspected militants. (nr)

Indonesia (OPM/Papua)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1949
Conflict parties:	OPM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM), fighting for the independence of the province of West Papua, and the government remained violent. Police detained at least 13 protesters for flying the forbidden morning star flag, a symbol for an independent West Papua, at two rallies against Indonesian rule in the provincial capital of Jayapura on 12/01/09. Two weeks later, police forces killed Kelly Kwalik, an OPM regional militant leader in his hideout in Timika, Mimika regency. In the days leading up to Kwalik's funeral on 12/21/09, 600 people demonstrated for independence in front of the local parliament building in Timika. In addition, another 500 were trying to block a local airport. On January 27, about 1,500 Papuans attended a rally organized by the West Papua National Committee in Mimika regency, calling for a referendum on the political status of West Papua. About 5,000 protesters gathered in front of the provincial legislature in Jayapura to call for a referendum over independence on July 8. Throughout the year, numerous violent attacks by both conflict parties were reported. On May 17, police and military forces killed an OPM member in Goburuk village, Puncak Jaya regency. Five days later, suspected OPM fighters attacked a military post in Yambi, Puncak Jaya, wounding at least three officers. On October 11, police burned almost 30 homes in a raid in Bigiragi village, Puncak Jaya. On November 11, a military tribunal in Jayapura sentenced four soldiers to five and seven years in prison for human rights abuses committed in Puncak Jaya regency earlier this year. Two days later, the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights criticized the sentences as too lenient. The government announced a national dialogue

on West Papua for late 2010. In March, OPM's military wing, the National Liberation Army, welcomed the offer under the condition of UN mediation. On May 15, authorities restored Indonesian citizenship to Nicholas Jouwe, the 87-year-old founder of OPM, who had returned to West Papua in January after decades of self-imposed exile in the Netherlands. (nr)

Japan - China (Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1972
Conflict parties:	Japan vs. China (Republic of China/Taiwan), China (People's Republic of China)	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

In the ongoing conflict over the territory of the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands between Japan, on the one hand, and the Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei, on the other, all three governments maintained their territorial claims. The governments' claims included oil and natural gas reserves and other resources within the disputed territory. In April, Japan remonstrated that a naval helicopter from a flotilla of warships of the People's Republic of China (PRC) had flown close to a Japanese naval ship. The same month, Japan declared its plans to explore the seabed in its exclusive economic zone around the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands for rare metals including gold, copper, and zinc, a basic component of high-tech products. The Republic of China voiced concerns about Japan's plans. On April 30, the government in Taipei announced an agreement with Japan to strengthen ties in various sectors including the Senkaku / Diaoyutai dispute. In the night of May 25, eight Taiwanese activists of the non-governmental Chinese Diaoyutai Defense Association sailed for the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands on a fishing boat. The association said their boat was rammed by a vessel of the Japanese Coast Guard and called Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration for help. However, the authorities in Taiwan stated they received no call for assistance from the fishing vessel. The Interchange Association, Japan's de facto representation to the Republic of China, denied any attempt to ram or board the fishing boat. On July 20, Japan's defense minister commented on the importance of deploying Self-Defense Forces to two islands off Okinawa near the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands in the next five to eight years. On September 7, a fishing trawler from the PRC allegedly collided with a Japanese coast guard ship, north of the disputed islands. The crew was arrested and the captain remained in Japanese custody until September 24. The incident caused a deterioration of relations between Japan and the PRC, including the cancelation of bilateral dialogs. (jun)

Japan - Russia (Kuril Islands)

Intensity: 2	Change: ↗	Start: 1945
Conflict parties:	Japan vs. Russia	
Conflict items:	territory	

The territory conflict between Japan and Russia over the Kuril Islands escalated slightly. Japan upheld its claim to the four disputed Kuril Islands of Kunashir/Kunashiri, Iturup/Etorofu, Shikotan, and Khabomai/Habomai, which

were all under Russia's control. On January 29, Russian border guards shot at two Japanese fishing vessels from a helicopter near the disputed Kunashir/Kunashiri Island. Allegedly, the Japanese boats had entered Russian territorial waters. None of the 15 crew members were injured. Japan lodged an official complaint. In June, Russia planned to purchase Mistral class amphibious assault ships to ensure the protection of the Kuril Islands. On June 29, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan expressed the desire to solve the territorial conflict on the margins of the G8 summit in Toronto, Canada. The following month, Japan was concerned by Russia's Vostok military drills, held every two years, on Iturup/Etorofu. On November 1, Medvedev visited the four disputed islands. In response, Japan temporarily recalled its ambassador to Russia. (jun)

Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz - Uzbeks)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↑	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	ethnic Uzbeks vs. ethnic Kyrgyz	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources between two of the major ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, escalated to serious crisis level after almost 20 years of relative quiet between the ethnicities. The Uzbeks made up about 14 percent of the population and the Kyrgyz constituted about 67 percent of the population. The violence concentrated mainly on the southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, both in the Kyrgyzstan portion of the Fergana Valley. About 30 percent of the population of Osh Province and approx. 20 percent of Jalal-Abad Province are Uzbek. In June, when a new constitution for Kyrgyzstan was drawn up [→ Kyrgyzstan (opposition)], Uzbeks raised the question of Uzbek as second official language again. However, the Interim Government (IG) retained Russian as the language of interethnic communication. On May 19, 2,000 Kyrgyz supporters of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev protested at the office of Uzbek leader Kadyrjan Batyrov near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University (KUU), accusing him of having set Bakiyev's house on fire and of instigating interethnic hostility. About 2,500 Uzbeks supporting Batyrov also gathered at the KUU, as well as a group of approximately 5,000 Uzbek followers of alleged mafia leader Aibek Mirsidikov. A shootout ensued, leaving three dead and 74 injured. On May 26, violence erupted between the Uzbeks of the Uzbekistani exclave of Soch and the Kyrgyz of the Kyrgyzstani village of Sogment as the Uzbeks demanded Kyrgyz pasturelands. Between June 9 and 11, riots in Osh between Kyrgyz and Uzbek left about 400 people dead and up to 1,000 injured. Around 3,000 ethnic Kyrgyz tried to enter Osh through the Uzbek village of Furkat, where Uzbeks had barricaded the road to Osh. Attempts to break through the barricades resulted in significant casualties. In Osh, about 1,000 Kyrgyz obtained weapons from a military base. In the city center, large crowds of youths smashed shop windows, set cars on fire, and burned down hundreds of buildings. The armed forces sealed the city off. Many people were killed in intense shootouts, including

sniper fire, in the Uzbek districts of Osh. In Bishkek, Batken and Jalal-Abad, about 2,000 ethnic Kyrgyz demanded to be taken to Osh in order to participate in the riots. Severe clashes also spread to Jalal-Abad, where thousands of Kyrgyz youths were reportedly handed automatic weapons. They later looted and burned Uzbek houses in the city center. Systematic rioting and killing, plundering, kidnapping, raping, and torturing of civilians took place in Osh and Jalal-Abad from June 9 to 12. On June 12, the IG declared a state of emergency and mobilized the armed forces. The same day, Russia refused Kyrgyzstan's official request for a military intervention. Uzbekistan reported 75,000 ethnic Uzbeks had fled to Uzbekistan, while the UN recorded about 400,000 refugees from the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. In addition, 600 Kyrgyz citizens from the Barak exclave in Uzbekistan fled to Kyrgyzstan. More than 2,200 people were evacuated to Bishkek from Osh, where the basic infrastructure had broken down. Atrocities continued in various localities throughout June. Most of the victims were ethnic Uzbeks, many of them raped and burned alive. According to the Health Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, 408 people were killed, most of them men having died due to gunshot wounds, and more than 2,500 hospitalized in May and June. Unofficial figures estimated about 2,000 fatalities, mostly Uzbeks. Officials estimated that 70 percent of the city of Osh was burned to the ground, displacing 37,000. Kyrgyzstan security forces denied an involvement of Tajikistan and blamed the ethnic clashes on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its splinter group, the Jihad Islamic Union (JIU) [→ Uzbekistan (IMU)]. They also accused the Bakiyev family of sponsoring the clashes. On June 27, 26 countries and 15 international organizations offered USD 1.1 billion in aid for the reconstruction of the cities of Jalal-Abad and Osh. An OSCE police mission was set up in Kyrgyzstan in mid-July. Week-long demonstrations were held in Bishkek and Osh against this mission, voicing concerns about Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty. (jib, ct)

Kyrgyzstan (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The power and system conflict between the oppositional United People's Movement (UPM) and the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev rapidly escalated to a violent level. On 12/15/09, the president sent parliament a bill of constitutional reforms proposing the abolishment of the Security Council and the president's administration, as well as the creation of a new Presidential Council. The latter institution would have been authorized to appoint the president. On February 12, the major pro-presidential party, Ak-Jol, accepted the bill. The oppositional Social Democratic Party, member of UPM and led by Roza Otunbayeva, opposed it. A month before, former Security Minister and UPM member, General Ismail Isakov, had been imprisoned for eight years. In response, UPM announced a hunger strike. Meanwhile, the police arrested 30 of Isakov's followers in Osh. With the beginning of 2010, a radical taxation reform concern-

ing heating, water, and electricity came into force. On February 24 in Naryn, 1,500 people protested against the legislation and demanded an increase in salaries. On March 10, a UPM rally of 3,500 people in the same town demanded, among other points, a reduction of electricity and heating costs as well as Isakov's release. One week later, a UPM protest of about 1,500 people took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan's capital. The UPM had planned to organize country-wide protests for April 7, but many key UPM activists were arrested. On April 6, fights broke out between the police and demonstrators in Talas. The police shot at the crowd, and a group of protesters captured a governor. The protests continued the following day with 7,000 people taking part. Demonstrators stormed the Department of the Interior and abducted the interior minister, leading to 85 police officers and 49 civilians being wounded. In Bishkek, the police and military shot at unarmed demonstrators. A group of demonstrators stormed the president's residence, forcing Bakiyev to flee to the south-western city of Jalalabad. During the two days of clashes, 1,522 people were injured and 89 were shot dead by security forces and snipers, according to the Health Ministry. The leaders of UPM formed an interim government (IG) led by Otunbayeva. The IG dissolved parliament until fresh elections were held and annulled all reforms and directives of the former president. Between April 7 and 9, some 10,000 people attacked and looted Bishkek. Throughout the week, Bakiyev tried to mobilize his supporters in Osh, Jalalabad and his home village, Masadan. On April 15, with the active assistance of Kazakhstan and Russia, Bakiyev left Kyrgyzstan for Belarus and officially resigned. Six days later, he withdrew his resignation. In May, a total of 800 partially armed supporters of Bakiyev's regime stormed the government offices in Osh, Jalalabad and Batken. About 1,500 ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek supporters of the IG retaliated. In sum, two people were killed and 50 hospitalized. On June 27, ten days after violent ethnic clashes [→ Kyrgyzstan (Uzbeks - Kyrgyz)], the citizens of Kyrgyzstan voted on a new constitution, which was accepted by 90 percent of the voters. Thereby, a parliamentary system was introduced. In August, the IG was able to prevent a second coup without resorting to violent measures. At the same time, an anti-IG demonstration in Bishkek demanded the annulment of the referendum. Parliamentary elections were held on October 10. Of the parties forming the IG, only the Social Democratic Party (SDPK) and Ata-Meken attained seats in parliament, jointly winning 44 out of a total of 120 seats. Ata-Jurt, the former Ak-Jol party, won 28 seats, while Ar-Namys and Respublika together attained 48 seats. The latter three parties were all in favor of a presidential form of government. On November 29, the SPDK announced that an agreement to form a coalition had been reached with Ata-Meken and Respublika. Almazbek Atambaev of the SPDK was expected to become prime minister. (jib, ct)

Laos (Christians)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	Christians vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The ideology conflict between Lao Christians and the government continued on a non-violent level. Religious freedom was guaranteed by law; however, authorities persecuted Christians and demanded that they renounce their faith. On 12/03/09, local authorities arrested two Hmong Christians for alleged missionary activities. In January, authorities and villagers stormed the morning service of the 48 Christians living in Katin, a village in the Ta-Oyl district, Saravan. Officials seized all their personal belongings and destroyed six of their houses. They forced them out of the village at gunpoint and impeded their return. In March, officials threatened to burn down their temporarily shelter. The police arrested 35 young Christians in the north on September 18 and held them in detention. The group was reportedly very active in converting people. Later on, 30 of them were released. (er)

Laos (Hmong, Royalists)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	Hmong, Royalists vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power and system conflict between ethnic Hmong and royalists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. The international Unrepresented Nations and People Organization accused Laotian and Vietnamese military forces of jointly attacking over 120 Hmong civilians in the Phoua Bia Mountain area on January 18. The military forces allegedly wounded around 30 people with small arms, grenades and mortars. In February, the Lao Hmong Human Rights Council reported military attacks on ethnic Hmong in the areas of Phou Bia, Phou Da Phao, Luang Prabang province, Khammoune province, Xieng Khouang province, and Saysamboune. The military allegedly killed and wounded several Hmong. Furthermore, Hmong groups accused the Lao military of entering Hmong indigenous areas on April 24. The government denied an armed conflict with the Hmong. International concerns about Laos' treatment of ethnic Hmong came up when Thailand forcibly returned a group of about 4,500 Hmong refugees to Laos on 12/28/09. In February, Hmong groups claimed that several of the returnees had been beaten up and subjected to food and sleep deprivation. (er)

Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1948
Conflict parties:	KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs. government, DKBA	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a high level. The Democratic Karen

Buddhist Army (DKBA) fought alongside the government and became part of the Border Guard Force (BGF). However, splinter brigades of the DKBA decided to continue their fight against the government and did not join the BGF. By the end of August, about 1,500 soldiers of the DKBA had defected to the KNLA after their leaders had agreed to become a BGF. For instance, soldiers of the DKBA Battalion 999 defected to the KNLA Brigade 7 on July 12. Nine days later, 500 soldiers rejected the government's demand to transform DKBA Brigade 5 into a BGF and defected to the KNLA. In late September, several militias met in Chiang Mai, Thailand, to coordinate their fight against the government. On November 6, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the Shan State Army–North (SSA –N), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) announced that they had formed a "federal army" consisting of KNU, CNF, KNPP, NMSP and KIO. Its political wing was called Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union. Throughout the year, KNU and KNLA fighters together with DKBA splinter groups clashed with government forces and DKBA troops. On January 17, government troops attacked several villages in Karen State, killing four people and forcing 1,000 to flee their homes. On February 7, government soldiers fired mortar grenades into Karen villages, destroying 20 buildings. Approx. 2,000 Karen were forced to flee into the jungle and more than 70 houses were burned down in a series of attacks between February 3 and 7. On June 10, two KNLA ambushes killed twelve government soldiers and wounded 22. On August 4, nine government soldiers were killed and 14 injured during a clash with the KNLA in Paikyu Township. On August 16, the government deployed soldiers and artillery to Three Pagoda Pass. On September 8, an ambush launched by the KNLA Battalion 202 killed two government soldiers and left six injured. On October 26 and 28, the KNLA attacked two military columns near Three Pagoda Pass, killing two soldiers and wounding three. On November 8, one day after the general elections [→ Myanmar (opposition)], DKBA Brigade 5 attacked army troops and seized several buildings in the border town of Myawaddy. DKBA Brigade 5 used rocket-propelled grenades, killing two and injuring six. In response, the army deployed more troops to these areas the day after. As a result of the fighting, more than 10,000 Karen fled Myawaddy to Thailand. Reportedly, seven people were killed and another 20 wounded. The same day, heavy clashes erupted between the DKBA Brigade 5 and government troops at Three Pagoda Pass. DKBA Brigade 5 took control of Three Pagoda Pass Township. Reportedly, 30 people died. On November 9, government forces, supported by the BGF, retook Myawaddy. However, fighting continued near Three Pagoda Pass. The same day, many refugees started to return to Myanmar. Two days later, Thailand-mediated ceasefire talks between DKBA Brigade 5 and the government troops failed. On November 14, 400 people fled from the North Valley subdistrict after clashes between Brigade 5 and army troops

occurred. Between November 13 and 15, forty government soldiers were wounded in several attacks near Three Pagoda Pass. Since November 8, more than 1,000 government troops had been deployed to the region. KNLA and DKBA Brigade 5 agreed to coordinate their attacks. After the battles on November 8 and 9, the BGF controlled the area and twelve battalions were deployed to the area. On November 22, the government demanded the DKBA Brigade 5 either join the BGF or disarm. DKBA Brigade 5 rejected. (prü, sg)

Myanmar (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 1962
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between various opposition groups and the government escalated. On April 15, three bombs detonated in the former capital Rangoon, killing ten civilians and wounding 170. Police forces arrested a member of an anti-government exile group, the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, allegedly based in Thailand. Following its Roadmap to Democracy, on November 7, the military government held the first general elections since 1990 when the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD) had won a landslide victory but had not been allowed to assume power. The Union Election Commission announced that the newly-founded Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a follow-up organization of the recently disbanded Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), had taken nearly 80 percent of the seats in both houses of parliament that were up for election. The USDA was a mass organization supporting the military government. One quarter of seats was reserved for the military by constitution. Prime Minister Thein Sein, who had stepped down from his military position along with dozens of other high-ranking generals, had formed the USDP in late March. The elections were criticized by oppositional parties as well as international actors, among them the US, the EU, and the UN, who urged the government to free political prisoners and hold free and inclusive elections. Some parts of the country, controlled by non-state militias, had been excluded from participation in the elections. The main oppositional party, the NLD, boycotted the elections because several laws passed earlier that year prohibited convicted persons from membership in a political party. Because NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and at least 500 other members were detained or under house arrest at that time, the party would have been forced to expel these members, a move unacceptable to the party's leadership. Opposing the decision, Than Nyein along with a number of leading members of the NLD split from the party and formed a new party, the National Democratic Force (NDF), to participate in the elections. Suu Kyi urged NLD followers to vote neither for the NDF nor any other party. Since the new electoral laws required any political party to register and participate in the elections, the NLD was officially disbanded by the government on May 7. An NLD appeal to the Supreme Court against the disbandment was rejected three weeks af-

ter the elections were held. Six days after the election date, on November 13, Suu Kyi's house arrest was lifted and she was set free without further conditions. After her release, she stated she would continue her struggle for human rights and democracy in the country. The elections led to a renewed outbreak of violence in the eastern provinces between a faction of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, called Brigade 5, and government troops [→ Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)]. The violence prompted tens of thousands of civilians to flee the country across the border to Thailand [→ Thailand-Myanmar (border)]. (1r)

Nepal (Madheshis/Terai)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	MJF, JTMM-R, JTMMM, ATMM vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between Madheshi people and the government continued. While the major Madheshi political parties agitated for their goals peacefully, smaller armed outfits used violent means in the Terai region. At least 26 people were killed, including five government officers, and several dozens arrested throughout the year. Most of the bombs, detonated by Madheshi groups, caused only minor material damage. Abductions and extortion continued and the Terai region saw 15 days of strike due to Madheshi related activities. On the political level, the Madheshi People's Rights Forum (MJF) and other Madheshi political parties protested against the government's reluctance to implement agreements reached in 2007 and 2008. Despite eight rounds in parliament, the representatives had not been able to agree upon a new prime minister since May 2009. In the Constituent Assembly Committee on Restructuring of the State and Devolution of State Power, the Madheshi parties unsuccessfully voted against the proposal of a federal system which provided for the partition of the Madheshi area among several federal entities. This ran counter to the Madheshi demands for a single Madheshi entity. In late July, the Terai People's Liberation Front faction led by Rajan Mukti (JTMM-R) and the Terai Madheshi People's Liberation Party (JTMMM) urged all Madheshi political party leaders not to support a Nepali-speaking government and to participate in a joint Madheshi movement. Meanwhile, various armed Madheshi groups continued their violent agitation. Only the Madheshi Liberation Tigers and the Akhil Terai Liberation Front (ATMM) announced their willingness to negotiate with the government. The ATMM handed over weapons to the police. After the killing of one Village District Committee (VDC) secretary in Sarlahi district and repeated threats by several armed outfits, VDC secretaries resigned en-masse in at least 19 districts across the country in June and July. Several incidents between the different armed outfits and political parties were reported. A political party activist of the Terai Madheshi Democratic Party was killed by Terai Liberation Front members in Mahottari district on September 20. In the observed period, seven activists of the United Communist Party of

Nepal - Maoist or affiliated organizations were killed by armed outfits, five of them by the JTMMM. (1s)

Nepal (various ethnic groups)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	various ethnic groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The conflict over autonomy and the federal rearrangement of Nepal between various ethnic groups and the government continued. On 12/13/09, Adivasi/Janajati Brihat Morcha Nepal (A/JBM-N), an umbrella organization of several indigenous groups, staged a sit-in in front of the official seat of the government in Kathmandu. They demanded the inclusion of indigenous peoples' rights in the new constitution and handed over a memorandum with 23 demands to the prime minister. On January 1, A/JBM-N called a nationwide strike. The communist political party Rastriya Janamorcha (RJM) opposed a federal system and both organized and enforced several strikes throughout the year. In late December, twelve people were injured in clashes between RJM activists and police forces in the Dailekh district. A RJM strike in the Eastern Region on January 13 was boycotted by various ethnic groups in many places. The Unified Party of Nepal - Maoist (UCPN-M) organized a counter-strike demonstration in Gaighat where they burned RJM flags and threatened to behead all opponents of federalism. On January 16, the Palunwang faction of Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC) enforced a strike in Ilam, demanding the release of all detained members. The Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) supported the UCPN-M's proposal for a federal system consisting of 14 states and 23 autonomous states on January 20. Madheshi parties objected to the proposal [→ Nepal (Madheshi/Terai)]. The CPN-UML later withdrew its support. The Aadibasi Janajati Dalit Ganatantrik Morcha, an umbrella organization of smaller ethnic groups, announced the formation of a paramilitary wing on June 29. On August 7, the ethnic outfit Limbuwan Prantiya Parishad enforced a strike in nine eastern districts, demanding a Limbuwan federal state. (1s)

North Korea - South Korea

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1948
Conflict parties:	North Korea vs. South Korea	
Conflict items:	territory, system/ideology, international power	

The system and territory conflict between North Korea (NK) and South Korea (SK) continued. Tension increased sharply at the end of November. On January 15, the North accepted an offer of 10,000 tons of food from the South. On January 26 and February 1, NK declared seven temporary no-sail zones near the sea border between the two Koreas. On January 27, both countries exchanged fire near their disputed maritime border. After the North had fired artillery shells as part of its annual military drill, the South responded with warning shots. On February 19, the North declared four naval firing zones in the Yellow Sea and the Japanese Sea,

near the disputed maritime border, and installed rocket launchers. Tensions rose on March 26, when a South Korean navy ship manned with 104 people sank near the North Korean sea border due to an explosion in the hull. 46 sailors died. NK denied any involvement. On May 10, SK found traces of explosives used in torpedoes on the wreckage of the ship and called for an international investigation. On May 20, the international report concluded that a NK submarine torpedo had sunk the ship. The North rejected the claim and threatened war in the case of any sanctions. Four days later, the South imposed sanctions, suspending trade and cooperation with the North. Furthermore, it banned North Korean ships from passing through Southern waters and demanded an apology. On November 2, NK said it was willing to turn over samples of torpedoes used by its navy to prove it was not responsible for the sinking of the South Korean warship. On May 24, the US confirmed it would hold its annual naval exercises with SK in the upcoming months. One day later, NK announced to cut all relations with the South immediately. On May 27, SK conducted a major anti-submarine drill. The North announced to immediately launch an attack if any South Korean ships crossed the border. On July 24, the US and SK declared they would hold joint military exercises. The North warned of a nuclear "sacred war" in response. The US and the SK held major military exercises in the Sea of Japan the following day. SK started a four-day anti-submarine drill near the disputed sea border in the Yellow Sea on August 5. However, after heavy rains in NK in July and August, on August 31 SK offered aid to the flooded North. One week later, NK accepted the offer. In late September, SK said the first military talks between the two Koreas in two years had yielded no results. On October 29, the two countries exchanged fire across the land border for the first time since 2006. On November 23, NK, for the first time in 57 years, shelled inhabited areas in SK. 50 to 200 shells were fired at the island of Yeonpyeong near the disputed border. Civilian as well as military buildings were hit. Two soldiers and two civilians were killed, 15 soldiers and three civilians injured. SK responded by firing 80 grenades at Northern territory. Some 1,500 people were evacuated from the island. While SK placed its military on highest alert, NK stated that it had reacted to South Korean offensive maneuvers in the course of which territories claimed by NK had been affected. One day later, US President Barack Obama condemned the attack. Meanwhile, a US aircraft carrier with 75 fighter jets was on its way to Korea, accompanied by numerous other naval ships, as part of a long-planned US-SK exercise. The People's Republic of China (PRC) called upon all sides to show restraint. On the morning of November 28, SK and the US started the exercise in the Yellow Sea, 150 km south of the border, in spite of warnings from NK. Allegedly, NK stationed ground-to-air missiles at the border. On Yeongpyeong Island, artillery fire was reported to be heard. On the same day, the PRC called for immediate six-party talks to discuss the situation in the Koreas as a whole. NK, SK, the PRC, the US, Japan, and Russia had been involved in

talks confined to NK's nuclear weapons program since 2003. (are)

North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power, other	

The system and international power conflict between North Korea (NK), on the one hand, and the US, South Korea (SK) and Japan, on the other, continued. In late January, SK announced it would launch a pre-emptive strike against NK if indications of a planned nuclear attack arose. In response, the North emphasized that any such attempts would be treated like a declaration of war, and threatened to break off the dialog with the South and to react with military actions. On March 26, a South Korean navy ship sank near the border [→ North Korea - South Korea]. As a reaction, tensions between the two Koreas rose. During a visit to the People's Republic of China in the beginning of May, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il met Chinese President Hu Jintao, saying that he was disposed to work with China to create favorable conditions for a resumption of the six-party talks. On May 12, NK claimed to have built a thermo-nuclear reaction device to carry out nuclear fusion. On May 28, the report of a UN panel accused NK of ongoing nuclear and missile technology export in defiance of a UN ban. The report furthermore denounced that the North was selling weapons and providing illegal assistance to Syria, Myanmar, and Iran [→ Iran - USA, EU-3]. On June 25, the US urged NK to refrain from preparing a new round of missile tests. At the end of the month, NK threatened to increase its nuclear weapons capabilities, citing US hostility. When the US and SK conducted a military exercise at the end of July, NK immediately responded by warning of a nuclear "sacred war". Amid concerns about cooperation in developing nuclear technology between NK and Myanmar, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun traveled to Myanmar and met his counterpart Nyan Win on July 29. At a meeting in Pyongyang on August 20, China's special envoy as well as senior North Korean officials declared their hope for an early resumption of the stalled six-party talks. SK, however, stressed it would refuse to resume until NK apologized for sinking the South Korean warship in March. At the end of August, the US imposed new financial sanctions on NK. (are)

Pakistan (BLA et al./Balochistan)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	BLA, BRA, BLF, BLUF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The conflict between various Baloch insurgent groups and the government over the status of the province of Balochistan continued on a violent level. More than 50 people were killed in numerous incidents throughout the year. On 12/10/09, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani announced his willingness to talk to all Baloch separatist leaders and proposed a package tackling constitutional and federal matters. Nine days later, the

Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the killing of three people affiliated with the Balochistan Constabulary forces in Quetta. On January 13, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik stated that India was continuously interfering in Balochistan [→ India - Pakistan]. On January 25, the BLF launched a bomb attack in Quetta, killing one security official and injuring nine civilians. On February 6, ten people including three security forces were injured in a bomb blast in Quetta. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. On March 6, the BLF conducted three targeted killings in Mastun and Khuzdur. Among the casualties was Sardar Aziz Umrani, a Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz party leader. Two weeks later, BLA militants killed a professor, which sparked student protests. On March 27, a Frontier Corps (FC) soldier arrested BLA commander Murad Marri. The BLA shot another professor on the same day. On May 14, the BLA killed four people including a police officer in armed attacks in different towns of Balochistan. One week later, the BLF killed two FC personnel and injured four others in a rocket attack at Gwadar seaport. On August 14, sixteen people of Punjabi origin were killed by the BLA in two separate incidents. On September 8, Interior Minister Rehman Malik banned five militant groups including the BLA, BRA, BLUF as well as the BLF, and announced the transfer of police powers to the FC for a period of three months. (is)

Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↗	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	Mohajirs vs. Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the Mohajir people and its political organization, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), on the one hand, and Sindhis, the Pashto speaking Pakhtuns, backed by the Awami National Party (ANP), and Baloch, backed by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), on the other, continued on a highly violent level. 400 people were killed throughout the period observed. The city of Karachi in the southern Sindh province, populated by approx. 18 million people, was most affected. An estimated 500,000 new migrants, mostly Pakhtuns and Baloch, moved into the city each year due to the ongoing military operations in Pakistan's northwest, the war in Afghanistan since 2001, and this year's large-scale floods [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants); Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. Although the ANP and MQM were members of the four-party coalition of the PPP-led federal government, they accused each other of killing rival political activists in Karachi. The discovery of the decapitated body of an MQM activist in a predominantly Baloch area of Karachi on January 1 sparked a series of targeted killings among MQM and PPP factions, which lasted almost two weeks, leaving more than 31 people dead. Following three days of clashes between MQM and ANP activists in early February, which left 20 people dead, paramilitary forces were deployed all over the city by the central government to restore order. From May to June, approx. 50 people, among them several mem-

bers of the MQM and ANP, were killed in drive-by shootings. The parties blamed each other for the killings. On August 2, Raza Haider, a Shiite MQM member of the Sindh Assembly, was killed in Karachi. The MQM blamed the ANP for Haider's death, whereas Interior Minister Rehman Malik accused the anti-Shiite militant organization Sipah-e-Saheba Pakistan (SSP) of his assassination [→ Pakistan (religious groups)]. On August 3, police arrested several members of the militant anti-Shiite organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for the alleged involvement Haider's killing. His death triggered week-long clashes between Mohajirs and Pakhtuns throughout Karachi as well as in other parts of Sindh province, leaving more than 100 people dead, more than 300 injured, as well as 100 vehicles, numerous buildings, and a train destroyed. Police and paramilitary forces were deployed all over Karachi with the order to shoot on sight any suspiciously acting person. On September 16, Imran Farooq, founding and senior member of the MQM, was stabbed to death in London, seat of the MQM Central Coordination Committee, where he had lived in exile since 1992. All government and official buildings, banks and shops in Karachi remained closed in response to his death. At least 14 people were killed in two consecutive days of riots. The MQM accused the PPP of instigating the violence. The latter denied the allegations. The by-elections for the Sindh assembly seat formerly held by Haider on October 17 fomented violent clashes between Mohajirs, Pakhtuns, and Baloch throughout the city for more than three days, leaving at least 55 people dead, 60 injured, and several vehicles and buildings destroyed. The MQM won the election. (is)

Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↘	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	various tribes vs. Taliban	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The regional predominance and system conflict between militants of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and various tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province deescalated but remained violent. More than 350 people were killed throughout the year. The military encouraged tribal militias to expel Taliban from their respective areas and to support the large-scale air and ground operations against TTP militants in FATA as well as in parts of KP [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants)]. Following major military operations early this year in South Waziristan, TTP militants frequently attacked and threatened pro-government tribes, killing more than 50 tribal elders in approx. 30 attacks. Tribal militia in Orakzai Agency clashed with Taliban fighters on 12/27/09, leaving 15 people dead. On January 1, a TTP suicide truck bomber killed at least 105 people, most of them teenagers, and injured more than 100 in KP's Lakki Marwat District. On January 20, a council of the pro-government faction of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan agreed to hand over 378 TTP fighters and declared its full support to the government. On February 10, a TTP suicide car bomber attacked a tribal police patrol in Khyber Agency, killing 17 people. Between April 8 and 10, at least 55

people were killed when jet fighters bombed Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) hideouts. LeI are Islamist militia predominantly of the Afridi tribe, based in Khyber Agency. On April 15, LeI announced its willingness to talks with the government in order to stop military operations in Khyber. Between June 5 and 6, at least 21 people were killed in clashes between LeI and TTP militants in Khyber Agency. Four months later, LeI militants killed two TTP fighters in an attack on a mosque. On March 8, Bajaur Agency's Salarzai tribal militia, sanctioned by the government, set 130 Taliban houses on fire. Two weeks later, the Salarzai announced a final attack on the Taliban, burning another 140 of their houses. On May 27, TTP militants armed with rockets and grenades blew up the house of a pro-government tribal elder after they had killed his family. At least 24 militants surrendered to the authorities in Bajaur Agency on July 19. (ar)

Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	TTP, LeJ, SSP vs. various religious group	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The regional predominance and system conflict between militant Sunni groups and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Sipah-e-Saheba Pakistan (SSP), on the one hand, and various religious minorities, on the other, continued on a high level of violence. In total, 450 people were killed and more than 1,000 injured. Suicide bombings were committed all over the country, whereas most of the targeted killings took place in the cities of Quetta and Karachi, located in the southwestern province of Balochistan and in the southern province of Sindh respectively. The attacks targeted Sufis, Ahmadis, Sikhs, and Christians. During the Shiite Ashura processions on 12/27/09 and 12/28/09, a suicide bomber attacked a Shiite gathering in Muzaffarabad in the Pakistani-administered part of Kashmir, killing eight and injuring another 80. Another suicide attack was launched on the Shiite procession in Karachi, killing more than 43 people and injuring dozens. Subsequently, violent clashes broke out during the victims' burial the next day. A TTP commander claimed responsibility for the attacks. On February 21, a group of around 150 armed Muslims attacked the Christian colony of Pahar Ganj in Karachi, damaging two churches, defecating on houses, beating Christians, and burning shops as well as vehicles. On March 5, twelve people were killed and 33 injured when a bus convoy with Shiite passengers was blown up by a suicide bomber in the Hangu district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. On April 17, two suicide bombers attacked an IDP camp in the KP district of Kohat, killing more than 44 people and injuring over 70. The anti-Shiite LeJ, a splinter group of the radical Deobandi group SSP, claimed responsibility for the attack. Subsequently, the UN suspended its displaced people program in Kohat and neighboring Hangu. On May 28, at least 100 people were killed and more than 90 injured when three suicide bombers attacked two Ahmadiyya places of worship in Lahore. On July 1, at least 44 people were killed and more than 175 injured in a suicide attack on a Sufi shrine in Lahore. LeJ

as well as TTP separately claimed responsibility for both attacks. On August 2, Raza Haider, a Shiite senior politician, was assassinated in a mosque in Karachi. More than 85 people were killed and over 200 injured in riots following Haider's death [→ Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baloch)]. Interior Minister Rehman Malik accused the SSP and LeJ of his killing, and ordered the deployment of paramilitary forces across the city in order to prevent further violence. On September 1, at least 35 participants in a Shiite procession in Lahore were killed and 250 injured in an attack by two suicide bombers. Two days later, a suicide bombing in Quetta killed at least 53 Shiites and injured around 80. The TTP as well as the LeJ claimed responsibility for the bombings. (chs)

Pakistan (various Islamist militants)

Intensity: 5	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	various Islamist militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The war over national power and system between Islamists and the government continued for the fourth year running. In the period observed, more than 6,800 people were killed. More than 150,000 Pakistani army forces were stationed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Following last year's military operation Thunder Storm in the Swat valley and Malakand Division in KP the security situation in the Swat area eased slightly. On May 18, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani stated that the roots of terrorism had thereby been removed. However, frequent clashes in Swat throughout the year between remaining Taliban militants and security forces as well as pro-government tribal militias left more than 260 people dead [→ Pakistan (Taliban – various tribes)]. On March 14, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants conducted a suicide bombing in Swat's district capital, Mingora, killing 14 people and injuring more than 50. According to military sources, a large number of Swat militants fled to Karachi in southern Sindh province and South Waziristan due to last year's military operation [→ Pakistan (Mohajirs – Sindhis, Pathans, Baloch)]. After government forces had started Operation Path to Salvation in FATA's South Waziristan Agency (SWA) in October 2009, more than 30,000 military forces equipped with heavy artillery and mortars invaded the northeastern part of SWA, stronghold of Hakimullah Mehsud's TTP faction. Helicopter gunships, F-16 jets, and main battle tanks were used. The army reached a non-aggression agreement with two other militant groups and allied itself with pro-government tribesmen to isolate the estimated 20,000 TTP fighters led by Hakimullah Mehsud as well as approx. 1,500 al-Qaeda and Uzbek militants allied with TTP [→ Uzbekistan (IMU)]. According to military sources, 594 TTP and foreign fighters as well as approx. 80 government soldiers had been killed and over 300,000 people displaced when the military declared the end of the major combat actions of operation Path to Salvation on 12/12/09. However, frequent clashes continued throughout the year. On February 20, military forces killed more than 36 TTP fighters in SWA. On March 7, at least eight militants were killed

when fighter jets dropped bombs on militant hideouts in the same area. In early January, the government announced a relief package for the affected areas of FATA. Simultaneously, administrative rights in SWA were transferred to some 500 then pro-government tribal elders, and the SWA authorities announced the recruitment of an additional 4,000 men to the Levies Force, a tribal police force. Reportedly, numerous militants of Hakimullah Mehsud's TTP as well as some Punjabi Taliban, who had been hiding in North Waziristan, returned to neighboring SWA on May 24. Following heavy monsoon rains in July and August, approx. 20 percent of Pakistan's total landmass was under water, displacing approx. 18 million people. In mid-August, TTP spokesman Azam Tariq urged the government to reject US financial aid and offered USD 20 million. From September 2009 to June, the military launched Operation "I will teach you a lesson" against TTP militants in FATA's Kurram and Orakzai Agency. More than 7,000 army and paramilitary forces were involved in the fighting. In preparation to the ground offensive, fighter jets conducted airstrikes in Kurram Agency on March 19. Two days later, ground troops backed by fighter jets, heavy artillery, and helicopter gunships started to attack Taliban compounds. Heavy clashes between suspected Taliban militants and the army on a daily basis left more than 1,500 militants dead. According to military sources, more than 70 soldiers died since the start of the operation. On June 1, the army declared victory over TTP militants in Orakzai Agency, stating that major operations were over and civilians could expect to return. According to UN reports, more than 200,000 people fled the combat zone. However, heavy clashes between the army and Taliban militants continued. Between June and November, 1,000 militants and an unknown number of soldiers were killed. Frequent clashes between the army backed by helicopter gunships and fighter jets in Kurram Agency killed more than 300 militants throughout the year. Eighteen soldiers were also killed in the fighting, according to military resources. In addition to the ongoing military operation, TTP fighters clashed occasionally with the Shiite majority in Kurram Agency [→ Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups)]. In addition to the major offensives in Kurram, SWA, and Orakzai, the military attacked Taliban militants in all tribal areas inside and outside FATA, claiming the lives of more than 1,000 suspected militants. TTP militants sharply increased their attacks on the two major NATO supply lines in Pakistan for the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. Almost 400 NATO trucks were destroyed and 33 people killed. Between September 30 and October 8, the government closed the border crossing in FATA's Khyber agency for NATO vehicles following an alleged violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by NATO helicopter attacks within Pakistani territory [→ USA - Pakistan]. Subsequently, TTP militants destroyed more than 200 trucks during the eight-day border closure. Throughout the year, the US sharply increased the frequency of drone attacks on suspected Taliban hideouts in FATA, killing more than 760 people in over 84 missile strikes. In in

a joint operation between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in early February, the Afghan Taliban's second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradarin, was captured in Karachi. Throughout the year, militants conducted more than 55 suicide attacks in KP and FATA, as well as in the major cities, killing more than 1,200 people and injuring over 2,000 in retaliation for US drone attacks and the Pakistani military operations. TTP militants destroyed almost 80 state schools over the year. On March 8, a suicide bomber attacked the office of the Special Intelligence Agency in Lahore, killing 13 and injuring 80. TTP claimed responsibility for the bombing. On April 5, six TTP militants, using two vehicles loaded with explosives, guns, and grenades, launched an attack on the US consulate in Peshawar, leaving eight dead and 18 injured. (ar)

Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)

Intensity: 3	Change: 	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the government remained violent. On 12/03/09, one person was killed in the Abu Sayyaf bombing of a main police headquarter and a civil building funded by US military in the province of Sulu. A week later, two hostages held by the ASG, which is assumed to be linked to Al-Quaida, were found beheaded on the island of Basilan. On 12/13/09, an armed group of five ASG fighters and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) attacked a prison in the southern region, thereby freeing 31 prisoners [→ Philippines (MILF)]. According to official sources, two fatalities were recorded. In the following weeks, the police captured several of the escapees. In response to the Abu Sayyaf attack, the national police's anti-kidnapping unit was ordered to strengthen its presence in the southern region of the Philippines. On February 14, security forces killed ASG top commander Albader Parad along with another militant. About two weeks later, the ASG raided a village in the southern region, which caused more than ten fatalities. This attack was the country's most severe militant attack on civilians in nine years. In response, government troops staged a series of offensives against the ASG using heavy artillery and helicopter fire. On March 28, soldiers took a key ASG jungle camp. On April 30, troops captured another ASG camp in the province of Basilan, killing at least five militants and injuring several. On June 6, ASG fighters beheaded three abducted farm workers in a village outside Sumisip Township. Ten days later, the government captured ASG sub-leader Kaiser Said in the same province. Suspected ASG members killed four people and injured another two a few days later. There was a series of ASG attacks in late June. For instance, ASG fighters killed at least four people in an ambush on a passenger jeepney on June 20. On August 5, a bomb detonated outside Zamboanga International Airport, killing at least one civilian and leaving 13 wounded. The ASG was held responsible for the blast. On August 30, national police commandos killed three

ASG members in a shootout. One week later, police forces shot dead another ASG member. On October 10, an ASG bomb went off in a passenger bus in Matalam Township in North Cotabato province, causing ten fatalities, and leaving several people injured. Twelve days after the explosion, five suspects were arrested. (sip)

Philippines (MILF/Mindanao)

Intensity: 3	Change: 	Start: 1977
Conflict parties:	MILF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology, resources	

The autonomy and ideology conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government deescalated. On 12/08/09, formal peace negotiations between MILF and the government were resumed in Kuala Lumpur after they had stalled for over a year. In mid-July, the new government under President Benigno Aquino III, who had taken office on June 30, initiated a new peace panel for negotiations with the MILF. Furthermore, he recognized MILF's efforts to limit hardliners' influence. On September 22, MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal disclosed that the MILF would no longer seek secession. Instead, Iqbal demanded the establishment of a sub-state in the southern region of Mindanao in which the Moro people held all governing powers, except for national defense, foreign affairs, currency and coinage, as well as postal services. In addition, the conflict parties undertook varied deescalation measures. In compliance with an existing accord, both parties undertook joint security measures. For instance, on August 18, the military and MILF joined forces in hunting an abductor group that had abducted a Filipino-Chinese trader in Cotabato City. On May 18, moreover, the MILF and the government signed an agreement to act jointly in the disposal and destruction of landmines and other unexploded ordnance. Throughout the year, 20 MILF rebels surrendered voluntarily. On several occasions, however, there were abductions and raids by some MILF factions. For example, members of the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) took a Swiss hostage in Zamboanga City on April 4 [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)]. Although both conflict parties jointly secured the general elections on May 10, MILF factions fired three mortar grenades at a polling station in Salibo town, Maguindanao. Throughout the year, government forces and MILF factions clashed several times leading to 22 fatalities and 40 injured. For instance, on 12/13/2009, MILF and ASG fighters raided a prison in Isabela City on the southern island of Basilan. On August 9, the military launched airstrikes against a MILF position in the township of Datu Piang. At the end of September, authorities arrested Eduard Guerra, a MILF senior leader. MILF demanded his immediate release. On October 21, at least 15 MILF rebels raided a military convoy in Datu Saudi Ampatuan town, killing two people. (ces)

Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)

Intensity: 2	Change: 	Start: 1976
Conflict parties:	LTTE vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government deescalated to a non-violent level. Throughout the year, LTTE suspects were arrested and former militants freed. According to Prime Minister D. M. Jayaratne, who came into office in April, approx. 1,500 suspected members of the LTTE were arrested in July. On May 19, more than 400 LTTE suspects, among them 198 child soldiers, were freed. An additional 4,500 Sri Lankan rebels were freed on October 20. In former LTTE-controlled areas in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, thousands of Tamils still lived in refugee camps. In December 2009, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake announced that foreign LTTE assets would be taken over. The same month, the Sri Lankan navy seized four LTTE vessels. On August 18, several thousand detonators and more than a thousand mines were retrieved. On May 17, President Rajapaksa established a commission to investigate the civil war. In June, human rights groups demanded further inquiry into alleged war crimes, later repeatedly criticizing the commission. Furthermore, they demanded investigation into the legal grounds for the ongoing detention of several thousand former rebels. A UN-appointed expert panel on war crimes was recalled by UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon after government-led protests in Colombo. On November 19, reelected President Rajapaksa was inaugurated. He announced his intention to focus on economic development, national unity, and power devolution. Earlier in the year, the biggest Tamil party, Tamil National Alliance (TNA), had dropped its demands for an independent Tamil state, now aiming for a merger of the two Tamil-majority provinces as well as a further devolution of power. (afp)

Tajikistan (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: 	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	IRP, IMU vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between the Islamic opposition and the government turned violent. The opposition was divided into the legal Islamic Revival Party (IRP) and the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) [→ Uzbekistan (IMU)], both stemming from the United Tajik Opposition, which had fought against the government in the Tajik civil war from 1992 to 1997. On March 1, elections were held. The OSCE as well as the IRP criticized the polls, citing non-democratic standards. President Emomali Rakhmon's party won 55 out of 63 seats in the lower house of parliament, only eight seats going to other parties, two of them to the IRP. On August 23, twenty-five prisoners escaped in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. Officials said several members of the IMU were involved in the liberation. Five guards were killed in firefights during the escape. By October 6, Tajik security forces had killed three fugitives and captured seven. Two suicide car bombers assaulted police headquarters in Khujand on September 3. According to officials, they killed four police officers and wounded up to 28 people. At least one bomber was killed. The Interior Ministry blamed IMU sympathizers. In Rasht Valley

near the Afghan-Tajik border, a stronghold for the Islamic opposition fighters in the civil war, at least 25 soldiers were killed in a grenade attack on a convoy on September 19. The Defense Ministry blamed the former opposition commanders Alovaddin Davlatov and Abdullo Rahimov, allegedly linked to the IMU. The IRP denied any involvement. The Interior Ministry announced that at least five militants were killed in a government-led operation against Islamic militants on September 21. During the operation, government forces attacked the house of former opposition commander Mirzokhuja Ahmadov with rockets. On October 6, about 20 members of the National Guard died in a helicopter crash in Rasht Valley. While government sources claimed former opposition commanders were responsible, the National Guard only confirmed an accident. However, the IMU assumed responsibility. Security forces detained 14 suspected militants in the Istaravshan District of northern Tajikistan on October 14. They were held responsible for the September car bombing in Khujand. According to official sources, Interior Ministry forces killed three presumed Islamic militants in the Rasht District on October 18. In a counter-insurgency operation in the Rasht District, security forces killed two militants on November 14, according to the government. At least one of the militants was a member of IMU. (mw)

Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1902
Conflict parties:	Muslim separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession and ideology conflict between Muslim separatists and the government in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat remained highly violent. Within the first ten months of 2010, 368 deaths were recorded. On January 7, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva paid a symbolic visit to the southern provinces. During his visit to Yala, he announced the reduction of troops by 2012 in order to restore peace. He also promised a USD 60 million stimulus package for the region. Almost two weeks later, the government decided to deploy another 1,440 defense volunteers to the southern border provinces. Throughout the year, Muslim separatists attacked representatives of the central government, including state officials, public school teachers, and defense volunteers as well as Buddhist monks and civilians of every religion on an almost daily basis. For instance, on March 11, suspected militants shot three civilians in the district of Yarang in Pattani and set them on fire. One day later, senior police commander Sompian Eksomya was killed in an ambush in the district Bannang Sata in Yala. On March 17, the Royal Family granted a royal cremation to Sompian. On April 21, a grenade attack and a car bomb killed a policeman and wounded at least 43 policemen and 17 civilians in Pattani town. On June 12, suspected militants threw grenades into eateries in Yala town, killing one civilian and injuring at least 24 others. The same day, four civilians were killed in shootouts in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. On September 7, suspected militants shot dead two

teachers in Narathiwat. During the following three days, all schools in Narathiwat remained closed. Twelve days later, alleged militants killed four civilians in the district of Bacho in Narathiwat and burned down their houses. Marking the sixth anniversary of the Tak Bai incident on October 25, at least 13 people were wounded in a series of coordinated bomb attacks in Narathiwat. Throughout the year, security forces and Muslim separatists clashed repeatedly. For instance, on January 9, one soldier was shot dead and three others were wounded by suspected fighters when they investigated a bomb attack in front of a mosque in Pattani province. On February 6, rangers and border patrol police raided a base of the militant group Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) in Narathiwat's Rueso district. An alleged leading member of the RKK was killed in the operation. On October 3, suspected militants shot dead two soldiers and injured four others in Yala. Between June 10 and July 10, the Pattani Malay Liberation Movement implemented a unilateral ceasefire in three districts of Narathiwat. However, several attacks occurred during the ceasefire. On October 19, the government extended the emergency rule over the region for the 21st time, for another three months. (hal)

Thailand (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	PTP, UDD vs. PAD, government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between the Puea Thai Party (PTP) and the National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the so-called "red shirts", on the one hand, and the government led by the Democrat Party (DP) and supported by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), on the other, continued. Throughout the year, more than 90 people were killed and 1,900 injured in violent protests. In December and January, "red shirt" protesters repeatedly gathered in Bangkok, demanding new elections. On February 26, the Supreme Court seized USD 1.4 billion from former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's assets. This prompted another wave of large scale "red shirt" sit-ins near the government house in Bangkok. In mid-March, large-scale rallies were staged in Bangkok with protesters splashing their blood in front of the government building. Talks were staged at the end of the month but failed to reach a conclusion. In early April, protesters started occupying Bangkok's business district, Ratchaprasong. On April 7, they stormed parliament. In response, the government declared a state of emergency in Bangkok and the surrounding provinces. On April 10, the military launched an operation against the protesters, killing 25 protesters. Both parties blamed each other for the escalation of violence. The "red shirts" built up a fortified camp in the commercial district. On April 22, "red shirt" grenade attacks on government supporters killed one and wounded several dozens. One policeman was shot dead in further clashes. In early May, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva presented a road map for reconciliation and offered to hold elections by November. However, he later withdrew the offer. Major General Seh Daeng, a "red-shirt" hardliner, was assassinated by a sniper on May

13. The next day, security forces started a five day offensive to regain control of the area, using live ammunition and snipers. On May 19, after the "red shirt" leaders had surrendered and called on their followers to return to their homes, the government extended the emergency rule to 24 provinces and imposed a ten day curfew. Numerous buildings, such as banks, shopping malls and the stock exchange, were set on fire. Additionally, governors' offices were torched in four north-eastern provinces. Throughout May, at least 54 people were killed in the violent clashes. In the aftermath, the Center for Resolution of Emergency Situations shut down oppositional media outlets and newspapers and banned financial transactions of persons believed to be the main financiers of the "red shirts". Several "red-shirt" co-leaders were arrested and charged with terrorism. On May 26, authorities issued an arrest warrant against Thaksin on charges of terrorism. On June 2, Abhisit survived a vote of no confidence in parliament, which was introduced by the PTP. The government established an Independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the fighting between March and May and gradually lifted the state of emergency in many provinces. In late October, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon offered technical assistance to the reconciliation commissions and reiterated that the conflict should be resolved internally. Thailand accused Cambodia of providing a safe haven for "red shirt" supporters [->Thailand – Cambodia (border)]. Rallies in the capital continued in November despite the emergency rule. (som)

Thailand - Cambodia (border)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1954
Conflict parties:	Thailand vs. Cambodia	
Conflict items:	territory, international power	

The border and international power conflict between Thailand and Cambodia persisted. Repeatedly, civilians and troops were killed in land mine explosions. On 12/30/09, a Thai court nullified the joint communiqué passed under the Samak Sundaravej cabinet in 2008. The communiqué accepted Cambodia's claims to the area around the temple Prasat Preah Vihear and its listing as a UNESCO world heritage. On January 24 and 29, few days after the border talks of the Joint Border Commission, short exchanges of gunfire broke out between Thai and Cambodian forces near the temple area. On January 31, Cambodian forces killed one Thai soldier after 20 Thai soldiers had intruded into Cambodian territory. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited the border region for five days in February. In late February and September, the Cambodian government reiterated its intent to push for international arbitration, seeking to file a complaint to the ICJ and the UN Security Council. In late March, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces deputy commander Chea Dara claimed that 88 Thai troops had died since 2008 with two Cambodian casualties. Thailand strongly denied this claim, adding that the death toll only amounted to three. On April 4 and 17, Thai and Cambodian troops again exchanged gunfire, each side claiming that the other had encroached upon their respective territories. Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin

Shinawatra resigned from his position as an economic advisor to the Cambodian government in August. In response, the two countries reinstated full diplomatic relations. In late October, current Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva requested Cambodia's cooperation in the investigation of the Thai oppositional "red-shirt" activities inside Cambodia [-> Thailand (opposition)]. The Thai parliament was supposed to decide on the demarcation issue on November 2. However, the vote was postponed as oppositional groups gathered in front of the parliament. Thailand established a committee to further investigate the border dispute. (som)

Thailand - Myanmar

Intensity: 3	Change: ↑	Start: 1948
Conflict parties:	Thailand vs. Myanmar	
Conflict items:	territory, other	

The conflict between Thailand and Myanmar over territory and refugees escalated. As ethnic conflicts within Myanmar escalated, the number of refugees from Myanmar in camps in Thailand rose considerably [-> Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N, SSNA); Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)]. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were already there. On May 21, a corporal of the Myanmar army killed a Thai soldier in a border incident. Burmese road construction in a disputed area between the two countries led to increased troop deployment of both countries along the border on July 10. Myanmar shut down the crucial Mae Sot-Myawaddy crossing point on July 18, ostensibly in protest over Thailand's construction of a riverbank erosion project. Following a bomb blast in Myawaddy on August 6, Thailand further increased its troop deployment along the border. Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Burmese government representatives failed to reach an agreement over the ongoing border closure during Abhisit's visit to Myanmar on October 11. Prior to the general elections in Myanmar on November 7, Thailand again increased the number of troops along the border. At least 10,000 refugees fled to Thailand in the wake of a post-election outbreak of violence on November 8 [-> Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)] but returned to Myanmar on November 9 when the violence had abated. Stray grenades that landed on the Thai side of the border during the fighting killed one Thai resident and injured at least three others. (jre)

USA - Pakistan

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	USA vs. Pakistan	
Conflict items:	international power	

The international power conflict over violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by the USA turned violent again. In late January, the US announced its Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, focused on defeating al-Qaeda forces in the region by providing developmental and military aid to Pakistan. However, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi criticized the lack of US attention paid to Pakistan's security concerns. In high-level talks between both coun-

tries, Pakistan demanded preferential access to the US market for its textile exports, a deal on the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes, US assistance in resolving the Kashmir dispute, and about USD 1.6 billion of military aid still due [→ Pakistan - India, Pakistan (various Islamist militants)]. The US only met the latter demand. On October 22, the US announced an additional USD 2 billion military aid, spread over the next five years, complementing the USD 7.5 billion civilian aid package pledged in 2009 and the USD 493 million additional aid for reconstruction projects related to this year's floods. On August 2, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed concerns over documented links between the Pakistani intelligence service and Taliban militants. He announced a massive US troop deployment to eastern Afghanistan, near Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. In addition, he announced he would increase CIA-led drone attacks within FATA in combination with operations on both sides of the border. According to Pakistani army sources, on September 10, three people were killed and five injured in FATA's North Waziristan Agency when mortar shells were fired from a NATO base in Afghanistan's neighboring Khost province. One day later, US embassy officials denied any allegations regarding the incidents. On September 26 and 27, US-led NATO helicopters entered Pakistan's airspace and killed more than 50 militants of the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies in FATA. On September 27, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik called the attack an unacceptable violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan, stated that it had operated within the rules of engagement agreed upon with Pakistan and under its inherent right of self-defense. However, Pakistan rejected the existence of such an agreement, calling the attack a clear violation of ISAF's UN mandate. On September 29, three Pakistani Frontier Corps soldiers were killed and three wounded in another US-led NATO helicopter strike in Kurram Agency of FATA. The following day, Pakistan stopped all NATO supply trucks passing through Khyber Agency to Afghanistan. It threatened with the use of military means in case of any future border violations. On October 6, US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Woods Patterson, apologized for the death of the three Pakistani soldiers. On October 8, Pakistan fully re-opened all NATO supply lines after eleven days of blockade. In late November, leaked cables from the US embassy in Islamabad indicated that officials from the USA and UK had feared that Pakistani government employees could pass nuclear material to Islamist militant groups. However, the Pakistani military insisted that its nuclear program is under stern control. (ar)

Uzbekistan - Tajikistan

Intensity: 1	Change: NEW	Start: 2010
Conflict parties:	Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan	
Conflict items:	resources	


Tensions emerged between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the context of the Rogun Dam project. The dam was planned to be built in southern Tajikistan as part of a hydroelectric power plant. Uzbekistan feared negative impacts on its cotton fields' irrigation system. On February 2, Uzbekistan ceased to transport any cargo from Tajikistan on its railway system. On March 22, Tajikistan's foreign ministry lodged an official protest with Uzbekistan's ambassador. Uzbekistan blamed the blockade on reconstruction works. After a meeting between the presidents of both countries, Tajikistan appealed to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. On April 6, US general David Petraeus, the then-commander of the US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, came to Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent, in order to mediate in the conflict. The blockade also affected transit wagons destined for US military bases in Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban)]. On October 21, Tajikistan declared that the Rogun reservoir would only be filled with water from the country's internal water resources. On November 1, Uzbekistan denied having blocked railway cargo transports between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, stating an increase of 102 percent in the number of transport wagons for 2010 compared to the previous year. (jib, ct)

Vietnam (Montagnards)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 1958
Conflict parties:	Montagnards vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, other	


The system and ideology conflict between the Montagnard minority in Vietnam's central highlands and the government escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year, security forces demanded Montagnard Christians to sign pledges to join the government-regulated church. Force was used regularly and several Montagnards were arrested. On March 11, a detained Montagnard Christian died in prison from internal bleeding. In August, several hundred soldiers, police and security forces entered villages in Gia Lai province and arrested numerous Montagnard Christians who refused to sign a document recanting their religion. In order to draw international attention to the situation, the president of the Montagnard Foundation, Kok Ksor, addressed the Italian Parliament on 11/19/2009 as well as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization on February 5. Furthermore, he spoke at a seminar on religiously motivated persecution at the European Parliament on October 5. Kok Ksor called on the international community to influence the Vietnamese Government in order to contribute to a peaceful conflict resolution. Between July 5 and 15, UN Independent Expert on minority issues Gay McDougall visited Vietnam. In her final statement she emphasized the right of minorities to practice their religions without restrictions. On July 22, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her concern about conviction, imprisonment and attacks on religious groups in Vietnam at the ASEAN conference in Hanoi. (jr)

The Middle East and Maghreb




The total number of conflicts in the region of the Middle East and Maghreb sunk from 56 in 2009 to 55 in 2010. With 33 cases, more than half of the region's conflicts concerned ideology or the orientation of the political system. As seven of the nine highly violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology, this was also the most violent conflict item. While the overall number of highly violent conflicts remained the same with nine in 2009 and 2010, the number of wars among them decreased from four to two. The nine high-intensity conflicts observed in the Middle East and Maghreb accounted for roughly a third of the highly violent conflicts worldwide. The war in Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)] intensified further throughout the year: The total number of civilian as well as of combatant fatalities rose significantly compared to 2009. While the number of civilian fatalities in Iraq [→ Iraq (militant groups)] decreased slightly, the overall security situation remained highly volatile as militant groups carried out several assaults on a daily basis. Iraq was further destabilized by Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) [→ Iraq (AQI, ISI)], who conducted several large-scale attacks on civilian as well as government targets. Additionally, the southern Arabian Peninsula remained among the most conflict-ridden regions. Last year's war in northern Yemen [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)] deescalated slightly but remained highly violent. The conflict between the Yemeni al-Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)] in the border region of the two countries remained a severe crisis, although it eased over the course of the year. In addition, Yemen fought Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [→ Yemen (AQAP)]. The conflict between Algeria and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was also fought out with the use of massive violence [→ Algeria (AQIM)]. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger set up joint command headquarters in Algeria to fight AQIM cooperatively. Another severe crisis was observed between Israel and several militant Palestinian groups [→ Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)]. This conflict had been classified as a war in 2009, after Israel had launched "Operation Cast Lead" against Hamas in late 2008. The severe crisis in Turkey remained on the same level [→ Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL)].

Conflict Intensities in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2010 compared to 2009



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2010 in the Middle East and Maghreb by Intensity Groups



Overview: Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2010

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads - Hazara)	Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara	regional predominance, resources	2007	↗	3
Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)	Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG, various militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	5
Algeria (AQIM)	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1989	•	4
Algeria (Berbers/Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1963	•	2
Bahrain (Shiite opposition)	Shiite opposition vs. government	national power	1975	•	3
Egypt (Bedouin groups)	Bedouin groups vs. government	other	2004	↗	3
Egypt (Islamist groups)*	Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	↓	1
Egypt (opposition)	Muslim Brothers, secular opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1977	•	3
Egypt - Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory	1958	•	2
Iran (Jundallah/Sistan-Balochistan)	Jundallah vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1979	•	3
Iran (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	•	3
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	People's Mujahideen vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1965	•	1
Iran (PJAK/Kurdish areas)	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	↘	3
Iran - Israel	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	2
Iran - UAE*	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1970	•	1
Iran - USA, EU-3	Iran vs. USA, EU-3	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	2
Iraq (al-Sadr group)*	al-Sadr group vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	↘	1
Iraq (AQI, ISI)	AQI, ISI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	4
Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)*	KRG vs. central government	regional predominance, resources	2009	•	2
Iraq (militant groups)	Sunni militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	5
Iraq - Iran*	Iraq vs. Iran	territory, international power	1969	↗	2
Iraq - Kuwait*	Iraq vs. Kuwait	territory, resources	1961	•	1
Iraq - Syria*	Iraq vs. Syria	system/ideology, international power	2003	•	1
Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	system/ideology, regional predominance	1994	↘	2
Israel (Hamas - Salafist groups)*	Hamas vs. Salafist groups	system/ideology, regional predominance	2009	•	3
Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)	Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PRC vs. Israeli government	secession, system/ideology	1988	↘	4
Israel (Hezbollah)	Hezbollah vs. Israel	system/ideology	1982	•	2
Israel (PNA, PLO, et al./Palestine)	PNA, PLO, al-Fatah, PFLP vs. Israeli government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1920	•	3
Israel - Jordan (West Bank)*	Israel vs. Jordan	territory	1967	•	1
Israel - Lebanon	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power, resources	1967	↗	3
Jordan (al-Qaeda)*	al-Qaeda vs. government	system/ideology	2005	•	2
Jordan (militant groups)	militant groups vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↑	3
Jordan - Israel (water)*	Jordan vs. Israel	resources	1945	•	1
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)	Fatah al-Islam vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↗	3
Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	system/ideology, national power	1975	↘	2
Lebanon - Israel (water)*	Lebanon vs. Israel	resources	2001	•	1
Libya - USA*	Libya vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1964	•	1
Mauritania (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Morocco (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	2
Morocco (POLISARIO Front/Western Sahara)	POLISARIO Front vs. government	secession	1975	↗	3
Morocco - Algeria*	Morocco vs. Algeria	territory, international power	1963	•	1

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Morocco - Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	1956	•	1
Morocco - Spain (Parsley Island)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	2002	•	1
Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	regional predominance	2009	•	4
Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	↘	2
Saudi Arabia (reformers)*	reformers vs. government	system/ideology	2001	•	1
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)*	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	↘	2
Syria - Israel	Syria vs. Israel	territory, system/ideology, international power, other	1967	•	2
Syria - Lebanon*	Syria vs. Lebanon	international power	1976	•	1
Syria - USA*	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	•	2
Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)	PKK/KONGRA-GEL vs. government	autonomy	1920	•	4
Turkey - Iraq*	Turkey vs. Iraq	international power	1979	•	1
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance	2004	↘	4
Yemen (AQAP)	AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	↗	4
Yemen (SMM/South Yemen)	SMM vs. government	secession	2009	•	3

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads - Hazara)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the Kuchi nomads, who are Sunni Pashtuns, and the Shiite Hazara, which mainly took place in the Maydan Wardak province near Kabul escalated. The Kuchi nomads claimed historic grazing rights in the settlement areas of the Hazara people. On May 16, armed Kuchi nomads broke into the Day Mirdad and Behsud districts, leading to heavy clashes between Kuchi nomads and Hazara residents, which lasted for several days. Government sources reported five Hazara killed, between 30 and 50 people injured, several houses burnt down, and hundreds of families displaced. Mohammad Mohaqqueq, leader of the Hazara party Hezbe Wahdat, claimed 1,000 Kuchi nomads had burned dozens of Hazara houses in Day Mirdad district, displacing 3,500 families in the first night of fighting alone. After the parliamentary pro-Hazara opposition had threatened to boycott the Peace Jirga (→ Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)), second vice president Mohammed Karim Khalili, an ethnic Hazara, declared on May 31, that any former decrees guaranteeing grazing land to the Kuchi nomads were not valid. On August 13, violent clashes between Hazara and Kuchi people broke out again in the capital of Kabul. Reportedly, violence started after Hazara and Kuchi people had laid claim to the same piece of state-owned land. According to the police, ten police officers and nine civilians were injured, ten houses and 15 tents damaged, and two police checkpoints set on fire. However, a Kuchi representative claimed 245 houses and tents were destroyed and 350 head of cattle belonging to the Kuchi killed, whereas Hazara sources reported six Hazara killed and another 15 injured. (mku)

Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)

Intensity: 5	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG, various militant groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The war concerning national power and the orientation of the political system between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and various insurgent groups, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, on the other, continued. More than 689 international troops were killed after 12/01/09. According to UN figures, the number of civilian fatalities had risen by 31 percent to 1,271 by July, 76 percent of which had been caused by anti-government forces. For example, on January 18, twenty Taliban raided government buildings and malls in the city of Kabul, killing five people and injuring 71. On February 26, the Taliban carried out another attack in Kabul, killing 17 people and injuring 30. On March 14, four Taliban suicide bombers killed approx. 35 people and wounded 57 in the city of Kandahar. On May 18, a Taliban suicide bomber attacked a NATO convoy in Kabul, killing 18 people and injuring 52. On June 9, a suicide bomber killed 40 people and injured approx. 70 in Helmand province. In August, suspected Taliban members shot dead eight foreign aid workers and two Afghans in Badakhshan province and kidnapped ten people in Herat province. Five of them were released, five others were found dead on August 29. Additionally, militants conducted various attacks against political and military targets. On 12/30/09, a Jordanian double agent, with ties to al-Qaeda as well as the Haqqani network, killed seven CIA operatives in a suicide attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman near the city of Khost.

On April 27, the HIG fired a missile at a ministry building in Kabul. On May 19, suspected Taliban militants attacked Bagram Airfield in Parwan province; coalition soldiers killed ten militants. On June 30, NATO forces killed eight Taliban fighters who were trying to raid an air base outside Jalalabad. On August 26, more than ten militants killed eight police officers at a checkpoint near the city of Kunduz. Two days later, some 30 Taliban fighters assaulted two coalition bases in Khost province. Coalition troops killed 24 militants and detained five. According to UN sources, militants assassinated an average of 21 people every week in 2010. On February 22, a suicide bomber killed a tribal leader and 14 others in Nangarhar province. On April 20, Taliban gunmen assassinated the deputy mayor of the city of Kandahar. On August 30, a suspected Taliban car bomb killed the governor of Nangarhar province. In the course of the parliamentary elections on September 18, 25 people were killed including eleven members of the Independent Election Commission and twelve people abducted, among them two candidates. On September 28, a suicide bomber killed the deputy governor of Ghazni and five others. The governor of Kunduz and about 20 worshippers were killed in a bomb attack on a mosque in Takhar province by unknown militants on October 8. NATO launched several large-scale operations. In a shift of strategy, coalition troops primarily targeted key areas instead of broad regions with military strikes. In mid-December 2009, 1,100 French, Afghan, and US troops conducted Operation Septentrion in the Uzbun valley in Kabul province in order to restore government control. On February 13, 15,000 international troops commenced the large-scale offensive Operation Moshtarak in Helmand province. More than 120 Taliban and twelve NATO soldiers were killed and at least 56 militants detained within the first days of the offensive. On September 15, coalition troops started the large-scale Operation Hamkari in three districts near the city of Kandahar. Furthermore, US forces launched numerous targeted attacks on high-ranking Taliban. Between August and October alone, 235 Taliban commanders were killed according to the commander of ISAF and US Forces in Afghanistan, David Petraeus. Additionally, the US rapidly increased the frequency of strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistani territory [→ USA - Pakistan], killing a large number of both militants as well as civilians throughout the year. At the International Conference on Afghanistan in London on January 28, more than 70 countries and international organizations decided on the gradual transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to Afghan forces, a simultaneous surge in the military and civilian engagement, and the reintegration of Taliban fighters. Members of the main militant groups and the government held three unofficial meetings on the Maldives in January, May and November. In March, a HIG delegation presented a peace plan to parliament and government representatives in Kabul. According to regional police sources, several HIG commanders and fighters defected to the government on March 7. Earlier, some HIG commanders and fighters had surrendered weapons to the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups program. On June

2, about 1,600 delegates met in Kabul to hold the national Peace Jirga, which was boycotted by the Taliban and the HIG. Additionally, in an attempted Taliban attack on the Jirga, two militants were killed by security forces. President Hamid Karzai met Sarajoddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network, on June 27. In early September, Karzai formed the High Peace Council in order to hold peace talks with militant groups. On October 15, NATO announced that it granted safe passage to at least one Taliban delegate in order to facilitate peace talks between the government and the Taliban in Kabul. At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon on November 20, the heads of the member states agreed to gradually withdraw all combat troops by 2014. At the same time, NATO assured its commitment to remain in Afghanistan and continue to train the Afghan National Army beyond 2014. (et, mku)

Algeria (AQIM)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	AQIM vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The crisis between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Algeria over national power and the orientation of the political system continued on a violent level. Algerian forces clashed with militants on a nearly daily basis, resulting in numerous arrests and multiple deaths on both sides. On January 9, security forces killed ten militants in a clash southeast of Algiers, the capital, which, together with the previous weeks', amounted to a total of 30 deaths. On February 2, police killed seven militants in Djelfa. Security forces shot dead another three in Tizi Ouzou, northern Algeria, at the end of March. On April 21, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger set up joint command headquarters in Tamanrasset, southern Algeria, to fight AQIM in the Sahara desert region cooperatively [→ Mali (AQIM), Mauritania (AQIM), Niger (AQIM)]. In mid-May, security forces killed three militants in the northern region of Jijel, and the army launched airstrikes against AQIM bases near Bejaia, northern Algeria. On May 25, a senior AQIM leader surrendered to security forces in Algiers following a governmental punishment mitigation offer. South of Algiers, a suicide bombing left at least nine people dead on June 11. Subsequently, police officers shot dead two suspected militants. In this year's deadliest attack, AQIM fighters ambushed paramilitary police near the Malian border in late June. Eleven paramilitaries were killed, and another two taken hostage, one of whom was killed later. Throughout June, security forces killed 17 AQIM militants in various raids. A suicide bombing in Tizimar left four police officers dead and injured at least 17 on June 10. AQIM bombings left seven security personnel dead. Police killed three militants in July. On August 29, police officers killed eight members of AQIM in the Kabylie region. A suicide attack and a bombing left at least four policemen dead in September. On October 3, AQIM fighters killed five and injured ten security personnel in an attack on a convoy in Tizi Ouzou. On November 1, security forces thwarted an AQIM attack planned for the national holiday. Police arrested an AQIM recruiter in Algiers on November 7. The

next day, the army killed four militants and a local AQIM emir in Boukehil and Boumerdes province. On November 15, militants abducted one civilian and injured another near Azazga, Tizi Ouzou. Throughout the year, several roadside bombings left at least ten civilians and eight security personnel dead and injured many. Algeria announced plans to arm civilians in order to support the fight against AQIM. (ak)

Bahrain (Shiite opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	Shiite opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The crisis over national power between the Shiite opposition and the Sunni government in the predominantly Shiite country continued. In March, Shiite protesters staged several demonstrations. On March 14, police shot and wounded an anti-government demonstrator in the city of Karzakan, while a large number of protesters threw Molotov cocktails at the police and set police cars on fire. On August 13, the authorities arrested four senior Shiite activists, among them Abduljalil al-Singace, a senior-leader of the Shiite opposition Haqq movement, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections on October 23. On August 18, several other opposition activists as well as clerics were arrested. Subsequently, Shiite protesters frequently clashed with police forces in the capital of Manama. Authorities detained up to 250 people. On September 4, the government arrested 21 Shiite opposition leaders and clerics on charges of plotting to overthrow the Sunni monarchy. Another two Shiite leaders, among them Hassan Mushaimaa, Secretary-General of the Haqq movement, were charged in absentia with plotting terrorist acts. Reportedly, the detainees were tortured. Another wave of clashes between police and Shiite rioters setting cars on fire and throwing petrol bombs at the police followed the arrests. On September 6, the government decided to reassert state control over the kingdom's mosques. Unknown assailants set off an explosion in Manama on September 14, damaging several cars. Six days later, authorities revoked the citizenship of two senior Shiite leaders, among them senior cleric Ayatollah Hussein al-Najati. On October 23, the Shiite opposition won 18 out of 20 seats open to contestation in the elections for the lower house. The opposition accused the government of irregularities, an allegation the latter denied. Authorities opened the trial against the 23 political activists and clerics on charges of forming an illegal organization, resorting to terrorism, financing terrorist activities, and spreading false information on October 28. (hb)

Egypt (Bedouin groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Bedouin groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	other	

The conflict between Bedouin groups and the government in the Sinai Peninsula escalated to the level of a crisis. In previous years, Bedouin groups had repeatedly staged large-scale demonstrations, protesting against

discrimination, unequal allocation of resources, and mistreatment at the hands of security forces. One protester was killed and several others injured in violent clashes with the police in these demonstrations. The relationship deteriorated between 2004 and 2006 when, in the aftermath of a series of bomb attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, up to 5,000 Bedouins were arrested and detained without trial. In February, Bedouin tribesmen attacked a police convoy in order to free their imprisoned leader Salim Lafy. In the subsequent clashes, two police officers were killed. On June 27, Bedouins tried to blow up a natural gas pipeline close to the Egyptian-Israeli border. Previously, they had threatened to attack infrastructure if police kept raiding their homes and villages. On June 29, Interior Minister Habib al-Adly met with Bedouin elders and promised to release detainees. About 70 were eventually set free but an estimated 400 remained in custody. On July 19, Bedouin activist Mosaad Abu Fagr was released after three years in prison without a trial. On September 13, a court in the city of al-Arish in northern Sinai sentenced seven Bedouins to life imprisonment for their involvement in the February attack in absentia.

(vs)

Egypt (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1977
Conflict parties:	Muslim Brothers, secular opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power and system conflict between the opposition, consisting of secular opposition groups as well as the Muslim Brothers, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. On February 19, more than 1,000 people gathered at Cairo International Airport to welcome Mohammed ElBaradei, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and possible challenger to President Hosni Mubarak in the presidential elections scheduled for 2011. Five days after his arrival, ElBaradei established the National Front of Change. This political movement was supported by several oppositional parties, including representatives from the protest movements Kefaya, Sixth of April, and the Ghad party of Ayman Nour, presidential challenger to Mubarak in 2005, as well as the Muslim Brothers. After organizing a rally for ElBaradei on March 7, an oppositional activist was tortured by the police in Fayoum province, sparking large protests in the capital, Cairo, on March 13. On April 6, protesters from various opposition groups demanding an end to the emergency law, which dates back to 1981, clashed with police in Cairo. Ten police officers were injured and at least 93 protesters arrested. In the June 1 upper house elections the ruling National Democratic Party won 80 out of 88 seats. On June 6, police beat to death 28-year old oppositional activist Khaled Said in Alexandria for publicly accusing the government of corruption. Subsequently, protesters staged large-scale demonstrations. A demonstration with 3,000 participants in Alexandria on June 25 was joined by ElBaradei. In October, at least 214 Muslim Brothers were arrested across Egypt in the run-up to November's parliamentary elections. On November 4,

another 50 were prohibited from running for parliament. On November 1, ElBaradei announced that he would drop out of next year's presidential race and called for an overall boycott of the 2011 elections. Whereas Nour's al-Ghad party had already announced to boycott the parliamentary elections in September, the Muslim Brothers eventually decided to run on November 28 after a series of internal discussions over the strategic direction of the Muslim Brothers. In mid-October, the Egyptian government tightened its media control, e.g. by limiting all live broadcasts to state television. On November 20, demonstrators clashed with police forces across Egypt. In Alexandria, 33 people were injured as demonstrators threw rocks at security forces. Meanwhile, police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesting Muslim Brothers in Cairo and arrested more than 250. After the parliamentary elections on November 28, the Muslim Brothers, who had won a fifth of the seats in 2005, stated they had not won a single seat in the first round due to government fraud. Reportedly, police had prevented a large number of voters from entering the polling stations. State-owned media confirmed that the ruling National Democratic Party was ahead in almost all areas and that the Muslim Brothers had suffered significant losses compared to 2005. Meanwhile, on the day of the election, fierce clashes broke out between protesters and police in several cities in the Nile Delta as well as in Qena, 500 kilometers south of Cairo. Human rights groups claimed that security forces had killed at least eight people by November 30. (vs)

Iran (Jundallah/Sistan-Balochistan)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Jundallah vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology	

The conflict in the Sistan and Balochistan Province concerning autonomy and ideology between the Sunni Balochis, organized in the Iranian Army of God (Jundallah) aka the People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), and the Shiite government continued. On 12/16/2009, authorities arrested a number of Jundallah members in connection with the bomb attack in the southeastern city of Zahedan on 10/18/2009. In early February, Pakistani security forces arrested several Jundallah members [→ Pakistan (BLA et al./Balochistan)] and handed them over to Iran. On February 23, the government announced the arrest of Abdolmalek Rigi, leader of Jundallah. While arab media reported that Rigi had been arrested in a Pakistani hospital and subsequently extradited, government sources claimed Rigi had been on a plane from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan at the time of his arrest. Subsequently, Iran accused the US of supporting Jundallah and televised an interview with Rigi in which he stated that he had received US military support and had been at a US base in Afghanistan prior to his arrest. The US immediately rejected these accusations. According to sources close to the Iranian government, a former US intelligence official had admitted that CIA operatives in Pakistan had held talks with Rigi. On March 18, security forces killed several Jundallah members as they were trying to en-

ter Iran from Pakistan according to similar sources. On June 20, Abdolmalek Rigi was hanged. His brother Abdolhamid Rigi had been executed in May. In retaliation, Jundallah conducted two separate bomb attacks on a Shiite mosque in Zahedan on July 15. At least 21 people died and over 100 hundred were injured. On July 24 and October 26, a number of Jundallah members were arrested in connection with the attacks. In September, five soldiers and a civilian were kidnapped in Sistan-Balochistan. After the military freed the hostages, it stated Jundallah had conducted the kidnapping. One hostage and one kidnapper were killed in the operation. (ptr)

Iran (opposition)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1993
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The crisis over national power between the opposition and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained violent. Throughout the year, the opposition continued to protest against the results of the presidential elections in 2009. In the course of the protests, security forces killed at least eight demonstrators and detained more than 450. Additionally, the government continued repressions against opposition leaders, such as travel bans and seizures of offices. In December, the death of Iran's most senior dissident cleric, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, sparked the most serious outbreak of violence since the election protests in June. On 12/27/09, police shot dead five protesters in the capital, Tehran. The opposition claimed that security forces killed eight people in Tehran and other cities across the country when tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets. Among the dead was opposition leader Mir Hussein Mousavi's nephew. Nevertheless, on December 30, more than 100,000 people participated in pro-government rallies across the country. In the protests, police arrested three senior advisors to opposition leader Mousavi. On January 28, two oppositional protesters were executed for their involvement in the 2009 protests. In the two weeks preceding the anniversary of the Islamic revolution, ten journalists were arrested, raising the total number of detained journalists to at least 55 according to oppositional websites. On February 11, police clashed with oppositional protesters in Tehran and arrested dozens. The paramilitary Basij militia, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, attacked opposition leaders Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi with batons. Prior to the anniversary of the 2009 presidential elections on June 12, Mousavi and Karroubi cancelled all opposition rallies, stating they feared for people's lives in a potential crackdown by security forces. Only isolated protests followed. On September 17, security forces that had been deployed around Mousavi's office for several weeks raided his office and arrested a senior aide of his. Earlier in September, pro-government protesters had attacked the home of Karroubi with homemade bombs and had beaten one of his bodyguards unconscious. (ptr)

Iran (PJAK/Kurdish areas)

Intensity: 3	Change: ▾	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	PJAK vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran between the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government deescalated. PJAK was considered an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) [→ Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)]. On January 19, PJAK militants shot dead the provincial prosecutor in the city of Khoy. Subsequently, at least three people were arrested. A week later, security forces clashed with a PJAK group, killing several of its members, and arresting another militant in relation with the shooting in Khoy. On April 20, security forces arrested members of an alleged PJAK cell. Between April 21 and May 5, at least eight PJAK fighters and three members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were killed in separate clashes. On May 9, the government executed five members of the PJAK who had been convicted of launching bomb attacks. A few days later, two PJAK members were killed by Iranian security forces at the Iraqi border. A shellfire attack in late May killed four more PJAK members in the western Kermanshah province. In early June, Iranian ground troops allegedly entered Iraqi territory in pursuit of Kurdish fighters. On June 8 the Kurdish Regional Government of northern Iraq sought support from the national government in Baghdad, claiming that more than 300 people had been displaced by the Iranian attacks. However, Iran denied any accusations of military actions in northern Iraq. In separate clashes in late August, five PJAK militants and five IRGC members were killed. In September, twelve people were killed and more than 70 injured when a bomb exploded amidst a crowd attending a military parade in the northwestern city of Mahabad. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. However, the IRGC claimed to have arrested and killed 30 PJAK members allegedly connected to the attack. In October, five Iranians, including four members of security forces, were killed and nine injured when PJAK gunmen opened fire on a police patrol in Iran's Kurdistan province. (ptr)

Iran - Israel

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The system and power conflict between Iran and Israel remained manifest. On January 12, a bomb killed an Iranian nuclear scientist in Tehran. Iran accused the Israel and the US of being responsible for the attack [→ Iran - USA, EU-3]. On 12/16/2009 and February 3, Iran tested medium-range missiles capable of reaching Israel. On January 6, Israel announced that tests of its short-range missile-defense system had been successful. On February 21, Israel introduced a fleet of surveillance drones capable of flying as far as the Persian Gulf, and launched a military surveillance satellite on June 23. On April 18, when Iran's military displayed a range of domestically-built drones and missiles at its annual army

parade, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that Israel was on its way to collapse. On April 30, Iran vowed to retaliate if Israel attacked Syria [→ Syria - Israel]. On May 10, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon answered that Israel was prepared to wage war on Iran. On August 17, Iran announced Israel's existence would be in danger if Israel realized its threat to attack Iran's nuclear power plant in Bushehr. On August 22, Iran introduced its first domestically built unmanned bomber. During his official visit to Lebanon on October 13, Ahmadinejad assured that Iran would defend Lebanon against any Israeli aggression [→ Israel - Lebanon]. On October 25, Israel commissioned a report on how to prepare for a nuclear-armed Iran. On October 28, Nigeria intercepted a ship carrying 13 containers of weapons from Iran, intended for Hamas [→ Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)] according to Israeli sources. (mst, tse)

Iran - USA, EU-3

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. USA, EU-3	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The conflict between Iran, on the one hand, and the US as well as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (EU-3), on the other, centering on Iran's nuclear program continued. Iran claimed to be enriching uranium for civil purposes only, whereas the US and EU-3 suspected Iran's program of possibly having a military intent. On February 9, Iran began enriching parts of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile to the 20 percent level, one day after officially notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intent to do so. On April 13, at a two-day nuclear security summit, US President Barack Obama pressed for a further tightening of sanctions on Iran. The summit participants agreed to take action against the proliferation of nuclear material to non-state actors like al-Qaeda. On May 17, Iran, Turkey and Brazil signed a common declaration laying out the terms of a nuclear fuel swap deal. According to the agreement, Iran would ship 1,200 kilogram of 3.5 percent LEU to Turkey and in exchange receive a corresponding amount of 20 percent LEU in fuel rods for the Tehran research reactor. The conditions of the agreement resembled those of an October 2009 proposal by the US and the EU-3, which Iran had consented to at first but then refused to implement. However, in late May, the US and the EU-3 rejected the recent swap deal as a new IAEA report revealed that Iran had in the meantime amassed nearly twice as much LEU as it had agreed to ship abroad. On June 9, the UN Security Council (UN-SC) passed a fourth set of sanctions tightening financial and trade restrictions against Iran. The sanctions mainly targeted the Revolutionary Guards by freezing their assets and banning the export of weapons to Iran. In July, both the US and the EU imposed additional unilateral sanctions aimed at Iran's energy sector as well as major banks and transportation companies. In reaction to the UN sanctions, on June 21, Iran barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country, after it had already denied another two inspectors entry earlier this year. On July 13, Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri, who Iran claimed had

been abducted by the US Central Intelligence Agency the previous year, sought refuge in the Iranian interest section of the Pakistani embassy in Washington. The US rejected the accusations and declared that Amiri had been staying in the US voluntarily and that he was free to leave the country. Amiri returned to Iran the following day. On August 21, Iran inaugurated its first nuclear power plant in Bushehr. However, the loading of fuel into the core of the plant was delayed until October 26, after an attack by a computer worm had caused technical problems. Iran claimed the worm was an act of sabotage by Western governments. In late October, after EU mediation efforts, Iran agreed to participate in talks with the five UN-SC members plus Germany for the first time in more than a year. Although Iran initially stated that the nuclear program would not form part of the discussions, an agreement was reached in mid-November to hold comprehensive nuclear talks on December 5. After the bomb attacks on two Iranian nuclear scientists on November 29, Iran blamed the US as well as Israel for the attacks. (nr)

Iraq (AQI, ISI)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	AQI, ISI vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The severe crisis over national power and ideology between Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its affiliate Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), on the one hand, and the government, supported by US forces, continued unabatedly. Government forces and their supporters detained several high-ranking AQI members. On January 17, eleven AQI members who had participated in the bombing of two ministries in August 2009 were sentenced to death. On February 13, Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISI, threatened to prevent the March 7 elections by violent means in order to avert a Shia dominated government. In spite of the warning the elections were held with a voter turnout of 62 percent. On the day of the election, 38 people were killed. The government accused AQI of being responsible for most of the killings. On April 4, the ISI carried out assaults on the Iranian, Egyptian, Spanish, and German embassies, killing 41 people and wounding more than 200. ISI leader Al-Baghdadi and AQI leader Abu Ajjub al-Masri died in a joint Iraqi-US operation in the province of Anbar on April 18. ISI gunmen and suicide bombers attacked the central bank in the capital, Baghdad, on June 13. In the following shoot-out with security forces, 15 people were killed. AQI and ISI suicide bombers killed at least 57 recruits and soldiers in an attack on an army recruitment center in Baghdad on August 17. Furthermore, AQI and related organizations targeted the Awakening Councils, pro-government militias consisting of militants who had switched sides in 2005. On 12/29/09, an AQI-related group killed four members of an Awakening Council in al-Karmah. On April 3, Iraqi officials stated that AQI was responsible for the killing of 25 people, most of whom were members of the Awakening Councils, in an attack on a village near Baghdad. A suicide bomber killed 43 people and wounded 41 on July 18 by blowing himself up amidst

Awakening Council militias waiting to receive their salary. AQI and ISI also attacked civilian institutions. Three ISI suicide bombers killed at least 36 people and wounded another 70 in attacks on three hotels in central Baghdad on January 25. In an AQI assault on an Al-Arabiya television office on July 26, at least four people were killed and another 20 wounded. AQI announced it was going to conduct attacks on broadcasting stations they considered to be cooperating with the US. On November 1, ISI and AQI militants took hostages in a Christian Church in Baghdad. After Iraqi security forces raided the church, at least 52 people were killed and another 67 injured. Two days later, ISI declared that violence against Christians was legitimate and announced to commit further assaults against them. (val)

Iraq (militant groups)

Intensity: 5	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Sunni militant groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between various militant groups, on the one hand, and the government, supported by US forces, on the other, continued. Some 3,500 civilian deaths were reportedly caused by militants throughout the year. According to Iraqi and US officials the ambiguous political situation following the March 7 parliamentary elections contributed to the violence. The exclusion of the Baath party of former Sunni President Saddam Hussein from the elections sparked numerous protests. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused the Baathists of having links to Sunni militant groups. As the elections did not produce a clear majority, no stable government could be formed for several months. In late November, President Jalal Talabani asked al-Maliki to form a government, urging him to include representatives of all major ethnicities and confessions in order to ease tensions between those groups. Iraqi and US officials suspected different Sunni militant groups of having carried out attacks against Shiites throughout the year in order to ignite ethnic tensions and destabilize the country. On 12/08/09, in one of the year's deadliest attacks, several car bombs exploded in the center of the capital, Baghdad, killing at least 127 people and wounding 448. The government blamed Sunni militant groups. On February 1, a female suicide bomber blew herself up among Shiites on their pilgrimage to the holy city of Kerbala in central Iraq, leaving at least 41 people dead and 106 wounded. Two days later, a bomb attack killed more than 20 pilgrims as they streamed into the city. On February 5, two car bombs claimed the lives of at least 40 Shiite pilgrims and wounded 145 in Kerbala. At least 56 people were killed when 13 bomb blasts hit different parts of Baghdad on April 23, predominantly near Shiite mosques and marketplaces. On May 10, two suicide car bombers killed at least 35 people and wounded 136 in an assault on a textile factory in Hilla, 100 kilometers south of Baghdad. The government accused al-Qaeda-related Sunni militant groups of being responsible [→ Iraq (AQI)]. On August 7, three explosions at a market in Basra, southern Iraq, left at least 45 civilians dead. A suicide bomber

blew himself up in a café mainly frequented by Shiites on October 29, killing at least 22 civilians and wounding 60. On November 2, militants launched a series of coordinated attacks, targeting mainly Shiite areas of Baghdad's Green Zone, employing mortars and conducting car and roadside bombings. 84 people were killed and another 380 wounded. Official sources were conflicting as to the perpetrators. (val)

Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)

Intensity: 2	Change: 	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The system and regional predominance conflict between the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian territories deescalated. On 12/22/09, security forces of the al-Fatah-dominated Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the West Bank arrested 14 members of Hamas to prevent anti-Fatah rallies against a possible prisoners exchange between Israel and Hamas. On 12/31/09, Hamas police in the Gaza Strip arrested several al-Fatah members allegedly involved in an Israeli plan to determine the location of the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. In early January, leaders from al-Fatah and Hamas separately met Saudi officials in the Saudi capital of Riyadh to talk about a possible reconciliation of the two groups. On February 4, a senior member of al-Fatah visited the Gaza Strip to talk about the stalled reconciliation efforts with Hamas officials. At the end of March, PNA military courts in the West Bank sentenced Hamas supporters to prison. On March 31, Hamas security forces seized USD 400,000 in cash from a bank in the Gaza Strip shortly after the PNA had announced it would freeze these assets. On May 2, PNA security forces prevented Hamas from holding a rally in the West Bank town al-Ram. On May 25, Hamas officials announced the boycott of the municipal elections in the West Bank scheduled by the PNA for July. Subsequently, PNA security forces arrested at least 20 Hamas officials and supporters in the West Bank. On June 10, the PNA indefinitely postponed the elections. Three days later, Hamas rejected an offer by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to hold talks aimed at ending the power struggle between the rival parties. On July 4, Hamas security forces took dozens of al-Fatah activists in the Gaza Strip into custody. In response, PNA security forces in the West Bank arrested dozens of relatives of senior Hamas figures on August 3. On August 23, Hamas postponed a meeting with al-Fatah indefinitely due to PNA's decision to start direct talks with Israel. However, on September 25, the conflict parties agreed to renew negotiations for a potential unity government, mediated by Egypt. Following the killing of four Jewish settlers near the West Bank city of Hebron by Hamas [→ Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)], PNA police forces detained more than 550 Hamas members in early September. Hamas strongly opposed the plans to extradite six of said detainees to Israel. (hl)

Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)

Intensity: 4	Change: 	Start: 1988
Conflict parties:	Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PRC vs. Israeli government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The conflict between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), and other militant groups, on the one hand, and the Israeli government, on the other, concerning the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state deescalated but remained highly violent. According to Israeli military sources, militant Palestinian groups fired at least 165 mortar bombs and rockets out of the Gaza Strip at Israel throughout the year, although Hamas had announced it would stop such attacks. On 12/26/09, two Hamas officials were killed in a bomb blast in a southern suburb of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, after they had met with representatives of Hezbollah. Both groups accused the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad of being responsible for the incident. On January 2 and 9, Israeli forces launched a series of air strikes and tank attacks on the Gaza Strip, killing three Palestinians and wounding several. Prior to the attacks, PRC and another militant group had fired a number of Kassam rockets and mortar bombs at Israel out of the Gaza Strip. In January, through German mediation, Israel proposed a prisoners exchange to Hamas. Hundreds of militants, some of whom were allegedly responsible for the killing of Israelis, were to be exchanged for Gilad Shalit, a soldier kidnapped in 2006. On January 20, the Mossad allegedly killed Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a senior Hamas military commander, in a hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The Israeli government declined to comment on this incident. In retaliation for the killing of al-Mabhouh, militants of PRC, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Brigades sent a barrage of floating barrels filled with explosives toward Israel's beaches on February 2. On March 26, four PRC and Islamic Jihad militants as well as two Israeli soldiers were killed in clashes at the Gaza Strip border. These clashes accounted for the most severe incident since the end of the Israeli "Operation Cast Lead" in early 2009. On April 6, Islamic Jihad and other small militant groups joined Hamas in its decision to stop rocket attacks against Israel. One week later, Israeli gunships and tanks clashed with Islamic Jihad militants in the central Gaza Strip, killing a militant and wounding three. On May 22, Israeli troops killed two members of Islamic Jihad who had entered Israel territory from the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces intercepted the so-called Gaza flotilla on May 31. The six ships with political activists from 37 different countries tried to break through the Israeli Gaza blockade and to deliver relief goods. Israeli commandoes killed nine activists when they took over the Turkish passenger ship Mavi Marmara. The action prompted harsh international reactions and sparked a severe diplomatic crisis with Turkey. Amidst ongoing international criticism, Israel announced an ease on its Gaza blockade in June. On June 1, Israeli forces killed three Islamic Jihad members and two other Palestinian militants along the Gaza border. On August 2, Islamic Jihad announced it would resume suicide attacks after Israeli aircraft had attacked

their positions in the Gaza Strip. In early September, Hamas militants killed four Israeli residents in an ambush near the West Bank city of Hebron. In October, Israeli forces killed three Hamas militants in Hebron. In November, Israeli fighter jets killed the leader and two members of the Salafist group Army of Islam in two air strikes in Gaza city. Israel planned to install a short-range missile interceptor system on its border to the Gaza Strip by the end of the year. (hl)

Israel (Hezbollah)

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1982
Conflict parties:	Hezbollah vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict concerning ideology between Israel and Hezbollah operating from Lebanese territory continued. Throughout the year, Hezbollah stated its readiness to repel any Israeli attack, whereas Israel repeatedly accused Hezbollah of military activities in southern Lebanon. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) detected a large number of explosive charges containing at least 300 kilograms of explosives near the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israeli sources accused Hezbollah of positioning the devices. Furthermore, the Israeli government accused Hezbollah of storing some 40,000 rockets, among them Scud missiles, which gave Hezbollah the ability to attack every point in Israel. On January 6, Israel revealed the plans of the new anti-missile system Iron Dome to protect its population against short-range missile attacks from the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon [→ Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)]. Although the system had successfully been tested in mid-July, no unit had been brought into service by November. On April 6, an Arab Israeli was sentenced to six years in prison for spying on Israeli Army Chief Gabi Ashkenazi for Hezbollah. On April 28, an Egyptian court sentenced four supporters of Hezbollah to lifelong terms and 22 others to minor jail terms for trying to smuggle military hardware into the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Israel started a large-scale civil protection drill on May 23. In mid-October, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the former Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon and met with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah [→ Iran - Israel]. (aw)

Israel (PNA, PLO, et al./Palestine)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 1920
Conflict parties:	PNA, PLO, al-Fatah, PFLP vs. Israeli government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology, resources	

The conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), al-Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), on the one hand, and the Israeli government, on the other, continued. On 12/24/09, members of the militant wing of al-Fatah, the al-Aqsa Brigades, shot dead a resident of a Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Israeli forces killed three al-Aqsa militants allegedly responsible in the West Bank city of Nablus two days later. On

February 2, the al-Aqsa Brigades, alongside other militant groups, sent a barrage of floating barrels filled with explosives from the Gaza Strip towards Israel's beaches. On March 9, Israel authorized the building of 1,600 new housing units in East Jerusalem. Ten days later, the al-Aqsa Brigades and other smaller militant groups claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip that killed a Thai farm worker near Ashkelon. Israeli F-16 aircraft and Apache attack helicopters conducted at least ten retaliatory strikes against targets in the Gaza Strip. On March 19, Israeli forces killed two Palestinian teenagers in violent clashes in the West Bank town of Iraq Burin. One day later, Israeli soldiers shot dead two Palestinians who had allegedly tried to stab an Israeli soldier near Nablus. On September 24, a Palestinian infant died of tear gas poisoning in a raid by Israeli security forces in the West Bank village of Issawiya. On April 3, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced the PLO's intention of proclaiming a Palestinian state by mid-2011. On May 9, US-mediated proximity talks between Israel and the PNA started after a 17-month stalemate in negotiations. On June 14, unknown gunmen killed a policeman and wounded three others in an attack on a police patrol car near Hebron. The identity of the attackers remained unclear as the Al-Aqsa Brigades and several other smaller Palestinian militant groups claimed responsibility. On September 2, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu started US-brokered talks in Washington. On September 14, Abbas held a second round of talks with the Israeli negotiation team in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh. However, settlement construction resumed after the Israeli settlement freeze had expired on September 26. On November 8, Israel unveiled plans to build further 1,300 housing units in East Jerusalem. Two days later, Abbas called for a UN Security Council meeting on the settlement issue. On November 22, the Israeli parliament passed a law requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament or a referendum on any potential land-for-peace deal involving Israeli-occupied land. (iv)

Israel - Lebanon

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 1967
Conflict parties:	Israel vs. Lebanon	
Conflict items:	territory, international power, resources	

The conflict between Israel and Lebanon concerning territory and international power escalated to a crisis. In addition to the disputed land border, the sea border became an issue of contention between the conflict parties when Israel discovered three gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea in 2009. While Israel declared that said gas fields were entirely located on its territory, Lebanon claimed they stretched into its territorial waters. On August 17, the Lebanese Parliament passed a bill in preparation of the exploitation of the gas. Throughout the year, Israeli fighter jets on reconnaissance mission violated the Lebanese airspace several times. In response, Lebanese anti-aircraft units repeatedly fired at the Israeli jets. No damages were reported. On February 10, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri

accused Israel of deliberate aggression and announced that further air space violations would be repelled. On July 13, a Lebanese citizen was sentenced to death on charges of spying for Israel. Another 70 were detained throughout the year for similar allegations. E.g., on July 20, the Lebanese police arrested two employees of a state-owned telecommunication enterprise [→ Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)]. On August 3, Israeli border posts and Lebanese soldiers clashed near the Lebanese town of Adayse when Israelis were cutting down trees next to the border fence. One Israeli officer, at least two Lebanese soldiers as well as one Lebanese journalist were killed in the shoot-out and the subsequent shelling of Lebanese army positions. Two weeks later, UNIFIL commander Alberto Asarta Cuevas held talks with Israeli and Lebanese officers to clarify the borderline. On November 17, Israel decided to withdraw its troops from the northern part of the village of Ghajar, occupied in 2006, in the Lebanese-Israeli-Syrian border triangle. (aw)

Jordan (militant groups)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↑	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	militant groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict between militant Islamist groups and the government escalated to a violent level. On April 22, a rocket that was fired from the Egyptian Sinai peninsula exploded near the city of Aqaba. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. On April 25, the three-year-old daughter of a senior Hamas member was transferred to Jordan from a hospital in the Gaza Strip on request by Jordan's King Abdullah. On August 2, another rocket fired from Sinai exploded in Aqaba killing one person and injuring another four. Although Egypt denied both the Israeli and Jordanian accusations that the missiles had been launched from its soil, Egyptian security sources confirmed on August 4 that the rocket had been fired from Sinai and held Gaza-based militant groups responsible for the attacks. According to Palestinian intelligence, a commander of Hamas' military wing had ordered the rocket attack. However, Hamas denied all involvement in the attack. In August, Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence services announced that the main suspect of the rocket attacks was the radical religious group al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, who also denied the accusations. (in)

Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	Fatah al-Islam vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict between Fatah al-Islam and the government over the orientation of the political system escalated to a violent level. Police and army intelligence services detained several alleged Fatah al-Islam members in early 2010. On May 12, a military court sentenced 31 members of Fatah al-Islam to prison terms of up to 15 years for terrorist activities. On August 14, Abdel Rahman Awad, alleged leader of Fatah al-Islam, and another

member of the movement were killed in a clash with security forces in the town of Chtaura in eastern Lebanon. In what security forces called a retaliatory act by Fatah al-Islam, an army officer and another soldier were killed in the eastern town of Majdal Anjar on October 21. (kv)

Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)

Intensity: 2	Change: ↘	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power and system conflict between the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance deescalated. The March 14 Alliance was led by the Future Movement of Saad al-Hariri, son of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, assassinated in 2005. The March 8 Alliance mainly consisted of Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Amal Movement. In early December, the government approved the right of Hezbollah to keep its weapons in order to deter potential Israeli attacks on Lebanon [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. On 12/10/09, the parliament gave a vote of confidence to Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri by an overwhelming majority. On March 9, the national defense strategy talks concerning the integration of Hezbollah's fighting forces into a coherent national defense strategy were adjourned. In late March, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), established to investigate the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, interrogated several members of Hezbollah. On July 20, two employees of a state-owned telecommunication enterprise suspected of spying for Israel were arrested [→ Israel - Lebanon]. Hezbollah challenged the findings of the STL, claiming that these were based on telecommunications records potentially manipulated by Israel. Members of al-Hariri's Future Movement rejected these assumptions. In late July, the government deployed some 3,000 additional troops to southern Lebanon. On July 30, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz and the Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani visited Lebanon in order to urge the different political parties to refrain from violence. In late October, a crowd forced an STL investigation team to suspend its enquiries in the Hezbollah-controlled Ouzai suburb of Beirut. The March 14 Alliance and the STL condemned the incident, linking it to Hezbollah. The next day, Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah called on the Lebanese people to boycott the STL and not to cooperate with the investigation teams. On November 2, the deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah stated Hezbollah would not refrain from violence if the STL indicted any member of the group. (rl)

Morocco (POLISARIO Front/Western Sahara)

Intensity: 3	Change: ↗	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	POLISARIO Front vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO Front) and the government over the secession of Western Sahara turned violent. On February 11, both sides started

UN-backed talks over the status of Western Sahara, but reached no agreement. On November 8, the conflict escalated when Moroccan forces killed up to eleven civilians and injured approx. 700 in a raid of a protest camp near the Western Sahara territory's capital, Laayoune. Government officials claimed that the incident had left eight security forces dead. Subsequently protests erupted in Laayoune. Authorities arrested up to 160 protesters. POLISARIO claimed some of the arrested remained missing. Morocco barred foreigners and journalists from the Western Sahara territory. On November 16, the UN condemned the November 8 clashes. On the same day, a new round of UN-backed negotiations yielded no results. However, both parties agreed to continue negotiations. (ak)

Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the Shiite Yemeni al-Houthi rebels and the government remained highly violent. Abdul Malik al-Houthi, leader of the al-Houthi rebels, accused Saudi Arabia of assisting the Yemeni government in its fight against the al-Houthi rebels [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. In early December 2009, the Saudi Air Force attacked al-Houthi positions in the foothills of the Jebel al-Rumayh and Jebel al-Dud mountains in Saada province, Yemen, with Apache gunships. Abdul Malik al-Houthi claimed that Saudi combat aircrafts had shelled the Malahidh, Shada and Razez districts in northern Yemen. On 12/05/09, the government of Jordan deployed several hundred Special Forces to the Saudi-Yemeni border to support the Saudi army in their fight against the rebels. Two days later, the rebels prevented the Saudi army from entering the Yemeni province of Saada and claimed to have destroyed three Saudi tanks. On 12/18/09, the rebels attacked the Saudi-Yemeni border with Katyusha rockets. In December 2009, according to the al-Houthi rebels, the Saudi Air Force conducted some 600 air strikes with fighter jets and Apache attack helicopters against rebels' positions in the Saudi-Yemeni border region. The rebels claimed the Saudi air strikes had killed at least 130 civilians and wounded several hundreds on December 20 alone. In early January, the al-Houthi rebels accused the Saudi military of having killed 16 Yemenis in air strikes in the border region. The rebels furthermore stated Saudi Air Force had conducted attacks in the interior of Saada province. The Saudi government claimed to have killed hundreds of rebels, while the number of Saudi soldiers killed in the clashes since November 2009 amounted to at least 113 by late January. On January 12, renewed fighting between the al-Houthi rebels and Saudi troops erupted when Saudi soldiers tried to recapture a border post seized by the rebels. Four soldiers died. In late January, Abdul Malik al-Houthi offered Saudi Arabia a truce and the withdrawal from the kingdom's territory. On January 26, the rebels stated they had completed their retreat from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Assistant Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan rejected this,

claiming the rebels had been forced out. He linked a potential truce to the release of six Saudi soldiers held captive by the rebels. In addition, he demanded that the al-Houthi rebels allow the Yemeni government to monitor the Saudi-Yemeni border. In early February, the Saudi military employed artillery against the rebels, who claimed that at least 14 people had been killed in the shelling. In February, the rebels released three Saudi soldiers and returned the remains of three others. On April 3, the Saudi government handed over the remains of 32 rebels killed in clashes in the border region. (fhö)

Syria - Israel

Intensity: 2	Change: •	Start: 1967
Conflict parties:	Syria vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	territory, system/ideology, international power, other	

The manifest conflict between Israel and Syria over international power and the territory of the Golan Heights continued. On 12/10/09, the Syrian foreign minister warned that the Israeli bill, stipulating an absolute majority and a referendum for the withdrawal from the annexed territory, would damage the chances for peace. The relationship between the two countries deteriorated after the meeting between Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Damascus on February 25. On March 9 and on May 8, Turkish officials stated that Syria was ready to restart peace talks with Israel mediated by Turkey, adding that Israel had not sent any formal request for mediation. On April 13, the Israeli President Shimon Perez accused Syria of providing Hezbollah with Scud missiles [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. Syria denied the Israeli claim and accused Israel of trying to legitimize a military attack while UNIFIL stated that southern Lebanon was a Scud-free zone. On June 17, al-Assad stated that Israel's raid of the Gaza aid flotilla on May 31 had destabilized the Middle East, adding that a peace agreement with the current Israeli administration was difficult [→ Israel (Hamas et al./Palestine)]. On August 5, Israel detained three men from the Golan Heights and charged them with spying for Syria and attempted kidnapping. On September 29, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim stated that Syria was willing to restart peace talks with Israel if the Israeli government returned the Golan Heights. Israel answered it would not enter any peace talks as long as Syria had preconditions. On November 22, the Israeli parliament passed a law requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament or a referendum on a potential withdrawal from the Golan Heights [→ Israel (PNA, PLO, et al./Palestine)]. (cg)

Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)

Intensity: 4	Change: •	Start: 1920
Conflict parties:	PKK/KONGRA-GEL vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The conflict over autonomy between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) and the government remained highly violent. At least 139 members of the Turkish security forces (TSK) and 202 militants were killed

throughout the year. On 12/07/09, Kurdish militants killed seven soldiers in an attack in the northeastern province of Tokat. On 12/11/09, the constitutional court banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) due to links with the outlawed PKK/KONGRA-GEL. The ban was followed by violent protests all over the country. In March, PKK/KONGRA-GEL intensified its attacks on TSK. Later that month, TSK deployed military personnel to the southeast of the country in order to prepare for operations against PKK/KONGRA-GEL. On April 30, Kurdish militants killed five soldiers and wounded seven in the eastern province of Tunceli. A week later, two soldiers and five militants were killed in a clash in the Daglica area along the Iraqi border. TSK subsequently carried out several airstrikes against PKK/KONGRA-GEL hideouts in northern Iraq, killing dozens of Kurdish militants [→ Turkey - Iraq]. Clashes between security forces and members of PKK/KONGRA-GEL continued throughout May. On May 31, six soldiers were killed when PKK/KONGRA-GEL militants fired rockets at a naval base in the southern city of Iskenderun. On June 4, PKK/KONGRA-GEL announced that they had ended their unilateral ceasefire with Turkey, which had been declared in April 2009. As of mid-June, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL intensified its attacks on TSK. Kurdish militants killed twelve soldiers in attacks in the southeastern province of Hakkari near the Iraqi border on June 19 and 20. Employing gunships, TSK killed at least twelve militants in a retaliatory attack. Subsequently, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed to annihilate PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Two days later, four soldiers and one civilian were killed in a bomb attack on a military bus in Istanbul's Halkali district. In the following weeks, the military launched repeated air raids and two ground incursions against suspected PKK/KONGRA-GEL bases in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. In mid-July, Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul stated that the government planned to build approx. 150 military outposts in the mountainous border region and to create specifically trained army units to combat Kurdish militants. Security forces and Kurdish fighters frequently clashed until mid-August, predominantly in the southeast. On August 14, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL declared a renewed unilateral ceasefire for one month. One week later, seven Kurdish militants and one soldier died in a PKK/KONGRA-GEL attack in Hakkari. Nevertheless, the number of attacks decreased significantly in the following weeks. From mid-September onwards, the government reportedly intensified its diplomatic efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire. On October 12, the parliament extended the TSK mandate to conduct military operations against PKK/KONGRA-GEL hideouts in northern Iraq for another year. From October 21 to 25, the military carried out a broad operation against Kurdish militants in the rural areas of the southeastern provinces Sirnak and Hakkari. On October 31, a suicide bombing in Istanbul wounded 32 people, including 15 police officers. PKK/KONGRA-GEL, however, quickly condemned the attack and extended its unilateral ceasefire until the general elections scheduled for June 2011. (sw)

Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)

Intensity: 4	Change: 	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The conflict between the al-Houthi rebels and the government over the orientation of the political system and regional predominance deescalated, but remained highly violent. The rebels mainly operated in the northern Saada province and in adjacent provinces close to the Saudi-Arabian border. On 12/13/09, the Yemeni military conducted an air strike against the rebel stronghold Bani Maan in the Razez district. The al-Houthi rebels stated that over 70 people were killed and more than 100 injured. In late December 2009, the al-Houthi rebels claimed that the Yemeni military had conducted a massive amount of missile-attacks on two embattled villages in one day alone. On 12/28/09, the government reported it had killed the rebels' leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi alongside with 13 field commanders. The rebels denied this claim. On January 12, government forces started "Operation Blow to the Head" in order to conquer the rebels' stronghold in the old town of Saada. On the first day of fighting, 19 rebels were killed and 25 arrested. The Defense Ministry announced that at least 20 rebels had been killed in an air strike in the Safia area on January 31. Al-Houthi rebels attacked a military supply convoy, killing 15 soldiers in Wadi al-Jabara district on February 5. Another eight soldiers were killed in clashes in Saada city. On February 10, heavy fighting between soldiers and the rebels erupted in the area of Burkat al-Shamsi in Amran province. Twelve soldiers and 24 rebels were killed. One day later, rebels and government reached a ceasefire agreement which was to come into effect on the same day. However, the following day al-Houthi rebels attacked the car of a provincial army commander, killing at least one soldier and one government official. On March 17, the rebels released 178 soldiers and civilians as specified by the ceasefire agreement. In early April, the government released 236 rebels. In late June, the government revealed a newly signed deal with the rebels concerning the implementation of the remaining ceasefire terms. The government released 400 detainees on July 17, most of them al-Houthi rebels. In renewed skirmishes on July 25 in the Amran province, six soldiers were killed. Two days later, ten fighters were killed in heavy clashes when rebels took over the Zuala army base in Harf Sufyan district, capturing at least 70 soldiers. On August 24, the al-Houthi rebels and the government signed a Qatar-brokered deal on the implementation of the February ceasefire agreement in Doha. Despite the ceasefire with the government, fighting between pro-government tribesmen and al-Houthi rebels continued. On April 29, pro-government tribesmen prevented rebels from holding a rally in the northern town of Damaj. Subsequent clashes left three tribesmen and four rebels dead. In renewed fights in early June, the rebels killed five pro-government tribesmen and wounded another nine. On July 20, official sources reported that twelve rebels and 21 tribesmen had been killed when a pro-government tribe had attacked a rebel

stronghold in Amran province. On July 24, the rebels and the Bin Aziz tribe reached a ceasefire agreement, following heavy clashes with up to 70 fatalities in the previous week. However, renewed clashes between the rebels and a pro-government tribe broke out in late October. The UN Refugee Agency stated that at least 250,000 people were displaced internally in the last five years. (fhö)

Yemen (AQAP)

Intensity: 4	Change: ↗	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	AQAP vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), mainly active in the southern and eastern parts of Yemen, and the government turned highly violent. In mid-December 2009, the Yemeni air force killed 34 AQAP fighters in the province of Abyan and in the Arhab district north of Sanaa, the capital. Three senior AQAP leaders were killed in air strikes in December 2009 and January, as AQAP later confirmed. The government intensified its efforts against AQAP due to the organization's involvement in a failed terrorist attack on the US. The government launched a large-scale military campaign against AQAP in January, employing several thousand troops, Special Forces and air force in the southern and eastern provinces. In the course of the campaign, six members of AQAP were killed in an air strike in northern Yemen on January 17. Another 40 AQAP members and an unknown number of civilians were killed throughout February and March. On April 27, an AQAP suicide bomber attempted to kill the British ambassador in Sanaa. On May 25, an airstrike accidentally killed the deputy governor of the Maarib province, who had tried to mediate between the conflict parties. Subsequently, AQAP-affiliated tribesmen clashed with the army and conducted bomb attacks on oil pipelines. In mid-June, AQAP fighters attacked the intelligence headquarters in the city of Aden, killing at least seven security officers and four civilians. On July 14, alleged AQAP members attacked two security buildings in the city of Zanjibar. At least two officers and three of the attackers were killed. From early June to late August, some 30 security forces and at least seven AQAP members were killed and dozens wounded in clashes in the provinces of Maarib, Shabwah, and Lahj. On August 22, government forces sealed off the city of Loder in Abyan province in search for AQAP militants. In the following heavy clashes, at least eleven soldiers, 19 suspected AQAP fighters, and three civilians died. Up to 80,000 civilians were temporarily displaced. In September, government sources reported minor AQAP assaults on security forces leaving at least twelve people dead. On September 23, the military employed fighter jets, main battle tanks, helicopters, and US-trained Special Forces in an attempt to take the supposed AQAP stronghold of al-Hota in the Shabwah province. Four soldiers and five AQAP members were killed, dozens wounded on both sides, and 32 AQAP members arrested. 8,000 residents

were displaced. On October 13, an AQAP commander issued a video message threatening to topple the government. In mid-October, suspected AQAP militants tried to assassinate the provincial governor of Abyan. In a separate bomb attack, the police chief of Abyan was killed. In an attack on a tank column on October 17 and the subsequent air strikes against AQAP hideouts, six militants, four soldiers and four civilians were killed. (db, hm)

Yemen (SMM/South Yemen)

Intensity: 3	Change: •	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	SMM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The crisis between the umbrella organization Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) and the government over the secession of the formerly independent South Yemen continued. Government suspected SMM of cooperating with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [→ Yemen (AQAP); Saudi Arabia (AQAP)]. On 12/04/09, four civilians were killed and 16 protesters as well as soldiers wounded in clashes between pro-secessionist demonstrators and security forces in the city of Ataq in Shabwah province. On January 10, the SMM called for a general strike in the southern provinces of Yemen. On January 24, alleged separatist gunmen attacked an army checkpoint near the city of Ataq, killing three soldiers. A politician affiliated to SMM was shot dead by unknown gunmen in the city of Zanjibar in Abyan province on February 1. In late February, separatists killed at least four police officers. In response, the government arrested some 100 suspects. On February 27, the government declared a state of emergency in Dhale after large-scale demonstrations called for by the former president of South Yemen, Ali Salim al-Beidh. In early March, dozens of people were injured and some 50 arrested in clashes between security forces and separatists in Dhale and Zanjibar. On March 10, President Ali Abdullah Saleh invited secessionist leaders to hold talks. Two days later, mass demonstrations in support of SMM, accompanied by sporadic shootouts, were held in smaller southern cities and also in the northern city of Taiz. In late March, the leading SMM member Ahmad Bamualim was sentenced to ten years in prison. In late April, tens of thousands of demonstrators in principal southern cities demanded the release of detained SMM activists. On May 3, the police shot dead three demonstrators in Dhale. Militants ambushed the convoys of Saleh and the deputy prime minister in Lahj province in mid-May, killing at least two soldiers. The government blamed the attack on separatists. On June 2, the army shelled Dhale, killing seven civilians and injuring 17. Separatists killed four soldiers in the cities of Dhale and Lahj in mid-May. In September and October, at least 15 people were killed and dozens wounded on both sides in various minor assaults on government installations and personnel by separatists. Mass demonstrations in favor of secession were held in Dhale and other southern cities on October 24. (hm)

Methodology

Conflict definition

We define conflicts as the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals.

Conflict items

- Territory
- Secession
- Decolonization
- Autonomy
- System/ideology
- National power
- Regional predominance
- International power
- Resources
- Others

Conflict intensities

State of violence	Intensity group	Level of intensity	Name of intensity	Definition
Non-violent	Low	1	Latent conflict	A positional difference over definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.
		2	Manifest conflict	A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the stage preliminary to violent force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.
Violent	Medium	3	Crisis	A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
	High	4	Severe crisis	A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is used repeatedly in an organized way.
		5	War	A war is a violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.

Guideline

Regions: The HIIK is aware of the ongoing academic debates that pertain to the construct-character of regions in scientific research. Thus, the five research regions employed by the HIIK are not to be construed as entities. They are merely functional constructions as they reflect empirically observable conflict dynamics and linkages between conflicts. In their dynamic aspect, the regions are not rigid in their composition and can change over time with shifting conflict dynamics.

Intensities: In this publication, the intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as severe crises although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

Comparability: The present Conflict Barometer 2010 reflects our current state of research. Because conflict data even of previous years is continuously reviewed, this edition's data might differ from older editions. Therefore, if you wish to trace a conflict over time, please contact us in order to receive up-to-date time series evaluations.

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Database: CONIS

The CONIS database contains all the data the Conflict Barometer is based on. CONIS comprises information on all forms of inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today. It aims with more than 12,000 conflict-year data on comprehending the dynamics of conflict and war. CONIS was developed on the basis of COSIMO in the course of two research projects at the University of Heidelberg co-financed by the European Union and in collaboration with the HIIK. More information on CONIS, containing data on affected countries, conflict parties, conflict items, and annual intensities, can be accessed at conis.uni-hd.de

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